The Citizen-Soldier Tradition in the United States

Has Its Demise Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Ronald R. Krebs
University of Minnesota

Many contend that the citizen-soldier tradition in the United States is dead. They argue that the elimination of the draft in 1973, and the establishment of the all-volunteer force (AVF), severed the link between military service and citizenship. The author maintains that this conventional wisdom is wrong. Critics of the AVF have idealized the pre-AVF U.S. military; they have failed to recognize that the AVF was more a product of change in U.S. citizenship ideals than a cause of them; and they have asserted a homology between institutional design (military recruitment system) and a cultural phenomenon (the citizen-soldier tradition) that has little historical purchase. This article reconceptualizes the citizen-soldier tradition as a set of rhetorical conventions, and it demonstrates that these tropes continue to shape political debate in the United States. From this perspective, the AVF did not condemn the citizen-soldier to death: it gave him or her a new lease on life.

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The conventional wisdom is that the citizen-soldier tradition in the United States is today at its historical nadir. Leading scholars of civil–military relations often argue that the installation of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 marked the end of—or even, as they sometimes boldly claim, severed—the link between citizenship and military service. Manpower trends over the ensuing three decades—an increasingly long-serving and professional force, combined with greater reliance on private military contractors—are thought to have rendered that link still more remote. Notwithstanding the ritual of Selective Service registration, Americans do not expect

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their national government to call on them to sacrifice for the nation, and they do not believe that their rights as citizens do, or should, hinge on their willingness to die for the nation. Whether this conclusion is warranted is of no small import. The demise of the citizen-soldier tradition is associated with a host of purported ills: a corrosive culture of rights, American national disunity, and an unstable social system in which national burdens are not equally borne.

But these conclusions do not follow if the premise is faulty. Is the citizen-soldier tradition a thing of the past, as so many maintain? Invoking Mark Twain, this article argues that the citizen-soldier’s demise has been greatly exaggerated. Students of civil–military relations often explicitly or implicitly advance a homology between military recruitment system and political culture: we know that the citizen-soldier tradition is no more because the mass army is no more. But the citizen-soldier as a cultural phenomenon exists independently of this presumed institutional manifestation, and it has survived institutional change. The citizen-soldier tradition is more usefully thought of as a set of rhetorical conventions that, at least at one time, generally commanded assent among both elites and masses in the United States, and the configuration of rhetorical commonplaces that constitutes the citizen-soldier tradition has historically been associated with a variety of military recruitment systems, not just with mass conscription. To claim that the end of the peacetime mass army marks the end of the citizen-soldier is to mistake a contingent relationship for an invariant one. By reconceptualizing the citizen-soldier tradition in this fashion, we become open to the ways in which it remains vibrant in the United States. Ironically, the resilience of the tradition since 1973 may plausibly be ascribed in part to the challenges of raising a large standing volunteer military: in other words, the AVF did not condemn the citizen-soldier to death but gave him or her a new lease on life.

The rest of this article proceeds in three moves. First, it critically reviews common claims among scholars of civil–military relations about the citizen-soldier tradition in the United States and the effects of the end of the mass army. Second, it reconceptualizes the tradition as a set of specific rhetorical conventions that situate the citizen-soldier opposite the mercenary—or, in contemporary parlance, the employee-soldier of the “occupational” model of military service. Third, it explores whether, viewed through this prism, the citizen-soldier tradition is dead in contemporary America and concludes that it is not. In short, the citizen-soldier lives.

Obligation, Occupation, and the Lessons of History

According to many leading observers of U.S. civil–military relations, the citizen-soldier has departed the American scene. Elliot Abrams and Andrew Bacevich emphatically assert that “the mythic tradition of the citizen-soldier is dead.” Daniel Moran notes, more broadly, that “the legend of the levée en masse has, to all appearances, lost its grip upon the Western imagination.” David Segal concludes that military service in the United States has been redefined “from being an obligation of
citizenship in a community to being an obligation of national citizenship and, most recently, to being a job.” James Burk writes that, with the end of the draft, the United States “abandon[ed] the ideal of the citizen soldier, conscripted into the mass army.” Eliot Cohen suggests that the citizen-soldier is in his “twilight.” Many ascribe this development to a notable change in military format and recruitment—from the mass army to the AVF.

Yet what is the citizen-soldier, and how is his or her rise and demise related to recruitment system? Charles Moskos famously argued that, with the introduction of the AVF, the citizen-soldier was replaced by *homo economicus*, motivated by the skills, salary, and educational benefits that military service bequeaths, rather than by patriotism or obligation. Burk similarly observes that “the charisma of the citizen soldier was routinized and diminished as the choice to perform military service became much like a choice to fill any job.” The Army recruitment slogans of recent memory—“Be All That You Can Be” and “An Army of One”—capture these individualistic motives. More important, they allegedly reflect a changing model of military service: from an *institutional* to an *occupational* model, from service as an obligation to service as a job. “The abandonment of conscription,” Moskos maintained, “jeopardizes the nation’s dual-military tradition, one-half of which—and truly its heart—is the citizen soldiery.” Thus, he recommended a short-term enlistment option that not only would boost recruitment but would, more important, inculcate a certain (republican) vision of citizenship: “the grand design is that the ideal of citizenship obligation ought to become part of growing up in America.”

In Cohen’s formulation, the citizen-soldier tradition suggests a force that is, at least in theory, demographically and socioeconomically representative of society at large; soldiers whose service is motivated by a sense of duty to the nation; and soldiers whose primary identity is that of citizens, temporarily in uniform. In Cohen’s view, universal conscription is necessary and sufficient to give rise to the citizen-soldier. Volunteer militaries, he suggests, differ along all three dimensions. In a volunteer force, the demand for service comes from below: even if motivated by patriotic stirrings, service in no way suggests the fulfillment of obligation. Such a military force is not, even in theory, representative of society. Finally, members of the armed forces are, far down the chain of command, long-serving professionals with training, expertise, and a corporate identity that sits alongside, and at times even supplants, their civilian identity.

