Real Time, Time Series Forecasting of Inter- and Intra-State Political Conflict

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Abstract

We propose a framework for forecasting and analyzing regional and international conflicts in real time. The proposed framework would generate forecasts that 1) are accurate, 2) are produced in (near) real time, 3) address the actions of multiple actors in a conflict, 4) incorporate prior beliefs about conflict processes, and 5) allow us to generate policy contingent forecasts. We propose to meet these desiderata by combining the CAMEO event coding framework with Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) and Markov-switching Bayesian vector autoregression (MS-BVAR) forecasting models. We outline an example using these methods and produce a series for forecasts for material conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians for 2010. Our forecast is that the level of material conflict between these belligerents will increase in 2010, compared to 2009.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 50th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York. Since this paper contains ex ante forecasts, the author(s) wants (want) to note that this version of the paper was written on January 19, 2010 and only uses data through the end of 2009. Part of this research is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Award Nos. 0921018, 0921051, and 1004414. We would also like to thank Christian Cantir for his research assistance. Finally, we are grateful for the helpful comments of the reviewers.
1 Introduction

Scholars and policy makers want to anticipate intra- and international conflicts. They also want to evaluate what might have occurred if certain actions had been taken in the past and (or) what might happen if governments take certain actions in a given conflict in the future. To this end, they developed tools for analyzing state failure, political instability, rebellion, repression and civil war. For their part, organizations like the international crisis group, ICG (www.crisisgroup.org) publishes weekly its “Crisis Watch” to help policymakers anticipate and hopefully mediate conflicts world-wide. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation funded a similar effort in recent years (FAST; www.swisspeace.org).

An ideal forecasting tool would have at least five interrelated features:

1. It would produce accurate forecasts. This desideratum sounds straightforward. The tool makes a prediction; the prediction either is realized or not. In fact accuracy is a more complex concept. Forecasts involve uncertainty. Even the simple forecasts from regression models contain forecast error, error derived from the random nature of the dependent variable and estimation uncertainty. A forecast therefore is better characterized by an interval rather than a point, more precisely, it is a probability distribution. As we explain below modern forecast evaluation now focuses on distribution prediction, not point prediction (Gneiting, 2008).¹

2. Useful forecasts need to be produced in real-time. A delay of weeks or months often is too late to anticipate (prevent) a conflict from occurring or escalating, and the postdictive analyses that characterize most academic studies of conflict are useful only for model development. And the forecast must be calibrated in time. Not knowing exactly when the predicted outcome will occur diminishes the usefulness of the forecast.

3. Scholars and policymakers are interested in the behavior of collections of belligerents in conflict systems. For instance, an ideal forecasting tool would allow us to anticipate both the

¹Forecast errors and intervals are explained in most intermediate regression books. Yet, many political scientists continue to base their model evaluations on point forecasts. For example, see the recent issue of PS (61(4), October 2008) on competing forecasts of the 2008 presidential election or the discussion of evaluating forecasts of European Union legislative bargaining in Achen (2006).
actions of one belligerent towards its adversaries but also the reactions of those adversaries and the subsequent behavior of the original belligerent.

4. To improve its performance, the tool should incorporate our knowledge about intra and international conflict in general and about the history of particular cases. There is a wealth of expert knowledge about this subject (a “wisdom literature”). This knowledge teaches about strategic behavior, the propensity for conflicts to exhibit phase shifts (non-linearities) and other characteristics. We should be able easily to incorporate this knowledge into our forecasting tool.

5. The tool should enable us to make contingent forecasts. We should be able to evaluate counterfactuals about the past history of a conflict as well as to make forecasts contingent on hypothetical behaviors of the belligerents or third parties. For example, we would want to generate contingent forecasts of the impacts of Israeli and U.S. actions on the relations among Israel, Hamas, Fatah, and the U.S. (e.g., Brandt and Freeman, 2006).

Existing tools for forecasting intra- and international conflict meet some but not all of these desiderata. Table 1 catalogs some of the most well known; space does not permit a complete review. So we focus on three. The first is the tool developed by Bueno de Mesquita to predict single events, a game theoretic, Expected Utility Approach (EUA). Its accuracy in making \textit{ex ante} point predictions has been heralded for years both by its creator and by government policy makers (Feder 1995; Bueno de Mesquita 1997, 2002, 2009, and www.diuusa.com). Among EUA’s strengths are its incorporation of rational choice theory and its use of experts to estimate preferences. Contingent predictions can be made with it by altering the specification of the model and deriving an implied (contingent) forecast. Unfortunately this first tool falls short on the first, second, and third desiderata. It has no provision for measuring the forecast errors from estimation, the elicitation of the variables for each subject (capability, salience, intensity) or, the fact that subjects’ utility functions have random elements. EUA users do not attempt to produce or

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\footnotesize{Some tools could be placed in multiple locations in Table 1. An example is prediction markets Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) describe how index contracts in these markets can be used to generate forecasts of mean levels of variables and conceivably of collections of outcomes.

Recent publications call Bueno de Mesquita the “New Nostradamus”, see \url{www.goodmagazine.com}, April 17, 2008.

