INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:
A SURVEY OF THE FIELD

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Class: Monday, 1:30 pm – 3:20 pm,
Location: 1314 Social Sciences
Office Hours: Friday, 10 am – 12 pm,
or by appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION
As its title suggests, this course is designed to guide students through the literature of one of international relations’ major “sub-subfields”: international security. It is intended primarily for graduate students in the Department of Political Science, though others are welcome to attend, with the instructor’s permission. Four caveats:

1. As this literature is immense and ever-expanding, any course of this nature can only be a survey, hoping to whet your appetite for further exploration. It must make difficult choices, and numerous topics have received less than their full due—including, among others, theories related to individual causes of war (sociobiology, Freudian psychology, personality); war termination; grand strategy and military doctrine; arms racing and crisis escalation; enduring rivalries; economic interdependence; ethics and the use of force; war and gender. Because I also teach 8401 (The Core) and because (nearly) all of you have taken it, I have skipped over topics, such as the democratic peace, that are adequately covered in that class, and I have omitted some important readings (such as David Campbell’s Writing Security) that we engaged with in that class.

2. This course is theoretical in orientation, and, with only the occasional exception, we will not focus on explaining the origins or consequences of particular wars or particular uses of force.

3. In part because realists have historically dominated the subfield of international security, the course’s readings are somewhat biased toward the realist perspective—though I have sought to include a fair number of readings from other approaches.

4. This course also focuses largely on more traditional questions of international security. That is certainly not meant to suggest that “new” security issues have no place in the field or that I as the instructor do not have interest in them. Just the opposite. But much of this recent exciting work either draws on older theoretical apparatuses and debates or consciously positions itself in contrast to them, and one can fully appreciate the moves being made only if one has a strong grasp of the foundations. Moreover, other graduate seminars regularly offered in the Department of Political Science and across the University devote their entire syllabi to such subjects, and I have sought to minimize overlap as much as possible.
ASSIGNMENTS

Students taking this course will be expected to complete four kinds of assignments.

1. **Two (2) Reaction Pieces** (3-4 pp.). These reaction pieces are an opportunity for you to try out new ideas in a less formal format. And, because they will not be graded (except as part of your class participation grade), you can do so with little risk. So be adventurous.
   • Each reaction piece will be due by 6 p.m. on the Sunday before the seminar meets and will be circulated by e-mail to seminar members.

2. **Reading Questions and Presentations.** For each session, all students, including auditors, will prepare 3-5 questions based on the reading to help spur class discussion. Questions must be circulated by e-mail to the seminar by 6 p.m. on the Sunday before the seminar meets.
   • Between 2 and 3 times per term (depending on the number of students), all students (including auditors) will prepare presentations (8-10 minutes). These presentations should not recapitulate one’s own or others’ questions, but rather should use those questions as a jumping off point to make an argument about a theoretical approach, an empirical phenomenon or pattern, etc.
   • Students may not present the same week that they write a reaction piece.
   • Students will sign up for presentations during the first class meeting.

3. **Research Proposal** (5 pp.). This may be on any topic of interest to you that falls within the broad purview of international security. If the relevant readings do not appear on this syllabus, please clear the topic with me before you delve into it too deeply. The research proposal should follow the following format:
   a. **Question and Issue:** What are you proposing to investigate, and why should anyone care? (You might build a very brief literature review into this section.)
   b. **Hypotheses and Tentative Argument:** What are potential answers to this question, and which seems likely to prove most useful/insightful/revealing/correct (pick your epistemological stance)?
   c. **Research Plan:** Were you to write a fully fleshed out research paper, what evidence would you use to test your hypotheses/illustrate your argument/demonstrate the explanatory value of your model? Make sure you explain how you would know if you were wrong.
      • The research proposal must be circulated to all seminar members by 12 pm on **Monday, March 30.** We will meet in small groups (depending on the seminar’s final size) during that week to review each other’s research proposals and contribute constructive feedback.
      • **NB:** The research proposal may—and normally will—serve as the basis for the research paper.

4. **Research Paper.** A first stab at a publishable paper (no more than 10,000 words; 30-35 double-spaced pages) on a topic that falls within the seminar’s themes, broadly defined. Students are encouraged to begin work on that paper as soon as possible.
   • A brief prospectus (1-2 pp.) and preliminary bibliography are due in class on **February 23.** That week, students will meet with me to discuss their prospectuses.
   • The final project is due in my mailbox in the Political Science Department main office by **12:00 p.m. on Friday, May 8.** It may, of course, be submitted before that date.
   • **NB:** The prospectus will count for 10% of the final project grade.

GRADING

Class Participation (incl. 2 reaction pieces, reading questions, and presentations) 25%
Research Proposal 25%
Research Paper 50%
READINGS
The following books have been ordered for purchase at the University bookstore in the Coffman Memorial Union. Copies of these books have (whenever possible) also been placed in the 8402 drawer in the 12th floor lounge.