These scholars suggest that the demise of the citizen-soldier has contributed to the dilution of American citizenship. Citizenship refers to the mutual claims that authorities and populations may make upon each other, to rights that must be respected and obligations that must be fulfilled by both. In the contemporary United States, some lament, citizenship has become a bundle of rights, a one-way street in which citizens make claims on the state but do not tolerate authorities’ claims upon them. Put differently, Americans have grown enamored of a liberal model of citizenship, which lacks a persuasive basis for civic obligation. In these scholars’ view, the AVF played a signal role in this process, for military service is
one of the few concrete demands that states make on their populations, and its potential cost goes beyond paying taxes, serving on a jury, or voting. When military service becomes just a job, it suggests that civic virtue is no longer a preeminent value. When meaningful sacrifice is not part of citizens’ lives, a culture emerges that is neither accustomed to nor appreciative of obligation. Critics of the AVF would find illuminating the summation of Bernard Rostker, a former director of Selective Service: “Today the all-volunteer force is one that values the individual, and through increased levels of retention, individuals signal back that they value the all-volunteer force”—but, revealingly, not the state or their countrymen.

In their view, mass armies suggest an alternative, republican model of citizenship. Republicans, like liberals, focus on the preservation of individual liberty, but they conceive of such liberty in terms of freedom from arbitrary interference. They therefore “do not view state action, provided it is properly constrained, as an inherent affront to liberty,” and they welcome state action that addresses relations and structures of domination. Republicans value active participation in democratic politics not for its own sake, but because it fosters a political culture of public-spiritedness that protects liberty. The republican tradition has long emphasized the importance of civic virtue in sustaining republican institutions, and it has historically identified the good citizen as one willing to die on the battlefield for the political community.

Point of Critical Entry 1: Idealized Motivations

One point of critical entry is the idealized portrait of American soldiers before the AVF: Moskos and Cohen, among others, define the citizen-soldier by, or at least associate him with, a willing and swift obedience to the call to arms. Yet Peter Karsten has observed that there is little evidence of “consent theory” in the history of U.S. military recruitment. Even during the later colonial period, when the citizen-soldier ideal supposedly was most unproblematically given practical expression, the middle and upper classes gladly paid fines to avoid militia service. Even at the height of the Revolution, generous recruiting bounties—in today’s argot, signing bonuses—were needed to procure sufficient forces for the Continental Army. The Continental Congress saw long enlistments as valuable but unfeasible: John Adams observed that in Massachusetts, not more than a regiment “of the meanest, idlest, most intemperate, and worthless” would have signed up for the war’s duration. George Washington was disappointed by the “dirty, mercenary spirit” that he perceived to move his fellow Americans, complaining to the Congress of an “egregious want of public spirit.”

The Civil War witnessed much the same. As battlefield losses piled up, state militias could not meet either army’s manpower needs, and a federal draft followed in the Confederacy in 1862 and in the Union the following year. In both settings, however, conscription was notable for its ineffectiveness, which in turn led to the distribution of enormous bounties. By one account, “bounties cost about as much as
pay for the Army during the entire war; exceeded the quartermaster expenditures for the war; and were twice as great as the cost of subsistence and five times the ordnance costs”; and “bounty-jumpers,” who enlisted and deserted repeatedly, were rife, as were substitute brokers. A spirit of sacrifice and civic duty seems to have been distinctly lacking. More than 30 percent of those examined in the Union’s July 1863 draft exploited commutation and substitution to evade service, and another 65 percent were declared exempt. The unequal burden led to widespread draft riots in Union cities, and another 14 percent of those called failed to report: whatever obligations citizens perceived came in a distant second to the priority of equity. In the four subsequent applications of the 1863 Enrollment Act, just 19 percent of those “held to service” personally served; the rest either furnished substitutes (47 percent) or paid commutation (35 percent).

Soldiers committed to republican ideals may still be somewhat self-interested and may push for renegotiating the terms of citizenship. The observation that American soldiers were hardly altruistic before the AVF—as veterans, they received housing, medical, and educational benefits, pensions, and preferential hiring—does not necessarily indicate some base motivation or that the relationship is purely commodified. More revealing, however, is when they press for revision. To do so in peacetime, when leverage is low but also when the costs to the common good are manageable, is compatible with republican motives. To threaten to withhold the performance of civic duty in times of crisis—when leverage is high, but also when the state is most vulnerable—makes good political sense but is at odds with a citizenship model in which the polity’s interests transcend those of the individual. Yet when the U.S. government has sought to mobilize citizens, Americans have often exploited the occasion to wring a more favorable citizenship bargain. Thus the African American activist A. Philip Randolph threatened a large-scale march on Washington in 1940, which led to a Fair Employment Practices Committee charged with enforcing nondiscrimination in the war industries; and in 1948, Randolph threatened black draft evasion unless Truman eliminated racial segregation in the armed forces. Even when African Americans set aside agitation for first-class citizenship—as during World War I and much of World War II—they did so not out of a sense of obligation, but for strategic reasons: so they could, through participation in the war effort, prove to white Americans their worthiness for full citizenship and lay the foundation for postwar claims-making. This same strategic logic guided advocates of women’s suffrage during World War I and Japanese American leaders during World War II.

Point of Critical Entry 2: Getting the Causal Story Backwards

As we have already seen, prominent scholars of civil–military relations believe the AVF bears substantial responsibility for the emergence of a culture of rights in which civic virtue is not prized, obligations are hardly acknowledged, and market-based
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solutions have proliferated. Even assuming that the critics are right to assert such a transformation in America’s dominant model of citizenship, they have the causal dynamic backwards. Liberal citizenship preceded the AVF, and the turn to volunteer recruitment was more a response to it than its cause.