There are few references in the EUA literature on the processes of elicitation. Elicitation necessarily gauges the assessors degree of certainty in the information she or he is providing the analyst. For a discussion and application of elicitation methods in political science see Freeman and Gill (2008, 2006).}
evaluate the probability distribution over the outcomes of interest. EUA’s forecasts have no time component. Bueno de Mesquita (1997, 264) indicates that predicted outcomes are expected to occur in “reasonable amount of time;” but he acknowledges that in practice the EUA forecasts suffer from “off-on-time problems.” Finally, because EUA produces one-shot, static predictions, its usefulness in forecasting the behavior of whole conflict systems is limited. Also, the possibility that these systems may exhibit phase shifts which alter the parameterization of the EUA model appears not to have been addressed.

[Table 1 about here.]

The Political Instability Task Force, (PITF; Bates et al. (2003)), the successor to the earlier State Failures Project (Esty et al., 1995; Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Levy, Dabelko and Surko, 1998) is a second major contribution to forecasting. It produces probabilistic predictions of state failure and of other discrete outcomes over time horizons of several years. Most of these predictions are based on strongly restricted, single equation models—e.g., neural network models based on a rare event logit specification with independent variables chosen, in part, on the basis of theory and expert consultation. Most of the rigorous accuracy assessments in the open literature have been *ex post* in nature (King and Zeng, 2001), although there have probably been unpublished *ex ante* assessments inside the U.S. government.

The PITF project falls short on three of the desiderata. To begin, forecast error is not incorporated in its accuracy assessments, at least in the published assessments. Second, the PITF models are highly aggregated in space and time. The results for the probability that particular states will fail are based on average effects and therefore subject to ecological inference problems. The use of country-year data means short-term risk assessments (weekly and monthly forecasts of state failure) are not available. Finally, its strong—usually untested—exogeneity assumptions ignore theoretical knowledge about the relationships between political and economic variables, like the endogenous relationships between democratization and certain forms of inequality.

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5The related work of Organski and Lust-Okar (1997) suffers from the same problem. They note that their predicted outcome for the Jerusalem negotiations does not indicate when the final agreement would be reached (See esp., Organski and Lust-Okar, 1997, 350).

6King and Zeng’s contribution is a critique of the State Failures Project. Their own contribution is a neural net model (Beck, King and Zeng, 2000). This model also uses strongly restricted, single equations of the nested logit type. Their demonstration of the accuracy of the neural net model also is *ex post* in nature.

7King and Zeng (2001) produce a more rigorous evaluation of the ability of the earlier, published State Failures model and their neural net model to predict one-shot events. This evaluation uses ROC curves.
Brandt and Freeman (2006) and Brandt, Colaresi and Freeman (2008) employ a third approach. Using data from the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS/TABARI), they show how Bayesian time series models can be used to analyze conflict dynamics and to make ex post forecasts in the Levant over the short-term. Their models are Bayesian vector autoregressions (BVAR) and Bayesian structural vector autoregressions (BSVAR). Their specifications use a modification—incorporating expert judgment of international relations scholars—of the Sims and Zha (1998) prior used in macroeconomic forecasting. The models produce ex post forecasts with error bands for weekly and monthly patterns of conflict and cooperation (directed dyadic behavior) of the Israelis, Palestinians and United States. In one of these analyses, the impact of Jewish public opinion is incorporated (ibid.). Counterfactual (ex post) forecasts are reported in both the pieces.

The work of Brandt et al. suffers from two problems. First, Brandt et al.’s accuracy assessments are based on the mean forecasts from their models; they rely on measures like residual mean square error (RMSE) of the respective point forecasts to evaluate their models. This is in spite of the fact that their approach produces—via computational simulation or Gibbs sampling—the full probability distribution for their forecasts. As we note below, Chatfield (2001) and others show that RMSE and related criteria are sensitive to outliers. Gneiting (2008) and other statisticians recommend using the full predictive density for forecast evaluation. In addition, all of Brandt et al.’s work is ex post in nature. They have not produced any ex ante forecasts with their Bayesian time series models.

We propose to build on the approach of Brandt et al. because it applies the advances in forecast evaluation from statistics, produces temporally disaggregated forecasts in real-time, allows for the analysis of whole conflict systems, and incorporates expert judgment in the form of Bayesian priors. Specifically, we propose a technology that accurately forecasts the weekly behavior of medium-sized conflict systems in real-time. This approach’s structural features and Bayesian prior, and the basic statistical models and estimation strategies will be based on existing theoretical and empirical research on conflict dynamics. We focus especially on those theories and empirical studies that illuminate and analyze phase shifts in the behavior of belligerents, shifts that can be traced to the multiple equilibria of games of incomplete information and to the invasion of dynamic versions of such games by certain strategies (Diehl, 2006), to path dependent sequences of cooperative and conflictual events (Schrodt and Gerner, 2000; Huth and Allee, 2002a), to multiple equilibria in
strategies played by audiences and elites in two level games in (non) democracies (Rioux, 1998; Huth and Allee, 2002b; Rousseau, 2005), and to psychological triggers that produce different types of cooperative and conflictual behavior (Keashly and Fisher, 1996; Senese and Vasquez, 2008). This theoretical work is supplemented *empirically* by an extensive set of datasets that also employ crisis phase concepts: the most notable of these are the early Butterworth-Scranton conflict management dataset (Butterworth and Scranton, 1976), CASCON (Bloomfield and Leiss, 1969; Bloomfield and Moulton 1997; http://web.mit.edu/cascon/methods/model.htm), SHERFACS (Sherman and Neack, 1993; Sherman, 1994; Dixon, 1996; Unseld, 1997), and the Brecher-Wilkenfeld International Crisis Behavior datasets (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997; Brecher, 1999).

