Sources of Mass Partisanship in Brazil

David Samuels

ABSTRACT

Scholars believe that mass partisanship in Brazil is comparatively weak. Using evidence from a 2002 national survey, however, this study finds that the aggregate level of party identification actually falls only slightly below the world average and exceeds levels found in many newer democracies. Yet this finding is misleading, because the distribution of partisanship is skewed toward only one party, the PT. This trend results from a combination of party organization and recruitment efforts and individual motivation to acquire knowledge and become involved in politicized social networks. Partisanship for other parties, however, derives substantially from personalistic attachments to party leaders. This finding has implications for current debates about the status of parties in Brazil. Also important is the impact of the 2005 corruption scandal implicating the PT and President Lula da Silva’s administration.

Partisanship—a psychological attachment to a particular political party—influences voters’ policy stances, their evaluation of the economy, attitudes toward democracy, and electoral behavior. The sources of party identification have therefore long motivated political scientists. This article explores the evolution and sources of individual-level partisanship in contemporary Brazil. Although many scholars have explored the sources of individual vote choice in Brazil (recent examples include Singer 1999; Baker 2002; Carreirão 2002; Carreirão and Kinzo 2002; Almeida 2004; and Baker et al. 2005), little research exists on the sources of mass partisanship. What does exist includes information that is already ten years old or more (Mainwaring 1999), explores only one slice of Brazil’s political spectrum (Mainwaring et al. 2000), or has limited potential generalizability to Brazil’s entire electorate (Kinzo 2005). Considering the substantial scholarly debate about the nature of Brazil’s political parties, the extent of mass partisanship in Brazil merits further exploration.

Brazil is frequently described as a chronic case of “party underdevelopment.” Its party system is highly fragmented; electoral volatility is comparatively high; more than one-third of its sitting legislators change parties during a term; and individualism, clientelism, and personalism, rather than programmatic appeals, dominate electoral campaigns. Mainwaring (1999, 114–19) suggests that mass partisanship in Brazil is both limited and ephemeral, on the basis of immediate political events or personalities; and Power (2000, 28) concludes that “Brazil is an extraor-
inary case of party weakness." The relative paucity of published research on mass partisanship in Brazil perhaps derives from this view.

Figueiredo and Limongi (2000), however, have challenged this view of partisan weakness. They claim that although the party system is fragmented, Brazil’s parties have evolved from an initial and temporary inchoate state and are highly cohesive at present. Yet Figueiredo and Limongi’s argument, along with most of the research about the nature of political parties in contemporary Brazil, concentrates on Brazil’s legislative parties.1 This is a critical element in the study of political parties, but not the only (or even the most important) one.

By exploring the status of mass partisanship in contemporary Brazil, this article builds on existing research and contributes to ongoing debates. First, it compares the established view of weak mass partisanship in Brazil with survey evidence, both over time and cross-nationally. Somewhat surprisingly for the conventional wisdom, it shows that the aggregate level of mass partisanship in Brazil actually falls only slightly below the world average and exceeds levels found in several other newer democracies. This finding, however, does not turn out to support the “strong parties” thesis, because the distribution of partisan preferences has become increasingly skewed over the last ten years toward only one political party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT). No other party counts on a large base of partisan identifiers.2

Second, exploring the factors associated with this distribution of partisan preferences reveals the sources of partisanship in Brazil more comprehensively than does the existing research. For example, Mainwaring et al. (2000) examine only partisanship for Brazil’s conservative parties. Surprisingly, despite the PT’s recent rise to power and despite observers’ belief that the PT is “different” from other Brazilian parties, no research has explored either the mass bases of petismo or the specific factors that differentiate petistas from other Brazilians.2 To accomplish this goal, this research used Brazil’s first-ever postelection National Election Study (CESOP 2003).

The results suggest that the differences across parties in terms of mass partisanship derive from the connection between party recruitment activity, individual motivation to acquire political knowledge, and individual engagement in highly politicized social networks. All three appear to be necessary factors, which explain the relative lack of partisanship for parties other than the PT. That is, non-petista Brazilians might be both engaged in politics and motivated to learn about politics, but only the PT has developed and maintained an organized web of connections to local, regional, and national political and social organizations, such as church groups, neighborhood associations, and unions. Through such networks, like-minded people are politicized about national issues (Meneguello 1989; Keck 1992; Hochstetler 2004; Samuels...
Although partisanship for the PT was initially quite small, by 2002 this activity resulted in the emergence of a relatively deep and wide base of partisan support.

Since early 2005, a corruption scandal involving payoffs to allied legislators and the illegal use of campaign funds by the PT has affected the popularity ratings of Brazil’s current president, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. Given the PT’s longstanding efforts to paint itself as “different” from Brazil’s other parties, moreover, especially in terms of its devotion to the principles of “clean government,” the scandal has caused much speculation about the future of the PT. This study therefore concludes with a discussion of the contrast between the PT and other parties derived from the 2002 survey evidence, and ponders the impact of the 2005 corruption scandal on mass partisanship in the Brazilian electorate.

**THE EXTENT OF PARTISANSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL**

The conventional wisdom holds that mass partisanship in Brazil is weak; but to what extent does this view reflect reality? Figure 1 reveals the total percentage of Brazilians who declared a party preference for any party from 1989 (when national-level surveys began asking this question) through August 2005. The surveys that provided the information asked for a spontaneous response to the question, “What is your preferred party?” The percentage mostly hovers between 40 and 50 percent, and the average is 46 percent.