Ironically, republican citizenship gave way in the United States to a more liberal version in the late 1940s—precisely when the commitment to the mass army was being rearticulated. The confrontation with Nazism and Soviet communism deeply shaped how Americans thought and talked about citizenship, as the mobilization rhetorics of those conflicts crystallized around America as the defender of individual rights, as the liberal state par excellence. Liberalism triumphed internationally as well, as the radically new notion of “human rights”—foundational rights to which all were entitled, prior to and irrespective of positive law—took hold.

Not only was the AVF not responsible for the emergence of liberal citizenship, it was in part a product of that cultural transformation. The end of the draft is often traced to the domestic, and especially campus, politics of the Vietnam War. Yet in major congressional forums, as early as 1963, even before the Americanization of the war, the equity and effectiveness of Selective Service were being questioned and a volunteer force’s feasibility and wisdom were being explored. Senator Barry Goldwater, as part of his 1964 presidential campaign, announced that he would end the draft, forcing President Lyndon Johnson to order a “comprehensive study” by the Defense Department. The draft’s days were thus numbered less because of the manpower pressures of Vietnam—hardly on Congress’ horizon in 1964—than because of a tectonic shift of the country’s ideological plates.

By the early 1960s, the postwar consensus in favor of Keynesian fiscal management in particular and government intervention in general was beginning to break down, and the Chicago School’s preference for market forces as the solution to social and economic problems was emerging as a well-defined alternative. The Selective Service system had, by the latter half of the 1950s, established itself as among the core institutions charged with managing the national economy: more than merely the agency supervising the draft, it used its byzantine system of deferments to channel the nation’s youth in ways that furthered national objectives. With Keynesianism’s decline, public trust in Selective Service fell as well. The extensive-ness of the deferments—Selective Service had become “a draft agency that did more deferring than drafting”—not only raised questions of fairness but also suggested that the agency was less than efficient. The Vietnam War’s role was substantial but indirect: by destroying the Great Society and ushering in the Great Inflation, Vietnam led to the rejection of Keynesian logic and paved the way for the neoclassical alternative. Under these ideological conditions, legitimating the draft became increasingly difficult: it came to be seen less as an obligation of citizenship than as a particularly burdensome tax that fell particularly unevenly. The AVF’s eventual success may have played some role in “demonstrating” the superiority of free-market logic, but the AVF was more the product of a neoclassical liberal cultural turn
that cast society as merely an aggregation of individuals, that saw citizenship as guaranteeing individuals’ rights against the state, and that portrayed the draft as unwarranted. Put differently, the AVF was the authentic expression of how the liberal state would meet the demands of national security.

The Vietnam War is normally identified as at least the proximate cause of the draft’s demise, but this computes only if one ignores pre-Vietnam trends. Yes, growing doubts among the public about the rectitude and advisability of the war, combined with revelations about government deception, led to increasing skepticism about whether the state should be entrusted with the coercive authority of which the draft was emblematic. Yes, Nixon hoped that ending the draft would quiet student protesters, allow the United States to extricate itself from Southeast Asia on its own terms, and ensure his reelection. And yes, the war’s unpopularity had rendered the draft highly inefficient as evasion burgeoned, appeals for waivers swelled, and claims of conscientious objection mushroomed. Yet on balance the war delayed the turn to volunteer recruitment: the draft would have ended even earlier if the United States had not intervened massively in Vietnam in the first place. Indeed, the growing manpower burden of Vietnam led Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas Morris to embargo until June 1966 the earlier Pentagon Draft Study that had embraced an AVF; Morris feared that the study’s release would imperil the war. The 1968 Republican Party platform famously endorsed the AVF but added a caveat: “when military manpower needs can be appreciably reduced.” What could be imagined in 1964 would not be implemented for nearly a decade. And policy makers could envision ending the draft only once they had made the strategic commitment to withdrawing the bulk of U.S. forces—albeit only when conditions were ripe and even then only gradually—from Southeast Asia.32

Point of Critical Entry 3: The Autonomy of Culture

The largest chink in this conventional wisdom’s armor lies in the asserted link between the design of military recruitment and the citizen-soldier tradition. The latter is properly understood as a cultural phenomenon—as Abrams and Bacevich imply in referring to “the mythic tradition of the citizen-soldier,” as Moran suggests in invoking “the legend of the levée en masse,” and as Claire Snyder indicates in speaking of “the citizen-soldier ideal.” Cohen, in contrast, treats the citizen-soldier tradition as a set of institutional properties. Yet he, among others, thereby misses the political power of the citizen-soldier, for it is as mythic tradition, legend, and ideal that the citizen-soldier has shaped the dynamics of claims-making. It is because of the citizen-soldier ideal—because of the citizen-soldier’s privileged cultural status—that veterans and minority groups have been able to offer moving and even effective claims on the grounds of battlefield sacrifice. Rather than presume that the citizen-soldier is linked to a particular institutional format, we should treat as an open question whether the citizen-soldier ideal hinges on a particular recruitment system and the kinds of soldiers that system produces.33
Viewed through this prism, the association of obligatory and universal military service with the citizen-soldier ideal runs aground. Obligatory military service has been much more the exception than the rule in U.S. history. Required service in the local militia was a feature of colonial life and of the Revolutionary period; and the 1792 Militia Act, which governed the essentials until 1903, demanded that “each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States” between ages eighteen and forty-five enroll in his local militia and procure his own arms and equipment. But obligatory service fell into obsolescence over the succeeding decades, notwithstanding the letter of the law. Many states abolished compulsory militia service, and others withdrew the state’s right to imprison those who failed to pay militia fines, negating the state’s capacity to enforce the law. By the time of the war with Mexico in 1846, the militia “was verging closely on extinction.”34 Between 1830 and 1860, middle-class men did flock to the uniformed militia, but these units remained purely voluntary and, with rare exceptions, were neither funded nor overseen by state officials; their members volunteered less out of any desire to serve the state than out of their eagerness to partake of the militia musters’ “carnival mood and the escape from monotony.”35 The formation of the National Guard after the Civil War continued this tradition of voluntary part-time military service, with still generally very limited state supervision. In short, throughout the nineteenth century, local forces remained crucial elements of the national military apparatus, but they rapidly evolved after independence so that they bore little relationship to the rhetoric of obligation perpetuated in the citizen-soldier ideal.