These theoretical and empirical phase shifts are consistent non-linearities in the conflict processes. Our methodology represents them with a Markov-switching process in Bayesian time series models. In terms of measurement, we employ event data series from KEDS/TABARI. The time series are constructed from archival and real-time text feeds by automated text parsing. The choice of the actual forecasting model for any given conflict or region will be based on forecast density evaluation using probability integral transform methods and other new tools developed by statisticians.

This new technology will produce theoretically grounded, policy-relevant forecasts, including contingent forecasts. All the results and tools will be available in the public domain. In this first stage of our project, real-time *ex ante* forecasts for three major conflict systems will be produced. More conflict systems will be included in future stages. Finally, we will actively monitor and compare our forecasting methods to other statistical forecasting models.

2 Research Design

Our design consists of four parts: production of event time series for selected cases, incorporation of statistical advances on forecast evaluation and phase shift analysis, comparison of our forecasting models to others, and website design and management. We explain these parts in the next sections. Figure 1 outlines our overall data generation, model building, and forecasting approach.
2.1 Data and Case Selection

Event data will be used in our project. These are data on the actions between two parties to a conflict, nominal codes indicating who did what to whom and when. These data will be produced by the state-of-the-art TABARI automated coding software\(^8\) using the CAMEO event and actor coding system\(^9\). TABARI can analyze text that is downloaded from data services such as Lexis-Nexis or Factiva, or in real-time—at for essentially no cost beyond that of a web connection and web-enabled computer—via real simple syndication feeds (RSS). RSS aggregators such as Google News\(^10\) and the European Media Monitor\(^11\) each monitor over 4,000 sources, including both international media sources such as the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, BBC, Agence France Press, and Reuters, as well as thousands of local sources. The availability of these aggregators, and RSS feeds more generally, provide an unprecedented ability to monitor global political behavior in real-time.

[Figure 1 about here.]

The automated coding program TABARI works in conjunction with the CAMEO event coding system, which has extended the scope of the Cold War-era WEIS and COPDAB inter-state coding systems to provide detailed coding of intra-state conflict and to incorporate contemporary, post-Cold War theoretical concerns and concepts. TABARI also provides a detailed and systematic framework for coding a wide variety of political actors, whether international, supranational, transnational, or internal. From the coded text we can extract interval measures of inter-state and inter-group cooperation and conflict, count data on various types of behaviors, and nominal data such as event sequences or patterns. Because text data are available and updated frequently, and TABARI’s coding is fully automated, we will have a continuous flow of information on a wide range of variables and actors. Because it is informed by social science theory in how it catalogs actors and actions via dictionaries, the TABARI/CAMEO routines will be much more efficient and accurate than routines used by unsupervised data miners or by manual coding.

Retrospective automated event data coding from a single source (typically Reuters or Agence France Presse) is now a well-established procedure, and almost all studies of political conflict in

\(^8\)http://web.ku.edu/keds/software.dir/tabari.html
\(^9\)http://web.ku.edu/keds/data.dir/cameo.html
\(^10\)http://news.google.com/
\(^11\)http://emm.jrc.it/overview.html
referred political science literature over the past fifteen years have used this type of data. The challenge is moving this to multiple sources in real-time. Specifically the three key challenges are

1. Automated detection and classification of new political actors, as well as the re-classification of existing actors (e.g., a political party switching from government to opposition). To a much lesser extent, event coding systems need to be updated as new political vocabulary—such as the emergence of the phrase “ethnic cleansing” in the early 1990s—comes into use.

2. Effective filtering of historical and non-political stories (e.g., sports and business stories that use military metaphors) from a multiple-source stream, as well as the efficient detection of duplicate reports of the same event.

3. Calibration of event reports across multiple sources and regions: it is well known that some areas of the world are covered less extensively than others (e.g., Africa is covered less than East Asia), and as one shifts to multiple news courses, editorial policies such as the mix between political and economic stories also affect the data. Based on some recent experiments, item response theory (IRT) and other scaling methods appear to have great potential in resolving this issue (Schrodt, 2007). But additional work is required to apply them.

In addition to these specific issues, we also will deal with some general issues involved in scaling conflict systems, and some additional refinements to the CAMEO coding systems as we take that out of the Middle East and Asia—the geographical domains where most of the development has been done—into other parts of the world. The open-source TABARI/CAMEO system recently was employed by a defense contractor to code 25 gigabytes of Asian news reports involving more than 6.7 million stories and 253 million lines of text from 70 news sources, so we are fairly confident that the system is sufficiently robust to be able to generate the data that we need.

In this, the first stage of project, we will focus on three cases. The first is the Levant, specifically the Israel-Hamas-Fatah and Israel-Lebanon-Hizbollah cases. The KEDS project has a retrospective dataset on this conflict that provides thirty years of coverage\textsuperscript{12}, more than ample data for estimating and assessing retrospective models. Furthermore, the news coverage of the Levant is continuous and dense. Schrodt and his collaborators have used this data in several retrospective predictive studies

\textsuperscript{12}http://web.ku.edu/keds/data.dir/levant.html
(e.g., Hudson, Schrod and Whitmer, 2008; Schrod, 2006; Schrod and Gerner, 2004; Schrod, 2000), and Schrod also has done field work in the region. Brandt and Freeman already have applied some Bayesian time series models to this case 
\textit{ex post} (Brandt and Freeman, 2006; Brandt, Colaresi and Freeman, 2008). Finally there are a number of competing forecasts to which we can compare the success of our technology. Note however that while we have extensive experience with the collection and analysis of these, our collective past analyses of KEDS data for the Levant have not produced real-time forecast densities like what we are proposing here. Our goal is to extend this to real-time forecast density estimation.