The most recent measure in the series reveals that about 42.6 percent of the electorate currently has a “preferred” party. Does this degree of mass partisanship confirm or refute the conventional wisdom about Brazil? Given the decline of partisanship in many countries around the world (Clarke and Stewart 1998; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), how does Brazil compare? We now possess a reliable cross-national measure of aggregate mass partisanship from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), a survey module that scholars designed specifically for cross-national application and that has been implemented in dozens of countries’ national election studies, including Brazil’s (following the 2002 elections). The CSES questions on partisanship first ask respondents, “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” If respondents answer yes, the survey then asks, “What party is that?”

Table 1 compares the level of partisanship in Brazil with the other countries that have implemented the CSES questions. Note that because of the different question format, the BNES survey that included the CSES questions is not included in the series of surveys in figure 1. As we should expect, the two-question CSES format returns a slightly lower
level of aggregate partisanship (35 percent) than the one-question format used in the surveys in figure 1 (40 percent for the survey taken at the same time as the BNES). Regardless, we can reasonably assume that the CSES format accurately measures cross-national variation in partisanship, which is what interests us at the moment.

The CSES figure for Brazil falls within one standard deviation of the mean for all countries (S.D. = 14.76), and while most established democracies exhibit relatively higher levels of partisanship (all except the Netherlands and Germany), Brazil compares well with many relatively younger democracies. For example, although Mainwaring and Scully (1995, 19–20) declared Peru and Brazil two of the most “inchoate” party systems in Latin America, mass partisanship (one of the elements of party-system “institutionalization”) is somewhat more widespread in Brazil than in Peru. More surprisingly, Brazil outperforms Chile, an “institutionalized” party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 17) in which the same parties reemerged in 1990 to compete following a 17-year dictatorship. In Brazil, none of the currently competing parties existed before the onset of a 20-year dictatorship in 1964.

According to table 1, the aggregate level of mass partisanship in Brazil appears only slightly lower than average. We might thus conclude that the conventional view exaggerates the comparative weakness of partisan attachments in the Brazilian electorate. However, the aggregate level of partisanship is misleading because it obscures the cross-party distribution of partisan identifiers. Figure 2 disaggregates the evolution of partisan preferences by party for three of Brazil’s largest parties since 1989, using the same surveys as figure 1.
Table 1. CSES Party Identification by Country (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>44.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>13.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>19.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>23.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>26.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>27.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>32.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>33.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>34.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>35.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>35.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>37.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>41.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>44.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSES

Figure 2 provides three pieces of information. First, the proportion of Brazilians expressing a preference for the PT grew more or less consistently from 6 percent in 1989 to 24 percent in late 2004. However, in mid-2005 a corruption scandal cast a dark cloud over the PT and the Lula administration, and PT partisanship declined to 18.5 percent of the electorate by August of that year. Second, the PMDB, the party that inherited power in the 1980s from the military regime, has exhibited a steady decline in partisan identifiers, from 15 percent to about 7 percent of the electorate over the same period. Third, no other party has developed a sizable and consistent base of partisans. No other party averages over 5 percent for this time period, and even Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s PSDB, the most prominent governing party from 1995 to 2002, has hovered near or below 5 percent for the entire period.

Because the BNES data are used here for statistical analysis (as a postelection survey and with better sampling methods, BNES has substantial advantages over the commercial surveys used in figures 1 and 2), the breakdown of partisanship in Brazil in 2002 using the BNES is shown in table 2, as a proportion of all voters and as a proportion of those expressing a party preference. For reference purposes, table 2 also includes the percentage of votes each party received in the 2002 Chamber of Deputies elections.

The BNES data confirm that in 2002, almost two-thirds of Brazilians expressed no partisan preference; about one in four Brazilians
expressed a party preference for the PT; and about one in ten Brazilians expressed a preference for one of Brazil’s many other parties. The distribution of partisan preferences is also clearly skewed relative to the distribution of votes in legislative elections. The PT is the only party that had greater partisan support than vote support in the 2002 legislative elections. The vote totals for all the other parties are several times larger than the number of people who “identify” with those parties. For example, the PFL, PMDB, PTB, and PSDB, four of the larger parties at the center and right of Brazil’s political spectrum, obtained 45.7 percent of the votes in the 2002 legislative elections, yet only 10.2 percent of Brazilians express a partisan preference for one of these parties. The numbers drive home a clear message: although Brazil has several electorally strong parties, only the PT can count on a large base of partisan support in its quest for votes.

**Sources of Partisanship**

Political scientists define partisanship as self-identification with one party that “structures one’s cognitive understanding of politics” (Miller and Klobucar 2000, 675). This identification is separate from vote choice, but partisanship shapes both voting and policy preferences over a relatively long time, even when the political context changes (Green et al. 2002, 39). To what extent are preferences for any party in Brazil an expression of such deeply held notions of political self-identification, as opposed to superficial attachments to various political personalities.
or to immediate events? To play devil’s advocate for a moment, do petis-
tas really hold different “cognitive understandings of politics” from other
Brazilians? Or does petismo echo traditional bases of politics in Brazil
and result merely from the personal charisma of the party’s longstand-
ing leader, Lula? Likewise, although scholars have suggested that pref-
ences for Brazil’s other parties derive from personalism and clien-
telism, perhaps such expressed preferences are truly partisan but are
simply embryonic, reflecting the relative youth of many of Brazil’s par-
ties. Perhaps the low levels of partisanship for the PFL, PSDB, and other
parties are not superficial but are strongly held despite not (yet) being
widespread.

Especially given the recent corruption scandal, which will test the
“depth” of partisanship for the PT, these questions merit empirical
exploration. This study presents hypotheses about the sources of parti-
sanship in Brazil in an effort to provide the first comprehensive picture
of the nature of partisanship for parties across the contemporary Brazil-
ian political spectrum. To simplify the discussion, the hypotheses are
arranged in five groups, which focus on the potential impact on parti-
sanship of political leaders, group identities, insertion into social net-
works, demographic context, and individual attributes. No “comprehen-
sive theory of partisanship” generates these hypotheses; many of them
are drawn from the international literature on voter behavior, and some
are derived for application specifically to Brazil. The modest goal is to
assess how much partisanship for Brazil’s parties derives from similar or
different bases.