The mass army has been very much a mid-twentieth-century phenomenon in the United States. After the Civil War, the national armed forces, as they had been before the war, were small, unrepresentative of society at large, and composed of long-serving careerists. After World War I, postwar demobilization was rapid and extensive, and the Army resumed its prewar form. From the Revolution through 1940, except for brief exigencies, the U.S. military has been recruited on a voluntary basis: compared to their later counterparts, its officers and soldiers had similar professional motivations, a similarly distant relationship with society, a more intense sense of societal isolation (reinforced by geography), and a similarly distinct corporate identity.36

Even the large-scale draft, which began in 1940 and was lifted only briefly after the Second World War, was not as long-lived as is often supposed. Selective Service remained formally in operation until 1973, but the proportion of eligible men drafted shrank dramatically after the end of the Korean War: between 1955 and 1960, the number of draftees entering the armed forces declined from 153,000 to 87,000. Deferments became so widespread that, according to Selective Service’s longtime director Lewis Hershey, “We deferred practically everybody. If they had a reason, we preferred it. But if they didn’t, we had them hunt [for] one.”37 By the latter half of the 1960s, the Army was deeply riven by class and race, reflecting the extent to which conscription had become selective and unrepresentative. In short, one can speak of obligatory and relatively universal military service in the United States for less than fifteen years—from the beginning of World War II through shortly after the end of the Korean War.
Although citizen-soldiers have been relatively rare in U.S. history, the citizen-soldier idea has resonated strongly, from the colonial period through the mid-twentieth century. At the time of the founding, a civic republican tradition reigned supreme: that generation extolled local militias regardless of their failings. One American offered the following toast on the first anniversary of the Declaration of Independence: “May only those Americans enjoy freedom who are ready to die for its defense.” Republican tropes paved the way for democratization, as property requirements for the vote fell before the impassioned claims-making of unpropertied veterans. Later in the nineteenth century, women’s suffrage claims were turned aside because they had failed to contribute demonstrably to the nation’s defense—reflecting both the gendered nature of militarized republicanism and its continuing hold over the American imagination. It persisted into the first decades of the twentieth century, when a vibrant public debate over the meaning of citizenship “focused, above all, on participatory citizenship by emphasizing the duty and the privilege of citizens to act in support of the nation.” It is not accidental that opponents of anti-immigration legislation regularly made mention in the mid-1920s of the wartime contributions of South and East European newcomers. Nor is it accidental that post-war African American claims for first-class citizenship were predominantly framed around battlefield sacrifice.

Institutionally it is not the AVF but the mass army that is the greater departure from historical practice, yet a republican, and often militarized, civic culture reigned for much of the nation’s history before the introduction of universal and obligatory military service. Given a history of institutional variation and (relative) cultural stability, one cannot presume that more recent cultural changes have institutional foundations. The mass army would seem not to deserve much credit for in the past sustaining a political culture of obligation, and the AVF would seem not to deserve much blame for the contemporary culture of rights.

Citizen-Soldier as Cultural Practice

The institutional definition of the citizen-soldier is appealing because it is so tractable and observable. But can we perhaps more directly capture the citizen-soldier tradition and more accurately assess whether it has waxed or waned? The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu theorized culture as a set of practices, typically observed unthinkingly, that enable and constrain human action. Referring to these conventions that structure the everyday cultural forms through which subjects express themselves as the “habitus,” Bourdieu recognized the strategic nature of human action but contended that the realm of “strategic possibilities” was defined by preexisting “fields.” Whereas the conventional wisdom highlights how the citizen-soldier is institutionally made manifest, Bourdieu’s perspective suggests different questions: How is the citizen-soldier practiced? How is this figure experienced by the average citizen? How is the citizen-soldier reproduced as an ideal? In other words, the citizen-soldier tradition might be reconceptualized as a set of rhetorical conventions to
which social and political actors, both claimants and authorities, give voice. Because they are publicly expressed, these conventions are inherently observable, and the extent to which they are invoked or challenged may be measured. Moreover, silences—that is, occasions when one might expect the conventions to be invoked but are not—are also thereby underscored.

What are these rhetorical conventions? Occupying the discursive space opposite the citizen-soldier is the employee-soldier whose political allegiances are flexible and whose fighting skills can be bought. Both traditions—the citizen-soldier and the employee-soldier—rest on representations of soldier motivations and societal obligations. These representations need not hew closely to thorny realities—they often serve to articulate the polity’s unmet aspirations—nor will they necessarily accord with data, such as opinion surveys, that seek to capture privately held views. The opposed traditions provide answers to the following questions:

1. Do soldiers and veterans narrate their own service in terms of patriotism (altruism/voluntarism)? obligation (coercion)? self-interest (egoism)?
2. Are soldiers and veterans praised (criticized) as paragons (negative models) of patriotism (treason)? obedience (disobedience)? or as high-performing employees (incompetents)? Relatedly, how are the fallen represented—as heroes and patriots, exemplars of self-sacrifice? or victims of bad luck, who signed up fully informed of the risks?
3. Are special rights claimed on the basis of special obligations performed (e.g., battlefield sacrifice)? Are claims granted on that basis? If they are turned aside, on what basis?

If the citizen-soldier tradition were dead, one would observe little self-narration by soldiers and veterans in terms of selflessness and much more in terms of self-interest; little praise of soldiers, veterans, and the fallen as models of loyalty and sacrifice; few claims advanced by soldiers and veterans in terms of sacrifice; and even fewer claims granted by authorities on those grounds.

Cultural practices are typically laced through with contradictions and tensions, and thus it would not be surprising to find representations consistent with both models. Future research might explore how and why the balance of representations has shifted over time, or not. For this study, however, that is not necessary, given the null hypothesis that the citizen-soldier is dead. In the next section, I explore whether the citizen-soldier tradition remains a prominent presence in elite rhetoric. If it does, the citizen-soldier tradition lives.