In addition, to demonstrate the generality of our new approach, we also will forecast China-Taiwan-US relations and India-Pakistan-US relations. As just noted, TABARI/CAMEO very recently has been used to analyze a large body of Asian news text. So we have experience with the respective data sources.

\subsection*{2.2 Bayesian Models for Forecasting and Modeling Nonlinearities in International Relations}

\subsubsection*{2.2.1 Bayesian Forecasting in International Relations}

To forecast systems of behavior in time we need a multi-equation time series model. Consider the following:

\begin{equation}
\sum_{l=0}^{p} y_{t-l} A_l = d + \epsilon_t, \quad t = 1, 2, \ldots, T
\end{equation}

where $y_t$ is a $1 \times m$ dimensional vector say for the directed dyadic behavior of a three actor system, $A_l$ is a $m \times m$ matrix of coefficients for a set of lag polynomials representing the memory in the system back to lag $p$, $d$ is a $1 \times m$ vector of constants or deterministic variables such as electoral calendar counters, and $\epsilon_t$ is a $1 \times m$ dimensional error vector assumed to be uncorrelated with the $y_{t-s}$ for all $s > 0$, serially uncorrelated, and with individual variances equal to unity. The reduced form of equation 1 is

\begin{equation}
y_t = c + y_{t-1} B_1 + \ldots + y_{t-p} B_p + u_t, \quad t = 1, 2, \ldots, T
\end{equation}
where $y_t$ again is an $1 \times m$ vector of observations at time $t$, $B_l$ is the $m \times m$ coefficient matrix for the $l^{th}$ lag, $p$ is the maximum number of lags, and $u_t$ are the reduced form residuals.\footnote{The reduced form in equation (2) is related to the simultaneous equation model in equation (1) by}

$$
c = dA_0^{-1}, B_l = -A_lA_0^{-1}, l = 1, 2, \ldots, p, u_t = \epsilon_tA_0^{-1}.
$$

\footnote{For example, Pevehouse and Goldstein’s (1999) article, “Serbian Defiance or Compliance in Kosovo? Statistical Analysis and Real-Time Predictions” is based solely on causality tests in a reduced form model of the respective conflict.}

\footnote{Perhaps this is why Goldstein and Pevehouse and Goldstein et al. do not produce any impulse responses or forecasts for their models (they just report causality test results). Goldstein and Freeman (1990, Chapter 5) also do not produce confidence intervals (error bands) for their policy counterfactuals.}

Such reduced form models have been used by scholars to study conflict dynamics in the Levant and Bosnia (e.g. Goldstein, Pevehouse, Gerner and Telhami, 2001; Pevehouse and Goldstein, 1999; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 1997), as well as to study policy counterfactuals (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990, 1991). But to our knowledge they have not been used to produce \textit{ex ante} statistical forecasts.\footnote{The reduced form in equation (2) is related to the simultaneous equation model in equation (1) by}

There are at least two major problems with such models. First they are overparameterized. For a four actor illustration (e.g., the U.S., Israel, Hamas, Fatah) $y_t$ would contain the $m = 12$ directed, dyadic behaviors in the conflict system. If the VAR representation of this conflict uses $p = 6$ lagged values and $d$ is a vector of constants, the VAR model has 876 parameters. Clearly this produces a tremendous amount of estimation uncertainty and therefore a lack of precision in the model’s forecasts.\footnote{Perhaps this is why Goldstein and Pevehouse and Goldstein et al. do not produce any impulse responses or forecasts for their models (they just report causality test results). Goldstein and Freeman (1990, Chapter 5) also do not produce confidence intervals (error bands) for their policy counterfactuals.}

Overparameterization also can produce mistaken inferences about persistence, more specifically, about stationarity (Sims and Zha, 1998). But knife-edge tests for non-stationarity (unit roots) also can be erroneous. These tests can produce pretest bias in multivariate time series analysis (Freeman et al., 1998).

Bayesian multivariate time series analysis addresses these and other problems. By using expert knowledge in a Bayesian prior on the coefficients in equations 1 and 2, we are able to reduce the estimation uncertainty and obtain more precise dynamic inferences and forecasts. This prior applies to the weight of behavior at distant lags and the degree to which we believe the series might be non-stationary and possibly cointegrated. In the Bayesian model these restrictions are inexact whereas in the frequentist model they are exact and knife-edge. Brandt and Freeman (2006, 2009) explain how a prior for the study of intra- and international conflict (cooperation) can be constructed and applied to equations 1 and 2 (see also Brandt, Colaresi and Freeman, 2008). This work also explains how concepts like log marginal data densities Chib (1995) can be used to calculate Bayes factors.
(Kass and Raftery, 1995) to assess the in-sample fit of these Bayesian time series models. Finally, all these developments are based on posterior Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) samples. So the technology needed to produce predictive distributions for these models is available.\(^\text{16}\)