Table 2. CSES Party Identification by Party, Brazil 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent PID in Population</th>
<th>Percent PID of Valid Vote</th>
<th>Percent PID 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (11 parties)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: BNES 2002; TSE 2002
Political Leaders

To what extent does partisanship in Brazil merely reflect voters’ personalistic attachments to political leaders? This is an important question in countries like Brazil, where, many scholars argue, political institutions are weakly established and politicians campaign using populist, personalistic appeals (Singer 1990; Von Mettenheim 1995; Mainwaring 1999; Ames 2001). The question is also important because in Brazil, political leaders have often been around just as long as their parties have. This makes partisanship difficult to disentangle from personalism. The “Michigan School” of studying voter behavior assumes that personalistic attachments to politicians follow from partisan attachments, not vice versa. Thus, in the United States, for example, a Republican may have strong positive feelings for George W. Bush. That person’s support for the Republican Party, however, most likely predated Bush’s arrival on the political stage, and will most likely outlast Bush’s political career as well (Green et al. 2002). Of course, citizens’ feelings for or against Bush could catalyze an emerging partisan identification, but scholars of voter behavior in established democracies argue that partisanship is better understood as a form of social identity that derives from lived experience rather than as support for or against particular politicians.

However, in countries with relatively young party systems, it is important to question the assumption that partisanship precedes personalistic attachments to politicians. In newer democracies, the opposite is plausible: partisanship may derive precisely from personalism and only subsequently evolve into more complex, deeply held, long-term convictions that outlive any particular politician. An obvious example from one of Brazil’s neighbors is Peronism, a form of social identity in Argentina that has long outlived its founder.

Multivariate statistical analysis permits us to study how much partisan attachments are personalistic and whether personalism means different things to different people. Political leaders are not personalistic in the same ways. Some leaders work to develop their party organization so that it will outlive them; others seek to use the party for their own designs; and still others are indifferent to parties or even antipartisan. Support for a political leader may translate into partisanship or not. Using survey data, we may begin to understand whether any observed connection is a function of “personality” or of other factors, such as a politician’s policy stances.

Citizens’ Group Identities

This approach is inspired by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who argue that partisanship is rooted in deep societal divisions, such as class, religion,
urban or rural location, or race (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1969). This hypothesis suggests that partisanship is a sociological reflection of citizens’ membership in more or less objectively defined groups. This study includes several variables that scholars have suggested might be connected to the evolution of partisan attitudes. In Brazil, however, scholars generally expect that few such variables will be strongly associated with partisanship, for any party (e.g. Mainwaring et al. 2000).

Citizens’ Insertion into Social Networks

For some scholars, the most important elements of partisanship are not individual or even group identities, but the nature and extent of citizens’ involvement in politics and social networks. This hypothesis can be taken in two ways: as a test of the notion that “more involved” people are simply more likely to be partisans, or as an indirect test of the notion that recruitment by social activists enhances partisanship (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Both are likely to be true, because although some people may have a greater propensity to participate in politics, it takes some form of recruitment for most people to become involved in politics (Carmines and Stimson 1989).

Demographic Variables

Research on partisanship suggests that “structural” demographic variables can be associated with stronger or weaker tendencies for citizens to acquire partisanship. Such variables cannot be proximate causes of partisanship but can serve as proxies for social context, suggesting that some unmeasured and perhaps unmeasurable variables play a more direct causal role. An optimal variable to proxy for social context (better than region or state, for example) is the Municipal Human Development Index (MDHI). The MDHI was developed by the United Nations Development Program and has been implemented worldwide. The data for Brazil are for the year 2000 (UNDP 2003). The HDI is a composite index based on three indicators of human well-being: life expectancy, which reflects the healthcare conditions available to the population; education level; and per capita income. The HDI scale ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a tendency toward greater or better human development.

Health, education, and welfare are three key characteristics favorable to the formation of human capital, and municipalities with higher levels of the MDHI can be expected to have denser networks of social and political organizations. As noted, scholars suggest that partisanship is essentially an individual’s understanding of how he or she fits into political society, with reference to other social groups (Green et al. 2002,
23). The MHDI is a proxy for a hypothesized relationship between human capital and the formation of partisan preferences. Citizens in municipalities with a greater human capital are not only more likely to be encouraged to participate, but also to have relatively more opportunities to do so. This will lead them to make decisions about whether to get involved, and how (that is, for which party).8

Citizens’ Individual Attributes

Scholars have posited numerous connections between citizens’ individual attributes and partisanship. For example, socialization theories suggest that age is positively associated with partisanship (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Shively 1979). Similarly, scholars have long posited a connection between education and partisanship, often focusing on citizens’ political knowledge. Generally, scholars have found that better-informed citizens are more likely to develop a partisan identity (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Miller and Shanks 1996). As Brader and Tucker (2001) note, this question is particularly important in new democracies, where information costs are higher because of the newness of open politics and citizens’ comparative lack of experience with democratic politics. In newer democracies, we have an even stronger expectation that partisanship for any party will develop among educated citizens or those with a high degree of interest in and knowledge about politics.

Scholars have also hypothesized that individual beliefs about democracy are important components of partisanship (Almond and Verba 1963). Citizens who hold positive attitudes about democracy and who believe in the efficacy of political participation are more likely to develop partisan attachments. Along similar lines, we should explore whether certain cultural attitudes are associated with partisanship. The key question at hand is whether Brazilians who hold what might be called “traditional” versus “modern” cultural beliefs are more or less likely to develop a partisan identity for particular parties (Soares 1961; Reis 1978).