The Citizen-Soldier: And Yet (S)he Lives . . .

The claim that the citizen-soldier ideal lives on in contemporary discourse has surface plausibility. Bill Clinton drew on its themes in praising U.S. Naval Academy
graduates in 1994: “Regardless of where your careers take you, you clearly understand the imperative of civic duty. There’s no brighter badge of citizenship than the path you have chosen and the oath you are about to take.” Clinton sought to inject the language of obligation into public discourse beyond the military sphere, as in his 1995 State of the Union: “Responsibility, opportunity, and citizenship, more than stale chapters in some remote civic book, they’re still the virtue by which we can fulfill ourselves and reach our God-given potential and . . . also fulfill the eternal promise of this country.”45 Even before the Iraq War, George W. Bush hailed members of the National Guard and Reserves as “citizen soldiers” who “display values that are central to our Nation: character, courage, and sacrifice.” “You demonstrate the highest form of citizenship,” he continued. “And while you may not be full-time soldiers, you are full-time patriots.” On Veterans Day 2007, Bush praised “a new generation of men and women . . . fighting for freedom around the globe. Their determination, courage, and sacrifice are laying the foundation for a more secure and peaceful world.” He proclaimed them “the very best of our Nation.”46 In his inaugural address, Barack Obama invoked “those brave Americans” who, patrolling “far-off deserts and distant mountains,” are paragons of “the spirit of service—a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves,” and he called on all Americans to find inspiration in “this spirit that must inhabit us all.”47 Such talk on the part of the U.S. president runs counter to the employee-soldier tradition.

Nor is such talk a feature of presidential rhetoric alone. While the phrase “citizen-soldier” is often applied only to members of the National Guard and Reserves, the closely related rhetoric of sacrifice and national gratitude is everywhere applied to regular soldiers as well. Regardless of how one feels about the Iraq War, editorial writers routinely assert, one must support the troops and thank them for their sacrifices. In pushing improved health care and educational benefits for veterans, the Washington Post editorialized that with “tens of thousands of Americans . . . fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . [t]he sacrifices of these brave men and women imbue Veterans Day with special meaning. It requires more than pausing between shopping and football to say thank you.” And the New York Times, detailing the recent shoddy treatment of veterans, noted (sanctimoniously) that “the entire burden of today’s wars has been carried by a volunteer military force and its families. . . . The least a grateful nation should do is support the troops upon their return.”48 Closer to home—that is, university life—a 2008 University of Minnesota missive asked faculty to “express [to veterans] appreciation for their service” and to help veterans adjust to campus life, insisting that “this isn’t about the politics or the policy of the war; it’s about helping individual students transition back into our community.” Yet reflecting both the nation’s polarization over the Iraq War as well as the post-Vietnam campus skepticism of the military, even in the upper Midwest, the note reminded faculty that veterans, “like any other student group at the University, . . . need and deserve our respect and support”—as if such university-wide instructions were regularly issued. Of course such instructions are rare, if not unique, and veterans are not just like other “communities of students.”49
Assertions that the link between military service and citizenship are broken also seem misplaced in light of the “gays in the military” debates of the early to mid-1990s. Participants believed far more than military effectiveness to be at stake: both sides thought that the inclusion of gays in the armed forces would have profound consequences for society at large. For social conservatives and liberals alike, the struggle between the Clinton White House and the Pentagon was a bellwether battle in the culture wars. The *National Review* saw “don’t ask, don’t tell” as “a key victory. . . . Had Mr. Clinton delivered on his pledge to the gay lobby, he would have opened the way to the next controversy: redefining the family to mean just about anything.” Meanwhile, The *Nation* argued that the campaign was “ultimately the only way to advance society in the direction of sexual tolerance and, more than that, liberation.” The journalist Andrew Sullivan insightfully observed that the “real political power [of]—and the real source of resistance”—to the movement for gay soldiers’ rights “comes from its symbolism. The acceptance of gay people at the heart of the state, at the core of the notion of patriotism, is anathema to those who wish to consign homosexuals to the margins of society.”

Given the imagined stakes, it stands to reason that the military’s policies toward gays became the battleground for a fierce struggle over social values. Yet this would have made little sense if the military were spoken about merely as a job. The “gays in the military” debate was made possible by the persistence of a tradition that tied together the performance of military service, the display of civic virtue, and the claim to rights.

This continued association between citizenship and military service is reflected in public policy in at least two ways. First, military service remains a formal obligation of citizenship, even if it is one that the state has not demanded that Americans fulfill in the past thirty-five years. The U.S. Supreme Court has continually affirmed that government may require military service of its citizens and that citizens must obey when called. Yes, registering for Selective Service is for most eighteen-year-old American males a meaningless ritual. But as Bourdieu suggests, it is precisely the actions about which we are unreflective that reveal deep cultural norms.

Second, military service has been recognized as a basis for expediting naturalization. This is hardly new: millions have become Americans in this fashion since the Civil War. Nor has it gone out of style: in July 2002, Bush announced that noncitizens serving in the U.S. armed forces would immediately be eligible for citizenship, and in justifying this policy, he proclaimed military service “the highest form of citizenship.” Thousands have since availed themselves of the accelerated process. Some in Congress even proposed offering such rights to undocumented aliens, but the so-called Dream Act failed to reach the Senate floor in 2007. Seeking soldiers with special skills, especially fluency in key languages in current and likely theaters of operation, the new Obama administration swiftly made public in February 2009 that, for the first time, immigrants without green cards, holding only temporary work visas, would be admitted into the military; in exchange, they would be offered citizenship in as little as six months. If soldiers were merely employees of the state,
and if the republican logic of citizenship no longer had relevance, soldiering would not be recognized as evidence of worthiness for membership in the political community. In fact, the language of “military service,” which remains ubiquitous, requires one to ask: service to what or to whom? Government peons are members of the “civil service,” but that phrase is only etymologically related to *civitas*, or citizenship. When they are thanked, it is for service to their *organization*, much like long-serving employees in the private sector. Soldiers and veterans, in contrast, are thanked for their service to the *nation*.