### 2.2.2 Markov-switching Bayesian time series models

Our theories (for example Lebovic, 1994; Lund, 1996; Gurr and Harff, 1996) teach us that human conflicts are subject to phase shifts or fundamental non-linearities. This is another reason why normality assumptions break down in time series forecasting: non-linearities caused by conflict phase shifts are bound to produce fat tailed (leptokuric) forecasting distributions. Unlike financial analysts who model this behavior with “heavy tail distributions,” we propose to model the non-linearities with Markov-switching processes. These models allow us to capture the phase changes and non-normality of the data using Markov and mixture models (Frühwirth-Schnatter, 2006). Specifically, we will include in our evaluation of contending forecasting models, Markov-switching, Bayesian multivariate time series models.\(^\text{17}\)

A Markov-switching version of the Bayesian VAR model (in equations 1 and 2) can be represented as a set of \(h\) state VAR models. The structural Markov-switching Bayesian VAR (MS-BVAR) version is

\[
\sum_{l=0}^{p} y_{t-l} A_l(s_t) = d(s_t) + \epsilon_t(s_t), \quad t = 1, 2, \ldots, T, \tag{3}
\]

where \(s_t = j\) is an \(h\)–dimensional vector indexing the state of the process where \(j\) is the integer label for the state, with a \(h \times h\) Markov transition matrix \(Q\). The rows of \(Q\) give the probability of transitioning from state \(s_{t-1}\) to \(s_t\), or \(\Pr(s_t = k|s_{t-1} = j)\) for states \(k\) and \(j\). Note that while the models in equations (1) and (2) generically have \(m^2p + m\) regression parameters, the model in equation (3) has \(h(m^2p + m)\) parameters. As noted earlier, for a 12 equation, 6 lag model the model in equation (2) has 876 parameters. So if we allow a Markov-switching process with 2 states (say high and low conflict intensity / volatility) there will be 1752 parameters.\(^\text{18}\) So a Bayesian

\(^{16}\)Brandt has implemented these models in an open source R package called MSBVAR, http://yule.utdallas.edu/code.html

\(^{17}\)On the prevalence of fat tails in forecast distributions in economics and finance see such works as Granger (2005). Note that our models will allow us to capture more permanent structural breaks in conflict as well. These breaks are simply switches with high degrees of permanence.

\(^{18}\)In fact, the Bayesian estimation of these models is even more demanding, since the model in equation 3 has
approach is even more sensible when allowing for non-linearities and phase shifts, since it allows us to deal with the proliferation of parameters.

A prior for this model has to include beliefs about the $A_t$ and $d$ parameters as well as the Markov process $Q$. We already have been able to adapt the random walk prior in Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008); Sims and Zha (1998) to serve as a baseline set of beliefs in an analysis of international conflict event data (Brandt and Appleby, 2007). The sensitivity of this prior can be evaluated using methods like those discussed in Brandt and Freeman (2009).

Forecasting with these models is a straightforward application of data augmentation via Gibbs sampling. So we can generate dyadic, phase or state specific ex ante and ex post counterfactual forecasts. The MCMC output of the Bayesian model in equation (3) also can be used to estimate the number of states or phases in the model (Sims, Waggoner and Zha, 2008; Frühwirth-Schnatter, 2006). We will also be able to evaluate these forecasts in the manner discussed below: forecast densities that account for the possible state-dependent mixtures of forecast distributions. This allows us to capture both fat-tailed and other non-linearities in a sensible manner. Finally, the forecasts from a Markov-switching VAR model like equation (3) are a weighted combination of the forecasts for each state or phase. This means that the forecasts account for both the inherent variability of the time series themselves, but also the parameters and the phases. Thus, the uncertainty of changepoints or phase shifts is captured directly in the estimation and forecasting process enabling additional analyses of how regime changes impact the ability to predict conflict (cooperation).

2.3 Forecast Densities and Evaluations: Making the Transition from Point to Distribution Prediction

How then do we build the most scientifically sound and useful Bayesian time series model for forecasting intra and international conflict (cooperation) out-of-sample (ex ante) in real-time? The answer is that we need to make the transition from point prediction to distribution prediction and to apply the technique of “recalibration” (Gneiting, 2008; Timmerman, 2000; Tay and Wallis, 2000). $h(\text{m}^2p + m)$ parameters spread over $2^n(h!)$ possible posterior modes. Sampling from these modes is computationally intensive but feasible (Frühwirth-Schnatter, 2001; Scott, 2002).

19 The MS-BVAR model outlined here can capture changepoint, SETAR, TAR, and other switching and non-linear time series models as special cases (Frühwirth-Schnatter, 2006; Krolzig, 1997).
Statistical forecasting in political science still uses point prediction to evaluate model performance. In fact, we usually use a residual mean square error (RMSE) criterion for this purpose. First, there are many such criteria for point forecasts (Wallis, 1995; Diebold and Lopez, 1996; Chatfield, 2001). And RMSE is one of the weakest criteria because it is sensitive to outliers. But more important, point prediction does not tell us anything about the (un)certainty of a forecast. And reliance on normality assumptions to construct forecast confidence intervals is prone to mistaken inferences since they amount to strong, often inaccurate assumptions about the symmetry and about the size of the tails of a forecast distribution.\footnote{For a succinct summary and critique of these normality assumptions see Tay and Wallis (2000, esp. 235-236).}