Data and Measures

The five sets of hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and do not describe all possible factors associated with the evolution of partisanship, but are longstanding arguments in the theoretical literature and are relevant to the Brazilian context. These hypotheses were tested using data from the 2002 BNES survey.9

Brazil’s 2002 presidential election was significant. After winning reelection in 1998, president Fernando Henrique Cardoso saw his popularity ratings sag during his second term as Brazil’s economy remained
stuck in the doldrums. Lula, who had run and lost the presidential race in 1989, 1994, and 1998 (against Cardoso the last two times), mounted a successful campaign in 2002, which capitalized on Brazilians’ displeasure with Cardoso and their desire for a change of direction. Lula easily beat José Serra, the candidate Cardoso’s party nominated, and four other candidates.

The dependent variable explored here is self-reported party identification, derived from the CSES format as described above, for the four parties with the largest partisan bases: the PT, PSDB, PMDB, and PFL. Even with the BNES’s large national sample, too few people reported a partisan preference for any of Brazil’s other parties to permit statistical analysis for those parties. To reveal the relationships underlying the sources of partisanship, the statistical method of multinomial logit is used, with robust standard errors. This procedure estimates the impact of explanatory variables on a dependent variable that can take more than one categorical value. In this case there are six categories: partisanship for the PT, PMDB, PSDB, or PFL, other partisan identification, and no partisan identification. No identification is the reference category.

The following independent variables were explored, each of which fits into one of the three groups. Several of these variables are composite indexes.

- Political leaders: thermometer scores measuring respondents’ like or dislike of the leaders of the four main parties.
- Group identity: gender, age in years, race (white or nonwhite), religion (Catholic or not, and Evangelical Christian or not), and family income.
- Social networks: index variables that measure respondents’ degree of participation in electoral politics and in nonelectoral politics.
- Demographic context: the Municipal Human Development Index (a continuous variable that ranges from 0 to 1).
- Individual attributes: retrospective evaluation of the Cardoso administration, belief in the efficacy of the vote, extent of political knowledge (index), support for clientelism (index), tolerance of corruption (index), degree to which citizens see the world in terms of social hierarchies (index), years of education, and support for suppression of political protest (called political liberalism, also an index variable).

Multinomial logit generates regression coefficients for each category of the dependent variable; in this case, thus, for each of the four parties. Each coefficient tells whether a particular independent variable distinguishes partisans for that party from Brazilians who have “no” partisan identification. Table 3 presents the results (results for “Other” identification are not shown).
Table 3. Factors Associated with Partisan Identification with the Largest Parties in Brazil, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PFL</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>PMDB</th>
<th>PSDB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lula opinion</td>
<td>-0.050 (.043)</td>
<td><strong>0.367 (.039)</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.081 (.031)</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.158 (.037)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardoso opinion</td>
<td>0.021 (.058)</td>
<td><strong>-0.067 (.022)</strong></td>
<td>0.059 (.039)</td>
<td><strong>0.177 (.046)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jader opinion</td>
<td>-0.076 (.064)</td>
<td>0.008 (.030)</td>
<td><strong>0.143 (.048)</strong></td>
<td>-0.003 (.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM opinion</td>
<td><strong>0.175 (.049)</strong></td>
<td>-0.030 (.023)</td>
<td>-0.094 (.047)</td>
<td>-0.092 (.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.117 (.316)</td>
<td>-0.179 (.117)</td>
<td><strong>-0.461 (.224)</strong></td>
<td>-0.032 (.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.003 (.011)</td>
<td>-0.008 (.004)</td>
<td>0.001 (.007)</td>
<td>-0.012 (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-0.386 (.355)</td>
<td>0.027 (.119)</td>
<td>0.238 (.229)</td>
<td>-0.159 (.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>-0.283 (.625)</td>
<td>-0.035 (.211)</td>
<td>0.274 (.606)</td>
<td>-0.294 (.453)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-0.011 (.486)</td>
<td>0.060 (.172)</td>
<td>1.006 (.542)</td>
<td>0.184 (.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.001 (.001)</td>
<td>-0.001 (.001)</td>
<td><strong>-0.006 (.0002)</strong></td>
<td>0.001 (.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral participation</td>
<td>0.087 (.127)</td>
<td><strong>0.209 (.046)</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.385 (.078)</strong></td>
<td>0.172 (.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonelectoral participation</td>
<td><strong>0.315 (.102)</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.177 (.041)</strong></td>
<td>0.085 (.080)</td>
<td>0.101 (.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHDI</td>
<td><strong>-5.154 (1.712)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.020 (.908)</strong></td>
<td>-2.033 (1.511)</td>
<td>-2.572 (1.854)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td><strong>0.156 (.080)</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.127 (.033)</strong></td>
<td>0.024 (.059)</td>
<td><strong>0.263 (.063)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective evaluation</td>
<td>0.186 (.109)</td>
<td>-0.079 (.044)</td>
<td>-0.029 (.086)</td>
<td>0.042 (.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right placement</td>
<td>0.027 (.055)</td>
<td><strong>-0.072 (.019)</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.089 (.039)</strong></td>
<td>-0.033 (.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest suppression</td>
<td>0.035 (.040)</td>
<td>-0.020 (.015)</td>
<td><strong>0.065 (.028)</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.074 (.037)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>0.188 (.142)</td>
<td><strong>0.190 (.057)</strong></td>
<td>0.025 (.089)</td>
<td>0.016 (.091)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PFL</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>PMDB</th>
<th>PSDB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clientelism support</td>
<td>.039 (.031)</td>
<td>-.025 (.012)*</td>
<td>.025 (.024)</td>
<td>-.0003 (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.015 (.041)</td>
<td>.030 (.015)</td>
<td>.001 (.029)</td>
<td>.0061 (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption support</td>
<td>-.014 (.019)</td>
<td>-.010 (.007)</td>
<td>.007 (.012)</td>
<td>-.045 (.016)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical values</td>
<td>.054 (.057)</td>
<td>.015 (.019)</td>
<td>.071 (.040)</td>
<td>.058 (.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.461 (2.631)</td>
<td>-7.266 (.966)**</td>
<td>-5.102 (1.759)*</td>
<td>-2.724 (1.817)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Cell values are multinomial logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
N=2,491. Missing values imputed using AMELIA.
*p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001
For the political leaders variable, the model generates clear and intuitive results for all parties. The survey asked all respondents for thermometer rankings of the following political leaders: Antônio Carlos Magalhães, a longtime political boss from the northeastern state of Bahia who is known by his initials, ACM, and who is the most widely recognized leader of the PFL; Lula; Cardoso; and Jader Barbalho, a political boss from the northern state of Pará, known by his first name. The PMDB had no clear national leader at this time, but Jader had been in the news frequently as the target of corruption investigations and as a prominent senator from the PMDB. (The BNES did not include another PMDB leader.)