How do contemporary U.S. soldiers and veterans represent their reasons for service? State coercion is no longer part of the story, but coercion remains present in a still potent form among those who represent themselves as serving at least partly out of patriotic motives. Critics of the AVF note that while patriotic service has an element of selflessness, it remains voluntary and thus a seeming departure from the citizen-soldier ideal. But this does not resonate with the patriot’s self-portrait, in which an *inner* sense of obligation figures. The patriot does not see herself as serving the nation merely out of the goodness of her heart. She is coerced from within, by virtue of her personal integrity. The Defense Department’s “Why We Serve” public outreach program, initiated in 2007, captures the military’s narrative—the face it presents to its members and to the public at large—and it is revealingly subtitled “The Nobility of Service.” To be noble is to act on the basis of principles that exceed the self, and nobility *is* a matter of moral obligation. The profiles of the uniformed speakers invariably mention their sense of duty and invoke their commitment to “the greater good.” In fact, the patriot’s spirit of obligation is, in contrast to the draftee’s, unsullied by state coercion and thus arguably *more* true to the citizen-soldier ideal.

Patriotism is of course not the only reason volunteer soldiers enlist: they often also tell a story in which self-interest figures. This is true even among those featured in the “Why We Serve” program, as they acknowledge that signing bonuses and educational benefits are effective inducements. But the majority also portray themselves as patriots performing a needed public service. Duty always outpolls other reasons that military personnel cite when asked why they signed up. Whether most soldiers are actually motivated primarily by patriotic urges or a sense of obligation is not clear. But what matters for this argument, and for the fate of the citizen-soldier ideal, is how they portray themselves in public settings.

Second, how are soldiers, veterans, and the fallen represented? The discourse surrounding U.S. soldiers in Iraq in recent years departs markedly from the employee-soldier model. Those whose performance is extraordinary are recognized as heroes deserving of the nation’s gratitude, and soldiers who are killed, especially in combat, are touted as patriots. This was true even in the 1990s: in 1993 Clinton praised the crew of the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, and by extension other service-members, for being “the shining model of our American values: dedication, responsibility, a willingness to sacrifice for the common good and for the interests and the
very existence of this country.”

Since the invasion of Iraq, Bush regularly invoked the language of “patriotism” and “sacrifice” to characterize the work done by U.S. soldiers abroad, an odd linguistic choice if these were workers like any other. Obama has toed this same rhetorical line, acknowledging “with humble gratitude” America’s soldiers deployed abroad and comparing them to “the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington.” Soldiers do receive “hazard pay” for taking on risky assignments, but if they were mere employees, such compensation would suffice. Those who died might be praised as model employees, but it would be noted that they undertook the assignment fully aware of the risks. This is not how soldiers are represented: they are hailed for their sacrifice, and whatever additional pay they receive for service in a combat zone is not some emolument but only partial payment of the nation’s debt to them. Such language is so prevalent and familiar that it seems hardly worth noting. But it is at odds with the occupational model of military service, and it suggests that the citizen-soldier remains part of Americans’ everyday experiences—as a rhetorical practice.

Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this comes from a popular U.S. Army video game. In the spring of 2006, the Army took seven “Real Heroes” whose performance in Iraq and Afghanistan had been exemplary, created game characters based on their stories and likenesses, and even licensed plastic action figures. In fall 2007, the game was released for the Xbox system as “America’s Army: True Soldiers.” These Real Heroes, or True Soldiers, are selected for their “nobility” and “bravery.” Consider this statement from the “hero biography” of the highest-ranking Real Hero, Major Jason Amerine: “Serving as an officer in the United States Army has been the greatest privilege of my life. In Afghanistan, I commanded American and Afghan soldiers, each fighting for his own nation and his people, yet united in a common cause as they entrusted one another with their lives.”

Real Heroes fight for the American people, not for professional advancement or recognition, not for hazard pay or signing bonuses, not because of the contracts they are legally obligated to uphold. “Service” is a “privilege”—an honor bequeathed by the state on its most capable and most good. A mix of motives pervades narratives of the Real Heroes’ enlistment, but they all revolve around not opportunity but duty, sometimes to nation, other times to comrades or family. This is well reflected in the biography of Sergeant Jason Mike: “I didn’t go to Iraq to receive medals. I didn’t go to be a hero. I went to do my job and do my part for my country in a time of need. I did it for the buddy on my right, and for the buddy on my left. And I did it to make the Mike family proud.” The America’s Army video game and the Real Heroes program have an instrumental purpose—recruitment—but they also reproduce a portrait of military service as far more than just a job.

This representation of the volunteer soldier stands in sharp contrast to that of the private security contractor, on whom the U.S. effort in Iraq relies heavily. In reality, both serve voluntarily; generous (though unequal) compensation packages are crucial to both forces’ recruitment; and noncitizens are present in large numbers in both. Yet
the dominant public images and perceptions of the two are different. Most Americans believe that the nation’s soldiers are motivated by the desire to serve their country; only 23 percent think the same is true of private security contractors. Americans may be saddened or even angered by the deaths of the latter in Iraq, but contractors are not generally acclaimed for their sacrifice: rather, they are performing a service for which they are appropriately compensated, unlike their counterparts in uniform. A *New York Times Magazine* article nicely reflects the typically divergent images:

We often question the reasons for making war, but we tend to revere the soldiers who are sent off to fight. We honor their sacrifice, we raise it up and in it we see the value of our society reflected back to us. . . . We may not know what to think of ourselves if service and sacrifice are increasingly mixed with the wish for profit. We may know less and less how to feel about a state that is no longer defended by men and women we can perceive as pure.