Other readings may be found:
- **On-line**. Most articles are available on-line. To find the on-line article most easily, type the journal title into the search engine at: http://www.lib.umn.edu/articles/ej.phtml, and then click on the appropriate resource.
- **On-line II**. Readings that cannot be found through standard U of M on-line resources will be made available through the “rkrebs_8402” folder on the Shared drive.

BACKGROUND READINGS
While there are no specific course prerequisites, it is assumed that students have basic familiarity with theories of international politics. Those who have taken “the core” (POL 8401) will be well prepared. All would be well served to have read Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (Norton, 1997).

While this course is more theoretically oriented, history is its proving ground, and empirical questions will be raised and addressed both in the assigned texts and in seminar discussions. For useful background sources on the history of war, strategy, and great power politics, consult the following:

CLASS SCHEDULE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS

* = required reading
§ = highly recommended reading
(Translation: I would have assigned it if I were not already assigning you too much reading. But if you have not read it yet, you eventually should.)

Guide to Journal Abbreviations

AJPS  American Journal of Political Science  ISR  International Studies Review
ARPS  Annual Review of Political Science  JCR  Journal of Conflict Resolution
APSR  American Political Science Review  JOP  Journal of Politics
EJIR  European Journal of Int’l Relations  JPR  Journal of Peace Research
FA  Foreign Affairs  PoP  Perspectives on Politics
IO  International Organization  RIS  Review of International Studies
IS  International Security  SS  Security Studies
ISQ  International Studies Quarterly  WP  World Politics


* What is Security?


The Nature of Strategy
* Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP, 1976) p. 75 (s. 2), pp. 80-81 (s. 11), pp. 86-88 (s. 23-26), pp. 605-610.

The Uses of Force
The System: The Balance of Power

NB: This week overlaps greatly with many readings you have done or will do in the IR core, POL 8401. The reading assignments presume your familiarity with basic realist arguments about the nature of international anarchy and the workings of the balance of power, and so the assigned readings focused largely on states’ failure to balance. For those less familiar with the conventional arguments, the Levy reading (under Overviews) will be quite helpful, though now a bit dated.

* Kaufman et al., eds., The Balance of Power in World History, chaps. 1, 10, and 4 of 8 empirical chapters (to be assigned).

Overviews
§ Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (Columbia UP, 1954).

Balancing: Concepts, Logic, and Evidence
◆ Both the Mearsheimer and the Waltz are essential structural realist readings. If you have not read them before, you should do so soon.◆
Why States Fail to Balance

US Hegemony and Balancing (in addition to above)
Feb. 9  The System: Dynamics of Power


Feb. 16  NO CLASS MEETING DUE TO ISA
Feb. 23 Between State and System: Security Institutions—Alliances, Security Communities, IOs

RESEARCH PAPER PROSPECTUS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY DUE IN CLASS TODAY.

* Johnston, Social States, all.

Alliances and other Security Institutions

I presume most of you have read Mearsheimer 1994 elsewhere. Walt 1987 is an important work, but its realist logic is fairly straightforward, with the innovative move being the replacement of power with threat. Barnett 1996 is a good application of Wendtian constructivist logic to the Middle East.


Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Cornell UP, 1997).


**Security Communities and Regimes**


**Collective Security**


March 2

Culture, Language, and the Politics of National Security


§ Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia UP, 1996) esp. chapters by Elizabeth Kier (pp. 186-215), Iain Johnston (pp. 216-268), and Thomas Berger (pp. 317-356).


March 9  Coercion: Deterrence and Compellence (Conventional and Nuclear)

_The Theory of Coercion_
* Thomas Schelling, _Arms and Influence_ (Yale UP, 1966), chapters 1-4 (pp. 1-189). [recommended: entire book]
John J. Mearsheimer, _Conventional Deterrence_ (Cornell UP, 1983).

_Crisis Bargaining and Audience Costs_
Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” _IO_ 62:1 (winter 2008) 35-64. Democracies have no signaling advantage over most kinds of autocratic regimes.

_Nuclear Deterrence and Compellence, Theory and History_
McGeorge Bundy, _Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years_ (Vintage, 1988).
Alternatives to Coercion: Reassurance, Engagement, Appeasement


Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton UP, 2005).


The Rational Deterrence Debate


Deterrence: An Empirical Debate


Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (Yale UP, 1988).
Some Cases of Extended Deterrence and Compellence
Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

March 16 NO CLASS—SPRING BREAK
March 23

Reputation, Honor, Coercion, and Beyond


* Barry O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War* (University of Michigan Press, 1999) chapters 1 (pp. 3-8), 6-8 (pp. 85-138). (recommended: all)

* Psychological Critiques of Deterrence Theory*


March 30 Nuclear Proliferation

RESEARCH PROPOSALS TO BE CIRCULATED BY EMAIL TODAY, 12 PM. SMALL GROUP MEETINGS (OR THE SEMINAR AS A WHOLE, DEPENDING ON THE SEMINAR’S FINAL SIZE) TO BE HELD THIS WEEK.