For each party, partisanship is associated with positive sentiment for the party’s leader. In every case except the PFL, partisanship is also associated with a clear dislike for at least one rival party leader. These results support the hypothesis that partisanship in Brazil is partly driven by personalism, yet they raise two further questions: To what extent do attachments to political leaders shape partisanship? and To what degree can we predict partisanship without including the thermometer scores for political leaders?

Using the CLARIFY statistical software package (Tomz et al. 2003), a thought experiment can be conducted to answer these questions. Using the survey data, CLARIFY lets the researcher set the values of the independent variables and then predict the probability that a survey respondent with those values would “choose” categories of the dependent variable. To understand how much personalism is associated with partisanship, we can contrast the predictions CLARIFY generates from two simulations for each party. These simulations do not predict the probability that an “average Brazilian” will identify with a particular party; they predict the probability that a Brazilian with certain characteristics, which the researcher chooses, will identify with a particular party or with no party. Obviously, very few Brazilians actually have these characteristics, but we can learn a great deal about the relative impact of different independent variables by running the simulations.

For each party, the first simulation takes the variables that were significantly associated with partisanship for that party in table 3 and sets them at their “most likely to be a partisan” value for that party, except for the leadership opinion variable, which is set at its mean value. The second simulation changes only the leadership opinion variable, to its maximum value. Thus the first simulation predicts the probability that a Brazilian will express a partisan preference for a particular party given certain characteristics and given relative indifference to that party’s leader. The second simulation reveals the extent to which partisanship for that party increases when we add in a highly positive leadership assessment. Table 4 provides the predicted probabilities for each party for each simulation.
The second column of the table reveals substantial differences in the ability to predict partisans for each of Brazil’s major parties, assuming indifference to the political leader of that party. For example, even assuming relative indifference to Lula, we can predict PT partisanship 87 percent of the time using the “likely petista” variables. There is not much room for improvement here, but changing “Lula opinion” in table 3 to its maximum value and rerunning the simulation does increase the predicted probability to 95 percent. In short, with just a few variables, we can confidently predict which Brazilians are likely to be petistas; PT partisanship is not simply or even largely a function of Brazilians’ sentiments about Lula.

We already know that far more Brazilians identify as petistas than identify with all other Brazilian parties combined. Yet we can only confirm that petismo is “less personalistic” than partisanship for other parties by comparing the results for the PT in table 4 with similar simulations for the other parties. Doing so reveals a sharp contrast between petismo and partisanship for other parties, supporting the conclusion that petismo is (at least as of 2002) a sentiment not only more widely held among Brazilian voters but also more deeply held than the infrequent and relatively more personalistic attachments Brazilians hold for other parties.

When we run similar simulations for the PFL, the results in column 2, not surprisingly, generate a far weaker (and less confident) prediction. Without including the evaluation of ACM, we can predict PFL partisanship only about 16 percent of the time with the three other significant variables. When we set the opinion of ACM at its maximum value, the probability of identifying a pezelista increases to 33 percent. Given that we could predict a petista 87 percent of the time even without including Lula, it is clear that PFL partisanship is not only weaker than PT partisanship, but it depends relatively more heavily on a positive leadership assessment.

Slightly better results obtain for the PMDB. Using the variables associated with PMDB partisanship except for the respondent’s opinion of Jader Barbalho, we can predict a PMDB partisan about 37 percent of the time. Yet, similar to the PFL, PMDB partisanship depends a great deal on personalistic sympathies: our ability to predict a PMDB partisan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Without Leader</th>
<th>Including Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>.868 (.095)</td>
<td>.953 (.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>.160 (.193)</td>
<td>.334 (.275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>.373 (.291)</td>
<td>.557 (.313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>.451 (.120)</td>
<td>.666 (.119)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
improves considerably when we include respondents’ evaluations of Jader, to nearly 56 percent.

The results for the PSDB are similar to those for the PMDB. Initially we predict PSDB partisanship about 45 percent of the time, again relatively weak compared to our ability to predict a petista. When we include the evaluation of Cardoso, the probability of identifying a PSDB partisan increases to 67 percent. Thus PSDB partisanship is similar to partisanship for the PFL and PMDB in that it is weaker than petismo and depends relatively heavily on personalistic sentiment for the party leader.

These simulations reveal that it is relatively easy to predict a petista using the BNES data, but relatively difficult to confidently predict partisans for the PFL, PMDB, or PSDB. Moreover, only for the PT can we predict partisanship well without taking into account Brazilians’ sentiments about political leaders.