One alternative is to use prediction intervals. Put simply, this is the practice of constructing the upper and lower limits between which the future values of a series are expected to lie with some prescribed probability (Chatfield, 2001; Granger, 2005). Tools like fan charts are used to represent these intervals. Since the late 1990s the Bank of England has presented its forecasts for inflation and growth in this way (Gneiting, 2008). For various reasons these intervals are often difficult to apply. One is that until recently many software packages did not produce them. More fundamentally, they are apt to be too narrow on average (Chatfield, 2001, 479ff.).\footnote{Space does not allow for a full presentation of interval forecasting or for a discussion of the methods that have been developed to evaluate interval forecasts. (See Christoffersen, 1998; Taylor, 1999; Tay and Wallis, 2000).}

The favored approach in statistics is density evaluation, or what is called “probability forecasting” (Rosenblatt, 1952; Dawid, 1984). A density forecast is “a complete description of the uncertainty associated with a prediction, and stands in contrast to a point forecast, which by itself, contains no description of the associated uncertainty” (Tay and Wallis, 2000, 235). Our plan then is to use our Markov-switching Bayesian multivariate time series model to produce entire forecast densities for all our variables for conflict and cooperation between belligerents and to evaluate these densities for their accuracy through time. On the basis of the results we will recalibrate our model gradually improving its performance. We will make all of the data forecasts publicly available via a project website. We will also compare our forecasts to those generated by other methods and parties such as the recently announced political forecasting website—The Call—by the Eurasia Group in collaboration with Foreign Policy magazine (http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/node) and any additional such sites that come on-line during the period of the grant.

Several tools are used in this process. The primary tool is the probability integral transform
The PIT is defined for a series of realized values and forecasts. Let \( \{ y_t \}_{t=1}^m \) be a series of realizations from some conditional density \( \{ f(y_t | \Omega_{t-1}) \}_{t=1}^m \) where \( \Omega_{t-1} \) is the (past) information set at time \( t \). Then if the one-step ahead density forecasts \( \{ p_{t-1}(y_t) \}_{t=1}^m \) equal \( \{ f(y_t | \Omega_{t-1}) \}_{t=1}^m \) (and assuming a non-zero Jacobian), the PIT of \( \{ y_t \}_{t=1}^m \) with respect to \( \{ p_{t-1}(y_t) \}_{t=1}^m \) is i.i.d. \( U(0, 1) \), or

\[
\{ z_t \}_{t=1}^m = \left\{ \int_{-\infty}^{y_t} p_{t-1}(u) \, du \right\}_{t=1}^m \sim U(0, 1) \tag{4}
\]

If the forecast density is ‘correct,’ then the \( z_t \) is an independent uniform \( U[0,1] \) variate and the model is “well-calibrated.” This result extends to the case of time-dependent density forecasts and to multivariate forecasts. Deviations in \( z_t \) from uniform iid are indications that the forecasts do not capture some aspect of the data generating process. One uses graphical tools—comparison of the plot of the \( z_t \) with the 45 degree line that is the uniform’s distribution function, histograms, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von Mises tests, and correlograms of the levels and powers of the PIT to make this determination. Still newer tools that complement PIT histograms are calibration plots and sharpness diagrams. Using these tools we will be able to rank the performance of alternate forecasting models. By recalibrating the best of them, we will produce better forecasts of the Levant, South Asia and East Asian cases. Finally, if forecasting models can be found that capture the true data generating process, from a decision theoretic perspective, all analysts will prefer it regardless of their loss functions (Diebold, Gunther and Tay, 1998; Diebold, Tay and Wallis, 1998). Hence our best models will aid decisionmaking.

In the first stage of our project, we will evaluate competing forecasting models for intra- and international conflict (cooperation) for our three cases and evaluate them with the PIT and the tools mentioned above. The competing models will include theoretically relevant actor clusters and variables like election forces. To benchmark their performance we will include naïve models like univariate autoregressive moving average specifications. But Bayesian reduced form models like that in equation (2) and its Markov-switching variant in equation (3) will be the main objects of evaluation. Therefore we will need to apply multivariate techniques for density forecasting.
Thus we will produce forecasts that meet our earlier desiderata. As with any scientific enterprise, we expect to learn as much from where our models go wrong as from where they are correct. Erroneous predictions are key to determining the gaps and weaknesses in our existing theoretical concepts, variables, and measurement methods. The advantage of systematic forecasting such as the system we are proposing is that we can re-assess the models based on the sets of assumptions based on different theoretical perspectives, particularly as these feed into the model through the priors. With the high-speed automated coding provided by the TABARI system, we can also experiment with the theoretical constructs embedded in the event coding ontologies. For example by further differentiating sub-state actors, or differentiating types of events that are currently lumped together into a single coding category, but which can be differentiated in the texts from which they were originally derived, we can determine how definitions of actors and events affect our ability to produce high quality forecasts.

3 Illustrating Phase Baseline Forecasts for the Levant

To illustrate our approach, we generate a set of *ex ante* forecasts for material conflict among the Israelis and Palestinians. This is only an example of what we propose here: we plan to expand this example to include more equations (actors), mediation and cooperation event series, less aggregated data (weekly instead of monthly), and more complex dynamics. With these caveats, the goal here is to point out the advantages of MS-BVAR and BVAR models for forecasting conflict processes.

The case study for this analysis is data on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We employ monthly CAMEO-coded data from *Agence France Presse* (hereafter, AFP) from 1996:1-2009:12. We aggregated the data for U.S., Israeli and Palestinian *material conflict events* for each month. We use these data because they capture the second intifada and periods of recent high and low conflict. For the six dyadic material conflict series (ISR2PAL, PAL2ISR, USA2ISR, ISR2USA, PAL2USA, USA2PAL) we fit two models. The first is a Bayesian VAR with one lag using the prior specified for example, Kling and Bessler (1989) illustrate how a Bayesian multivariate model with a Litterman prior can be recalibrated in time to produce better forecasts of four variables for the U.S. macroeconomy.