What is most striking about this passage is its portrait not of contractors as tainted mercenaries, with pecuniary motives and without a conscience, but of soldiers in the AVF as if they were the citizen-soldiers of yore—unsullied by lucre, patriotic, reflections of the nation, paragons of sacrifice.

George W. Bush did not regularly use his bully pulpit to hail Blackwater and Dynacorp employees for their service to the nation; when he was compelled to address the issue, he deployed rhetorical tropes familiar from the world of commerce, confirming that “a firm like Blackwater provides a valuable service.” The Department of Defense does not keep track of contractor deaths on its Web site; nor do the network news programs post contractors’ names among the fallen. When contractors do make the news, it has more often been to highlight their lack of discipline and accountability, their exorbitant fees, and the ethics of their hire. Even a heart-wrenching story of an immigrant who went to Iraq as a laundress and is now paralyzed notes that “nobody makes the private workers go to Iraq or forces them to stay, of course”; at the end of the profile, even a RAND economist who calls on Americans to “honor [contractors’] sacrifices” must admit that “they’re not in uniform, and there is something special about being in uniform.” These representations of contractors are not incidental: they reinforce the uniqueness of America’s volunteer soldiers and the magnitude of the sacrifices they make for the nation.

Third, do soldiers’ sacrifices in the AVF era still serve as the basis for claims on the political community, and how are such claims received? The citizen-soldier ideal has historically sustained a categorical claim upon the state: as Otto Hintze put it, “Whoever puts himself in the service of the state must logically and fairly be granted the regular rights of citizenship.” Wherever the link between service and citizenship is maintained, it lays the groundwork for claims-making—regardless of whether soldiers are really motivated by political obligation, regardless of whether populations in practice welcome or resist the call to arms, regardless of whether policy makers actually believe in the norms they publicly espouse.
of AVF veterans is again revealing. Employees who sign a contract cannot claim afterward that they deserve better treatment in retirement than that to which they are contractually entitled; at most, they can require their employer to remain true to its word. If AVF veterans were mere employees, their claims would be granted on actionable legal grounds, and their demands for further postservice benefits would be turned aside with formal arguments.

Yet the contemporary debate over veterans’ benefits is suffused with republican rhetoric—among veterans and their advocates and among legislators. It is rare to hear a legislator say that veterans are treated well enough or that they signed a contract and cannot ask for more. The salutary effects of extensive veterans’ benefits on recruitment are often noted, and may in fact be the primary reason for their extension, but they are often cast as ancillary to the repayment of the nation’s debt. In fall 2007, the New York Times endorsed increased bonuses for young officers not just because it was necessary to preserve the Army’s core but because it was “the right thing to do, especially given the prolonged sacrifice demanded of the troops and their families.” A spring 2008 bipartisan “new GI bill” was portrayed as “an effort to say thank you,” according to Rep. David Obey. “It’s awfully hard to make the case,” writes a New York Times columnist, “that these young people who have sacrificed so much don’t deserve a shot at a better future once their wartime service has ended.” Ignoring the differences between the mass army of the past and today’s professional military, he asks, “We did it for those who served in World War II. Why not now?” The Bush administration, which opposed the measure, argued not that the expansion of veterans’ benefits was unwarranted but that the proposal’s specific design would unintentionally harm retention. This pragmatic objection doomed this particular bill even as it reproduced the citizen-soldier ideal. Benefits for veterans often fall through the cracks and sometimes fall victim to budget-cutting, but they do not fall prey to a legalistic contractual logic.

In sum, we are observing today a curious phenomenon: the citizen-soldier tradition is thriving even as many mourn its passing. The irony is that it may be the turn from the draft that has sustained the citizen-soldier as a rhetorical practice. Raising a volunteer force is expensive, and offering soldiers social approbation may compensate for the dangerous work and the relatively low pay. Rather than usher in a liberal culture of rights, the AVF may have helped preserve elements of republican citizenship in twenty-first-century America. The citizen-soldier model’s persistence may have instrumental origins, but that does not detract from its cultural power: just try to find a politician willing to run afoul of its rhetorical conventions.

**Conclusion**

An obvious objection is that there is a world of difference between the rhetoric and reality of the citizen-soldier. It is true that there is little prospect today of a
military format based on self-equipped reservists who eagerly fight to defend hearth and home. Yet such a citizen-soldier was a myth even at the time of the Revolution. And the persistence of republican ideals is significant. A society’s reality never matches its aspirations, but it certainly never exceeds them. Commonly articulated ideals are resources that aggrieved groups deploy to demand their due. Where the citizen-soldier ideal has been cast aside, so too has an avenue for social mobility. Where it has been retained, military service can underpin movements for change. In twenty-first-century America, the citizen-soldier tradition is not dead, and it remains a potential wellspring of reform.

This suggests a related normative question: should we be pleased to see that this ideal retains its sociopolitical power? Admirers too rarely note how it not only created opportunities for the expansion of democracy but imposed constraints on participation and contestation. Historically republicanism has imagined a citizenry composed of men, of men of substance, and of men in the mainstream. While contemporary advocates for republican citizenship persuasively argue that republicanism can accommodate and contribute to feminist, socialist, and multiculturalist agendas, a militarized republicanism has in practice often had a dark antidemocratic side. These concerns should give pause before one embraces the ideology of the citizen-soldier.

I am sympathetic to those concerned that Americans are too disengaged from each other and the polity. These critics have been attracted to mandatory national service as a way of nurturing a political culture attuned to the obligations of citizenship, and a watered-down version underpinned both Clinton’s Americorps program and Bush’s USA Freedom Corps. But national service is no panacea, especially when programs hold up the citizen-soldier as the model. Such proposals reproduce a militarized republican citizenship ideal, as did Barack Obama in summoning the image of America’s soldiers serving abroad to ground his call for “a new era of responsibility” in which Americans recognized “duties to ourselves, our nation, and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly” as “the price and the promise of citizenship.” This is inspiring stuff, but it would be even more inspiring if it did not rely on an ideal that was beyond the desire, capacity, or ken of most Americans.