* Solingen, Nuclear Logics, chaps. 1-2, 3, 6, 8-10, 12 (pp. 1-53, 57-81, 118-139, 164-228, 249-299).

Peter D. Feaver, “Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations,” SS 2:3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993).
S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe,” IS 30:2 (fall 2005) 127-152.
Complying with the Laws of War: Noncombatant Immunity

* Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Cornell UP, 2008).
* Hugo Slim, Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War (Columbia UP, 2008).

Highly Recommended: The Ethics of Force

§ Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books, 1977). Classic text on both the ethics of war and ethics within war.
April 13

Terrorism

* Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, chapters 1, 4-7 (pp. 1-41, 81-228). Optional: for good historical background, chaps. 2-3. A lot of pages, but this book is a pretty quick read (except for chapter 1, which is more terminological and analytical).


§ Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (Random House, 2005).


Mia Bloom, *Dying To Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (Columbia UP, 2005).


Peacekeeping, Intervention, and Occupation

* Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Cornell UP, 2003) chaps. 1, 3-5 (pp. 1-23, 52-161).


* Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Routledge, 2006) 37-54, 82-87, 95-147 (you can read these last 50 pages quickly).


Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” *IO* 60:3 (Summer 2006) 627-650.


Globalization and Security


**Economic Interdependence and Conflict**


May 4

The Present and Future of International Order and Security

* Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance, all.

Recommended: Is War Obsolete?
Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” IS 15:3 (winter 1990/91) pp. 7-57.

Recommended: China’s Rise
§ David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (Columbia UP, 2007).


FURTHER READING

Offense-Defense Theory
Offense-defense theory derives from Jervis 1978. Van Evera’s article and book are a good example of how far offense-defense theory can be taken (and how loosely it can be understood). Lieber’s article and book and the Shimshoni article are fine critiques. I, for one, am tired of this literature, but good portions of the field continue to mine it.


Rationality, Bargaining, and War
Depending on how one understands the logic of neorealism, rationality may or may not be essential to the theoretical framework’s operation. But rationalist literature on war has exploded in the last 20 years, with Fearon 1995 particularly important. Reiter 2003 is a good review essay, and Gartzke 1999 an important comment on this literature. Wagner 2007 is a major theoretical statement by a leading figure.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (Yale UP, 1992).
The Democratic Peace

Since the publication of Doyle’s seminal work, study of the democratic peace (republican liberalism) has been a very fruitful research area. Every time one thinks it has run its course, it starts up anew.


Overviews


The Democratic Peace: Yes!


John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War (Cornell UP, 1997).


**The Democratic/Liberal Peace: The Skeptics Reply**


**Rebuttals by the Believers**


**The Democratic Peace, With a Twist**


Democracies just learn a bit better and faster.


Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, eds., *Democracy, Liberalism, and War* (Lynne Rienner, 2001).

Domestic Politics and Security Policy
What follows is obviously very selective.

General
Peter A. Gourevitch, “Squaring the Circle: The Domestic Sources of International Relations,” IO 50:2 (Spring 1996) 349-73.
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Cornell UP, 1991).
Stephen Walt, Revolution and War (Cornell UP, 1996).

Diversionary War
(Snyder and Mansfield, “Democratization and War,” belongs here as well)

Public Opinion and War


**Bureaucratic Politics**


David A. Welch, “The Organizational and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect And Prospect,” *IS* 17 (fall 1992) pp. 112-146.


**Civil-Military Relations**


**The Second-Image Reversed: The Effects of War on Domestic Politics**


War Termination

After spending so much time on the causes of war, it seems incongruous not to spend any time on the implications of the conduct of war or on how wars end (or, as it has sometimes been put, on how peace breaks out). Oddly political scientists have rarely devoted much attention to either question, though there are emerging fascinating literatures in each. Recommended readings on war termination follow, including some readings on a case—the end of the Cold War. Goemans 2000 is the contemporary touchstone.

Theoretical Readings

- Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (Columbia UP, 1971).

The Debate Over the End of the Cold War

**Coercive Diplomacy**

**More Theoretical Discussions**

**Debating Airpower**
Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Cornell UP, 1996).

**A Case: Kosovo 1999**
Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Brookings, 2000).
Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (RAND, 2001).
Alternatives to Force: Economic Statecraft

Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions”
Military Effectiveness

Military Effectiveness: General

Do Democracies Have Bigger Muscles? Democracy and Military Effectiveness

The Revolution in Military Affairs
Biddle, *Military Power*.
Roundtable review of Military Power, with essays by Eliot Cohen, Lawrence Freedman, Stephen Rosen, and Martin van Creveld, as well as a reply by Biddle, in the *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28:3 (June 2004) pp. 413-469.