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We also did this analysis using data from the Reuters’ wire service. The results from these data are consistent with what is reported here.

These counts of material conflict events most correlate strongly with the Goldstein-scaled WEIS data from earlier KEDS coding.
in Brandt and Freeman (2006). The second is an MS-BVAR model with one lag where the prior for each regime or state is the same symmetric prior used in the BVAR model. The diffuse prior for the regimes is Dirichlet.\textsuperscript{27}

Figure 2 shows the probabilities of the two regime MS-BVAR model for the sample. Note that the high conflict periods (the black regimes) are those that correspond to episodes of very high regional material conflict. The regime switches come at some clearly defined points in the conflict: from late 1999 until early 2005 the regime with the higher probability is generally the high conflict (black) regime. This corresponds with the the second intifada. The period in 2005 and 2006 corresponds to the series of Qassam rocket attacks by Palestinians on Israel. The period in 2008 when the red or low conflict regime has higher probability corresponds to the Israeli-Hamas truce followed by stepped up rocket attacks. Thus, there is evidence for changes in parameters throughout the recent years of the conflict. The first regime occurs for about 60\% of the sample period and one where the conflict dynamics are nearly non-stationary, has an equilibrium level of twice as many material conflict events than the lower conflict regime, and a variance that is more than 50\% larger than the lower conflict regime. The second regime is one where the conflict stays near a status quo level with lower volatility.\textsuperscript{28}

Most importantly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s, current state is the high conflict regime. The in-sample predicted regimes moved back and forth from the high to low conflict regimes throughout 2009. The December 2009 regime is the high material conflict regime with a predicted probability of 0.75. This persists in forecasts for 2010. Figure 3 presents 12 months of forecasts (covering all of 2010) for the material conflict series. Note that these are a weighted combination (based on the probabilities of each regime, forecast 12 months into the future). Thus, this is a Markov-switching

\textsuperscript{27}For the MS-BVAR model we find the initial posterior mode and the regime probabilities via the EM algorithm. We then draw 20000 values from this posterior mode to construct the subsequent inferences and forecasts. The BVAR model posterior has a known analytic posterior density. We sample 20000 draws directly from this density to construct the BVAR forecasts. See Brandt and Freeman (2006) for details on the latter.

\textsuperscript{28}Further evidence of the MS process is the posterior transition matrix. If the transition matrix is equal across its rows then this is just a mixture process. This is not the case here: the data generation process is consistent with Markov-switching. The estimated posterior transition matrix $Q$ is

$$Q = \begin{pmatrix}
0.84(0.09) & 0.16(0.09) \\
0.24(0.10) & 0.76(0.10)
\end{pmatrix}$$

where the standard errors are given in parentheses.
distribution of the high and low conflict regimes. An important caveat to these current forecasts is that they are probably weakened by the fact that in this model we are not differentiating between Gaza and the West Bank. At present, those two systems seem entirely decoupled, as even very high levels of violence in Gaza have had almost no effect (other than a few demonstrations) on violence in the West Bank. We should be able to correct this in the future by looking separately at Fatah and Hamas actions.

The median forecasts across the BVAR and MS-BVAR models are very similar. For both the BVAR and MS-BVAR models, there is an upward trend in the number of material conflict events forecasted for 2010. The BVAR model forecasts are for a higher level of conflict than what is seen in the MSBVAR models. This is contrary to some current journalistic accounts that see little prospect for change in this conflict in 2010 (Ephron, 2010). The differences across the two models come in how we would characterize the forecast density coverage of the predictions. In general, the BVAR forecast credible intervals that assume constant parameters are too small: they are almost always within the forecast credible intervals of the MS-BVAR forecasts (which allow for the non-zero probability for the high conflict regime). Thus Figure 3 indicates that the risk of additional material conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians is different when we consider the MS-BVAR versus the BVAR forecast models. We believe that this serves as initial evidence for our claims that there are parameter shifts in the data that should be modeled.

This is a rather circumscribed example: in later iterations we plan on expanding this in the manner discussed at the start of this section. The inclusion of additional dyadic conflict and cooperation series (both material and verbal, per the CAMEO scheme) should provide us with more evidence for identifying parameter shifts and regime switching like that uncovered here.

4 Conclusions

Our plan is to expand this forecasting exercise in several directions. First, we plan on covering multiple conflicts around the globe – in addition to the Levant, this project will expand to cover India and Pakistan and China and Taiwan. We have already made efforts to establish the collections
of actors needed to code the data for these latter two sets of conflict. Second, we have to further scale up the number of actors, dyads, and measures included in our forecasts.