The challenge is to forge a political culture protective of liberty, dedicated to civic duty, supportive of solidarity, and committed to broad-based national citizenship. Yet we need not choose between the impoverished politics of liberalism and the potential exclusiveness of a militarized republicanism. We can, and must, craft a nonmilitarized republicanism, in which the performance of public duty is prized but in which civic virtue is not limited to, nor exemplified by, military service. In short, we must escape the citizen-soldier tradition. Creating a nonmilitarized basis for civic virtue is a challenging and imposing political and philosophical task given the centrality of the citizen-soldier in the West. Yet it is essential if Western democracies are to overcome their sclerotic state.
However, our policy instruments for shaping political culture are blunt and their effects poorly understood. In many accounts, contemporary citizenship discourse is merely the reflection of the state of military technology, the polity’s wealth, or the generous provisions of the welfare state. The policy implications that flow from each of these are unattractive, to say the least. But we do not live in a world determined by material constraints alone. Representations of reality reproduce political culture but can also transform it. Citizenship models change when people, especially leaders who enjoy an attentive media and are positioned to speak for the nation, talk in new ways about citizens’ obligations. Such an opportunity to reshape U.S. political culture may have presented itself after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but George W. Bush, and other elites, failed to seize it. Such an opportunity may be presenting itself today, as the nation staggers under the weight of an economic meltdown of proportions unseen in decades, but so far Barack Obama, while acknowledging that this is “a moment that will define a generation,” does not seem prepared to leave the citizen-soldier behind. In other words, there is a profound role here for agency. Calling for rhetorical entrepreneurs to grasp opportunities may not seem like a satisfying policy recommendation, but they are among the key mechanisms of cultural change—and they are all we have.

Notes


6. Moskos, “From Citizens’ Army to Social Laboratory.”

7. Charles C. Moskos, “Making the All-Volunteer Force Work: A National Service Approach,” Foreign Affairs 60 (Fall 1981): 17-34. See also Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., The Military: More than Just a Job? (Elmsford Park, NY: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988); and Charles C. Moskos, “Reviving the Citizen-Soldier,” Public Interest (Spring 2002): 76-85. Moskos’s treatment of the institutional/occupational thesis—at its most crude, the notion that the military had become just a job—was not consistent across his vast corpus. At times, he boldly suggested that U.S. military had, thanks to the all-volunteer force (AVF), changed as the thesis suggested. But at other times, he cast it as an ideal type, opposite the citizen-soldier tradition, with actual recruitment systems located somewhere between the two. For the latter, see especially Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces,” 15-26. Many thanks to Jim Burk for discussion on this point.

8. However, for an alternative view, see Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).


10. For others, however, the relationship is constitutive, not causal. Since, in these scholars’ view, the participatory citizenship of civic republicanism is part of the citizen-soldier tradition, the decline of one marks the decline of the other. See, for instance, R. Claire Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).


24. For a different periodization, focusing on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the critical period of the decline of civic republicanism in the United States, see Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors, esp. 96-100. For Snyder, the Progressives’ embrace of centralized national governance, bureaucratic expertise, and professionalism militated against participatory citizenship, which she associates with decentralized local governance. Yet the Progressive program coexisted with a republican citizenship discourse that remained dominant through the interwar period. Moreover, it hard to see how civic republicanism, given Snyder’s localized conception, could ever be revived in contemporary America, yet that is explicitly her normative agenda.


32. There are many other plausible explanations for the end of the draft and the embrace of liberal citizenship—military technology that privileges quality over quantity, unprecedented prosperity that promotes skepticism of authority, or the growth of the welfare state. Evaluating these alternatives is beyond the scope of this article, but note what they share: all focus on long-term processes of social change, and all see the AVF more as product than as cause.

33. See similarly Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism; and Burk, “The Citizen Soldier.”

34. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 82.

35. Mahon, History of the Militia, 9, and generally chap. 6.


37. Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 218, and generally chap. 8. See also Flynn, The Draft, chap. 6.
44. By invoking the “employee-soldier” as the idealized antithesis of the “citizen-soldier,” I am not suggesting that these two represent the full range of conceivable rhetorical practices regarding soldiering. They are, however, commonly invoked by AVF advocates and critics, who represent them as polar opposites and who have deeply shaped the contours of the U.S. debate.
45. Remarks at the United States Naval Academy Commencement Ceremony, Annapolis, MD, May 25, 1994; and State of the Union Address, January 24, 1995—both in *Public Papers of the President* (hereafter, *PPP*), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws.
49. E-mail re “Student Veterans” from Mary Koskan, Director, One Stop Student Services, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, February 21, 2008; onestop.umn.edu/onestop/staff/Supporting_Student_Veterans.html (accessed March 3, 2009).
56. Sometimes soldiers will speak of having been “forced” to serve by virtue of economic circumstances, but such coercion, in the sense of limited choices, does not suggest any moral obligation, as the citizen-soldier ideal requires.
61. See, among countless others, President’s Radio Address, April 23, 2005; Address to the Nation on Iraq and the War on Terror, December 18, 2005; Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, January 10, 2006; and Remarks to the American Legion, February 24, 2006—all in PPP.
64. www.americasarmy.com/realheroes/index.php?id=1&view=bio (accessed April 14, 2008). An older list (accessed June 19, 2006) had included one woman, but the later list included none, presumably because the Army found that her femininity was at odds with Real Heroes’ “warrior ethos” and that her presence put off potential recruits.
72. However, organizations facilitating private sector hiring of veterans typically make the argument in pragmatic terms. See Hire Vets First (www.hirevetsfirst.gov), Recruit Military (www.recruitmilitary.com), and Welcome Back Veterans (www.welcomebackveterans.org).
73. Although Defense Department officials have made the latter argument. See Mary Beth Marklein, “They Don’t Always Fit the GI Bill,” USA Today, July 11, 2007.
77. Pettit, Republicanism, 138-46; and Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors.
78. Inaugural Address, January 20, 2009.
79. Ibid.