The findings about personalism’s impact on even the limited degree of partisanship for several of Brazil’s major parties motivates a second question about the relationship between personalism and partisanship in Brazil: does personalism mean the same thing for partisans of different parties and different leaders (Miller et al. 1986, 1998)? While there is no direct way to test this proposition in the BNES, an indirect way is to correlate respondents’ leadership thermometer scores with their responses to batteries of questions about certain cultural values. This reveals what values are associated with positive assessments of each leader.

Brazilians’ sentiments about each political leader can be correlated with four index variables also used in the regression analysis: clientelism support, corruption support; support for suppression of protest; and hierarchical values. If personalism means different things to supporters of different political leaders, the cultural values ought to reveal different correlations with each leader. Table 5 provides results that support the idea that personalism means different things for supporters of different leaders.

Brazilians with positive sentiments toward Lula are neither more nor less supportive of clientelism than other Brazilians, but support for clientelism is correlated with positive feelings for the other three political leaders. Attitudes about political corruption are not associated with sentiment for Lula or Cardoso, but supporters of Jader and ACM tend to have slightly positive sentiments about corruption. The clearest distinction between Lula supporters and supporters of other leaders is that those who like Lula oppose the suppression of political protest, while supporters of the other leaders all favor some degree of suppression of protest. Supporters of Cardoso, moreover, hold the least “hierarchical” visions of Brazilian society. Lula supporters are indifferent in this regard, while Jader and ACM supporters hold highly hierarchical views. These findings indirectly suggest that personalism means different things to different Brazilians; future research should investigate this question further.
At this point let us return to table 3, to discuss further the results beyond “political leaders.” Turning to the group identity variables, we see very few strong relationships for any party—only 2 of the 24 coefficients reach the .05 level of statistical significance. The results for age merit comment because the literature on partisanship in older democracies associates age with partisanship through a life cycle perspective, meaning that scholars expect older voters to be more partisan (Converse 1969; Jennings and Niemi 1981). We cannot generalize this hypothesis to newer democracies, however, because many voters have not participated in democratic politics for their entire “life cycles.” In Brazil, age is not strongly associated with partisanship for any party (youth is only slightly associated with petismo).

Race, despite its critical importance in Brazilians’ lives and despite the prominent role that some Afro-Brazilians have come to play in national politics, also appears wholly unrelated to partisanship for these parties, and gender matters only for the PMDB, whose supporters are more likely to be men. PMDB supporters are also more likely to be slightly less well off, as defined by family income. What’s more, despite the growth of Evangelical Christianity in Brazil in recent decades, religious affiliation is not associated either positively or negatively with partisanship for any of these four parties.

Given the general absence of strong effects across parties, more or less objectively defined group identities therefore seem relatively unimportant for shaping partisanship in Brazil. These results echo the findings of Mainwaring et al. (2000), who argue that these sorts of weak results appear because parties have never politicized any of these (or other) potential cleavages.

Stronger results emerge from the third group of variables, which associate citizens’ insertion into social and political networks with partisanship. The regression tested for relationships between partisanship and respondents’ degree of electoral or nonelectoral participation. The former measures citizens’ participation in campaigns, and the latter measures their participation in such activities as neighborhood associa-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Lula</th>
<th>Cardoso</th>
<th>Jader</th>
<th>ACM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clientelism</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest suppression</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical values</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01

Table 5. Correlations Between Personality Thermometer Scores and Cultural Values
tions and social movements. At least one of these variables is associated with partisanship for three of the four parties, indicating that political or social engagement is frequently associated with partisanship in Brazil. However, the result for the PSDB is distinctive in that electoral participation is only weakly associated (at the .10 level of statistical significance) with partisanship.

Both of the participation variables are strongly associated with PT partisanship. The PT emerged out of activism associated with Brazil’s independent union movement, Catholic base communities, and other social movements (Meneguello 1989; Keck 1992). This finding confirms that petismo remains linked to social and political activism. However, the precise nature and influence of these networks require additional investigation, given the changes in the PT and in Brazil’s social movements since redemocratization (Hochstetler 2004; Samuels 2004), and especially given the divisions within the PT and the impact of the ongoing corruption scandal.

Partisans of the PMDB and PFL are also politically engaged in different ways. For example, nonelectoral participation is associated with PFL partisanship. Analysis of the eight components of the index of nonelectoral participation reveals that “participation in a neighborhood association” and “working together with similar-minded people” correlate with PFL partisanship. In contrast, all eight components of the nonelectoral participation index are positively correlated with PT partisanship, and all to a greater degree than for PFL partisanship. Future research could attempt to distinguish the ways in which different forms of sociopolitical action are associated with partisanship for different parties in Brazil.

In terms of the impact of sociodemographic context, the Municipal Human Development Index is positively associated with petismo and negatively associated with PFL partisanship. The MHDI is likely to be positively correlated with the density of local social and political organizations. Personalism and clientelism are therefore likely to be negatively correlated with the MHDI. Petismo is the only partisan sentiment associated with individuals living in more modern and highly developed localities, while pefelismo is a puzzling case of partisanship that emerges in a context of low social capital (Mainwaring et al. 2000). This finding certainly contradicts the main hypotheses that link social context to the emergence of partisan attachments.

The final category in table 3 is individuals’ particular attributes or dispositions. For the PFL, only political knowledge is associated with partisanship. Partisanship for the PFL is relatively uncommon and relatively weak, associated with socially active, politically aware people who like ACM but who live in relatively underdeveloped locales.

In contrast, several variables are associated with petismo. Petistas have a high degree of political knowledge, and they also self-identify as
Petismo also embodies several political-culture factors. PT identifiers tend to believe in the efficacy of the vote, in contrast to supporters of other parties, and they tend to affirm less support for clientelistic behavior than other Brazilians. In short, the average petista likes Lula and dislikes Cardoso, participates actively in politics, is highly knowledgeable about politics, identifies as left of center, supports clean government, and believes that his or her vote can make a political difference. Note, however, that “corruption support” is not significantly associated with petismo. This lack of a strong connection between attitudes about corruption and petismo may prove important in how the PT survives the current scandal.