The previous paragraph belies the technical complexity of our proposal. The estimation and summarization of forecast densities for even a simple BVAR model are computationally intensive: simulating the 100,000 posterior draws of nine month forecasts for six and seven equation (directed-dyad) models in Brandt, Colaresi and Freeman (2008) required over one hour of CPU time.\footnote{Time measured on an Apple G5 dual core 2.0Ghz PPC 970MP processor.} At present the sampling and forecasting for the 20000 draws what we have reported here takes 12 minutes on a current server.\footnote{Time measured on an Apple dual quad-core 2.26 Ghz server.} While this is an impressive decline in computation time, the burdens of estimating more advanced Markov-switching versions of these models is several orders of magnitude larger because we need to investigate forecasting models with different numbers of states (see below). Further, as we proposed in section 2.1, we will be forecasting multiple conflicts: Israel-Fatah-Hamas, Israel-Lebanon-Hizbollah, India-Pakistan, and China-Taiwan. In each of these cases there are many or more actors than in the \textit{ex post} forecasts of Brandt, Colaresi and Freeman (2008), since the U.S. and other regional actors would also be part of the models. So covering the four conflicts would take at least 4-6 hours for the sample number of periods, just to produce one set of MS-BVAR forecasts which is serious computational time across the different model orders, conflicts, and forecast horizons. Past experience with the BVAR and MS-BVAR models has shown that each additional actor added to a conflict increases the Bayesian posterior simulation time exponentially (since adding one actor increases the scale of the problem from $2^m - m$ to $2^{m+1} - (m+1)$). Further, each additional Markov-switching state increases the number of posterior modes that must be sampled from $h!$ to $(h+1)!$ Even for small values of $m$ and $h$, the initially estimated times grows by a factor of $4(h!)(2^m - m)$. So covering our basic three-actor models ($m = 6$) for a two state model ($h = 2$) would grow greatly to simulate the forecast densities over the conflicts. Our goal is to further work on these issues to reduce the computational burdens and time so that this becomes a feasible exercise.

Finally, once we expand our forecasting capabilities, we will work on further calibration and refinement methods. The plan is that these will be part of an on-going comparison of the \textit{ex ante} forecasts to the actual data. Once we have forecasts generated we will be able to compare the \textit{ex}...
forecasts to the actual data.

A possible reservation to this project may be that it is either already being done in the intelligence community, or that it should be done there rather than by us. We have several responses to this. First, to the best of our knowledge, none of what we are proposing duplicates existing efforts. Hollywood portrayals of an intelligence community endowed with vast technological capabilities for analysis are fiction, not reality, and at present the ability to collect information far outpaces the ability to analyze it.

Second, while forty years ago there appeared to be little point in doing work that did not use classified information because this was, in principle (if not always in reality, as the experience in Vietnam indicated) vastly superior to the unclassified work, that situation has changed dramatically with the information sources available for strategic analysis on the Internet. Since we are trying to make forecasts at policy-relevant lead times of six months to five years, not trying to figure out where Osama bin-Laden is sleeping tonight, the additional information provided by classified sources—Hollywood notwithstanding—is not only minimal, but often dysfunctional (Lowenthal, 2009; Johnson and Wirtz, 2004).

Third, there is an increasing interest in technical political forecasting in the NGO community. Two recent examples of this would be the SwissPeace FAST project31 which operated from 1998-2008, and the current Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project of the Peace Research Institute Oslo.32 Both the ability to generate real-time event data at a very low cost and some of the quantitative forecasting methods will be of interest to NGOs involved in either conflict monitoring or conflict forecasting. If successful, our system would be particularly useful in assisting NGOs who are called upon to provide material services such as food, medical support and refugee housing in areas experiencing violent political conflict. Acquisition and transportation of these resources typically requires three to six months of advance planning, particularly when large-scale relief supplies that must be shipped by sea are required. We are not suggesting that our models will be the sole factor in these plans, but—given the known problems with the accuracy of qualitative forecasting (Tetlock, 2005)—they can be another input. Quantitative models are already used for the advance planning of reactions to natural disasters: for example, the models of the U.S. Agency

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31http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/early-warning/index.html; for several years Schrodt was involved in generating event data for the Israel-Palestine conflict component of FAST.
32http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Armed-Conflict-Location-and-Event-Data/
for International Development Famine Early Warning System Network, FEWS-NET\textsuperscript{33}, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Coastal Services hazards assessment toolkits\textsuperscript{34} and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Information and Early Warning System.\textsuperscript{35} Our project would extend these to human-initiated political disasters.

Fifth, there is little publicly available software for the methods we are proposing to use to forecast conflict (cooperation). We will continue the practice begun with the development of the MSBVAR and TABARI software packages of making all of our code available and open source. The expanded availability of software and data that flows from this project will benefit both applied international relations, time series analysis, econometrics, etc.

Finally, the methods we are developing could be extended to many domains beyond political analysis. The event/network methods we develop for the study of political conflict could quite easily, for example, be used for the study of economic competition or small-group dynamics. That synergy will not occur if tool development such as this remains only behind the screen of security classification. Further, the application of BVAR, MS-BVAR, and other time series models will be advanced. As we have already done with developing modified priors for these models, we believe that there will be novel identification methods for the states and phases that can be used by researchers in other fields.

\textsuperscript{33}http://www.fews.net
\textsuperscript{34}http://www.csc.noaa.gov/bins/resources/hazards.html
\textsuperscript{35}http://www.fao.org/GIEWS/english/index.htm
References


Figure 1: Data generation, model specification and forecasting
Figure 2: Regime Probabilities: Monthly Levant Material Conflict Data, 1996-2010. Black (red) line is regime one (two)
Figure 3: Material conflict forecasts for Israeli and Palestinian dyads based on CAMEO material conflict data, 2010:1-2010:12. Black (red) lines are the median BVAR (MS-BVAR) forecasts with 68% and 50% credible intervals.
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<td><strong>One Shot Decision or Event</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Probability of Binary Outcome</td>
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Table 1: Some Approaches to Forecasting Conflict in International Relations