In contrast, PMDB supporters are found among lower-middle-class, conservative males who self-identify as right-of-center and support some degree of suppression of social protest. This image of the average PMDB supporter suggests that the party’s support base has changed a great deal since the party fought against the military regime and led the struggle for redemocratization in Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, the remaining PMDB partisans represent a conservative political force in Brazil.

As for the PSDB, although we can predict its supporters with only about as much confidence as PMDB supporters, we see that PSDB supporters strongly dislike Lula but like Cardoso, and are highly knowledgeable about politics. They appear to be centrists who favor “law and order” because, although they identify as neither right nor left, they oppose corruption but support suppression of some degree of social protest. As noted, partisanship for the PSDB seems relatively “passive” compared to partisanship for the other parties, in that participation in politics does not seem to shape partisanship for the PSDB.

In sum, the findings from table 2 and the results of the regression analysis indicate that partisanship for the PT is more widespread than for any other Brazilian party and is also a more deeply held substantive attachment. In contrast, partisanship for other parties is not widespread and rests relatively more heavily on personalism.

**DISCUSSION**

The conventional view that few Brazilians have strong attachments to political parties and that personalism rather than programmatic attachments shapes partisan identification is partly true. On the one hand, as of 2002, about one in four Brazilians had developed a partisan attachment to the Workers’ Party, and PT partisanship differs substantially from traditional political attachments in Brazil. On the other hand, after nearly two decades of democracy, two-thirds of Brazilians still express no partisan identity. About one in ten Brazilians expresses a partisan preference for some party other than the PT. However, these partisan
preferences are relatively weakly held and considerably driven by personalism. That is, partisanship for parties other than the PT continues to reflect the traditional bases of Brazilian politics and only partly reflects partisanship in the way that political scientists typically employ the term. Although this study does not explore the factors associated with the vote, we can certainly conclude that partisanship does not drive the vote for most Brazilians.

Moreover, the corruption scandal that emerged in mid-2005 has cost the PT considerable partisan support, at least in the short term. The scandal, which has resulted in several resignations and expulsions from Congress, has revealed the existence of a scheme to purchase the support of congressional deputies from several parties, and the illegal use of campaign funds by the PT party organization. One should never predict the future based on the last “point” in a time-series, but the PT has already hemorrhaged about 25 percent of its partisan support since the corruption scandal. Existing time-series data on partisanship in Brazil unfortunately cannot tell what sorts of voters are sticking with the PT or abandoning it. Without a repeat of the 2002 BNES, scholars will be unable to compare the impact of the scandal with findings presented in this article to learn more about the evolution of PT partisan support.

Regardless, the results presented here should be incorporated into ongoing debates about the status of Brazil’s political parties and used to inform future research. Clearly, mass partisanship, associated with voters’ ideologically driven demands for legislators’ policy unity, cannot be driving the relatively high levels of legislative cohesion exhibited by all of Brazil’s parties (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). This generates a puzzle for understanding Brazil’s major parties: if most voters have little interest in parties per se as collective entities, then it is unclear why politicians should care either. An argument for “party strength” rings hollow when voter sentiments remain absent.

For explaining the evolution of this distribution of partisan preferences, the growth of partisanship for the PT and the weakness of partisanship for Brazil’s other parties supports the general hypothesis that partisanship emerges as a function of both individual motivation to acquire knowledge and become involved in politicized social networks (Shively 1979) and parties’ organizational and recruitment efforts (Carmines and Stimson 1989). This conclusion rules out the hypothesis that education is associated with partisanship, even though scholars have long suggested that the most knowledgeable citizens are the most partisan (Campbell et al. 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996). In Brazil, education itself is unimportant for the acquisition of partisanship. (The coefficient on education is significant only at the .10 level for the PT.) Some Brazilian scholars (e.g., Moisés 1992; Balbachevsky 1992; Carreirão and Kinzo 2002) have associated education with partisanship in Brazil, but
this conclusion is mistaken. Education and partisanship are positively correlated, but the relationship vanishes when multiple regression techniques are used.

According to the BNES, the average Brazilian stays in school 9.4 years, which means that it does not even take a high school diploma to develop a partisan attachment in Brazil. Political knowledge—associated with the emergence of partisanship for three of Brazil's four largest parties—plays a more important role. It is not education per se that shapes partisan attachments, but rather whether Brazilians with even relatively limited degrees of education have the motivation to obtain political information, which requires actively paying close attention to politics or getting involved. This follows scholarship that holds that partisanship is a function of rational information seeking (e.g. Shively 1979) rather than of rational ignorance.

What motivates individuals to obtain political knowledge and get involved? As Carmines and Stimson (1989, 109–14) cogently argue, both politicians and voters are fundamentally inertial and prefer the status quo to any sort of change. Explaining change—for example, the growth of partisanship—requires the introduction of a dynamic, noninertial set of actors: political activists. Most citizens prefer to pay little attention to politics and to gather information from more politically attentive people around them, people whose views they know and trust. Political activists therefore can play a critical role in the formation of mass partisanship because they mediate complex political information about policy positions into relatively simple partisan cues. Thus mobilization, conversion, and recruitment start the process of political change, which can lead to the emergence of mass partisanship (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 145). That is, individual motivation to acquire knowledge appears sufficient to encourage a limited sort of partisanship, but the emergence of a full-blown partisan identity probably requires active participation in politics in some way, which highlights the role of party activists.

In terms of mobilization and recruitment, the PT remains the only Brazilian party with an extensive, institutionalized national organization (Keck 1992; Samuels 2004). The growth of partisanship for the PT up through 2004 was not exclusively or even mainly linked to the party's leftism, which it moderated over time (and refused to define), nor to its policy positions, which it also moderated, but rather to its ongoing recruitment efforts, its links to various social movements, the ability of rank-and-file members to participate actively in party politics, and the party's emphasis on gradual political change through the ballot box. Quantitatively and qualitatively, Brazil's other parties differ substantially from the PT in terms of their limited membership, grassroots connections, and recruitment efforts. The PT, despite its moderation and accession to power in recent years, remains the only Brazilian party with
extensive roots in civil society (see, e.g., Baiocchi 2003; Hochstetler 2004) and the only party with relatively widespread member involvement in its governance (Samuels 2004).

The PT’s ascension to power following Lula’s victory in the 2002 presidential election, and the impact of the 2005 corruption scandal, raise pertinent questions about the future of PT partisan support. Both Lula and the PT moved to the center over the past decade or so (Samuels 2004), yet partisan identification with the PT grew throughout the 1990s and up through 2004, suggesting that PT “pragmatism” went hand-in-hand with growth in PT partisanship.

In government, Lula has adopted policies that have alienated some PT supporters. The corruption scandal has also tarnished the PT’s reputation as a standard-bearer for clean government. The impact of Lula’s policies and the corruption scandal on the extent of partisanship for the PT remains unknowable at present. A disastrous Lula administration might certainly weaken support for the PT, but there is no obvious relationship between Lula’s personal popularity and the growth (or future stagnation) of PT partisanship. (Lula has always been popular, but PT partisanship has become widespread only gradually.) Moreover, the regression results suggest that sentiment about corruption is (somewhat surprisingly, perhaps) not among the most important determinants of partisanship for the PT.

Like other parties around the world that have weathered scandals, the PT is likely to suffer some loss of support in the short term. However, the party’s ongoing efforts further to expand and consolidate its organizational reach and to recruit new members (Genoino 2003; Primeira Leitura On-Line 2004) may compensate for any losses; newly recruited supporters may care relatively little whether the PT has or has not abandoned its historical “mission.” In any case, political developments under the Lula administration make mass partisanship for the PT a moving target, and thus the future of the PT remains an open question, one that a potential 2006 BNES or other survey can explore.

This article has explored the nature and extent of partisanship in contemporary Brazil. The PT is not simply the only party that devotes substantial resources to recruitment of partisan support; clearly, something about its message resonates with a growing cohort of Brazilians. Additional survey research and especially interviews in smaller focus groups should attempt to probe more deeply the sources of _petismo_—the link between individual motivation to acquire knowledge and to participate in political life and the party’s deliberate strategy to recruit supporters. Future research could also explore more extensively the meaning of “personalistic partisanship,” could connect partisanship to vote choices in executive and legislative elections, and could seek to discover what sorts of people have recently declared an attachment to
the PT and what sorts have decided that they no longer identify with the PT, given the party’s recent pragmatism and the tarnish from political scandal.

**Notes**

I thank Scott Desposato, Jorge I. Domínguez, Chris Federico, Wendy Hunter, Alfred Montero, Wendy Rahn, Fábio Wanderley Reis, Phil Shively, Amaury de Souza, Brian Wampler, the anonymous reviewers for LAPS, and the participants in the University of Minnesota Political Psychology Colloquium for suggestions and comments on previous versions of this paper. I also thank Simone Aranha of CESOP for research assistance.

1. For a review of the main debates, see Amorim Neto 2002; an excellent example of recent research is Amorim Neto et al. 2003.


4. All the surveys used in figure 1 are publicly available from the Center for the Study of Public Opinion (CESOP) at the State University of Campinas, São Paulo (UNICAMP). See <www.unicamp.br/cesop>. The BNES is also available through CESOP.

5. The BNES will also be made available (with an English translation) on the CSES website.

6. The levels of partisan identification for the PT and PMDB do exhibit short-term fluctuations, but this study is more interested in the long-term trend, which is clearly upward for the PT and downward for the PMDB, than in any particular “blip” in the pattern.

7. This is not entirely counterintuitive. In the United States, for example, a voter may prefer one party generally but may vote to reelect the other party’s candidate because the voter values the incumbent’s personal qualities or particular policy positions more than voting a straight ticket.

8. The MHDI is also superior to population density, which is a proxy for urbanization, which is itself a proxy for the density of social organization and human capital.

9. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 2,513 respondents, who were selected using a three-stage probabilistic method. The survey was implemented under the direction of Alberto C. Almeida, Zairo Cheibub, Andrea Schroeder, Rachel Meneguello, and Fernando Lourenço.

10. This study used the AMELIA software package (Honaker et al. 2001) to impute missing values. Values could be imputed for 2,491 cases of the 2,513 total.
11. Please consult the author’s web site <www.polisci.umn.edu/faculty/dsamue1s> for a version of this article that contains the question wordings in English. The original BNES survey instruments and data are available through CESOP <www.unicamp.br/cesop>.

12. The results do not change using personal income. The BNES did not include an urban-rural location variable.

13. To be clear, therefore, the statistical results do not distinguish partisans of one party from partisans of other parties. The coefficients detail the degree to which partisans for each party differ from Brazilians who express no partisan preference. Other statistical models could specify the extent to which partisans for each party differ from each other on certain questions, a topic beyond the scope of this paper.

14. The values chosen for the simulations are relatively unimportant. Using different values (e.g. 20th and 80th percentile instead of the mean and the maximum) would not change the substantive interpretation of the results.

15. This is self-declared number of years in school, and is not necessarily equal to finishing the ninth grade. Other government agencies provide different statistics on schooling.

16. I thank Fábio Wanderley Reis for thoughts incorporated into this paragraph.

REFERENCES


