Liberation à la Finland:  
Reexamining Eisenhower Administration  
Objectives in Eastern Europe

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In 1989 the promise of liberation was finally fulfilled, 30 years after the death of its most famous proponent, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Across Eastern Europe, former Soviet satellites embraced democracy, sometimes with the encouragement of the communist regimes, which sought to validate their illegitimate rule through elections. The Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellites were freed in a gradual and surprisingly peaceful fashion, their communist governments felled by internal pressures rather than Western intervention.

From the late 1950s until the end of the Cold War, the West’s role in the disintegrative process was limited. The states of the Western alliance pursued cultural exchanges and trade contacts with Eastern Europe, exposing the captive peoples to the West and providing them with a vision toward which they might strive. In the early years of the Cold War, however, the overblown rhetoric of American policymakers led contemporaries on both sides of the Iron Curtain to believe that the country’s leaders entertained more aggressive strategies aimed at separating the satellites from the Soviet Union. The speeches and writings of Dulles and his colleagues, usually carefully crafted to counter charges that the United States encouraged revolt in Eastern Europe, hailed the ‘spiritual and moral’ forces that might lead to liberation, feeding the public’s hopes and its imagination. But these nuances were frequently lost on even the most knowledgeable observers, and the declarations were – despite Dulles’ best efforts – construed as promising American support and protection to rebels in Eastern Europe.

Most scholars, benefiting from the historical hindsight that contemporaries lacked, have agreed that ‘liberation was a sham. It had always been a sham. All Hungary did was to expose it to the world.' With the release of thousands of documents from the Eisenhower administration, historians have reinterpreted US foreign policy in the 1950s, constructing a clearer picture of the Eisenhower foreign policy team’s strategies,
reasoning, and decision-making processes. For the most part, Eastern Europe has been omitted from this reassessment. Careful study of the archival record reveals that although US decision-makers knew they could not liberate the satellites single-handedly, violently, or immediately, they did intend to assist an inexorable process of liberation. To say that the policymakers of the 1950s took liberation seriously is to raise the question of what the term meant to them. What was their vision, their ultimate set of objectives for the region? How did this vision relate to their perceptions of US interests and the Soviet threat? What role did they foresee a liberated Eastern Europe playing in the Cold War? And today, as leading Russian politicians continue to intone nationalist slogans and as China becomes a growing concern in East Asia, these questions about liberation grow increasingly relevant.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles cultivated his public image as the tough, unyielding, anticommunist crusader who would liberate the Eastern European satellites from Soviet domination. Yet, within the Eisenhower administration’s policy discussions, he emerges as the most prominent spokesman for a radically different vision of Eastern Europe, based on the model of Finland’s finely calibrated relations with both the Soviet Union and the West. A later generation, fearing that a weakened Western Europe would, under Soviet pressure, leave NATO and go the way of Finland, would dismissively call the model ‘Finlandization’. As Walter Laqueur wrote in the late 1970s, ‘If the economic crisis deepens, if nationalism and Communism continue to prevent closer European cooperation, if NATO, shrunk or weakened, no longer offers effective protection, and if the paralysis of political will is not overcome, accommodation seems bound to turn into appeasement, and appeasement to lead to a diminution of sovereignty for which the term “Finlandization” continues, all things considered[,] to seem appropriate.’ Yet Laqueur and others who popularized this label would be shocked to learn that references to Finland as the epitome of US policymakers’ hopes for the Eastern European satellite states appear repeatedly in the internal documents of the Eisenhower administration. Moreover, the respect for a Soviet sphere of influence and the recognition that the Soviet Union had legitimate security concerns — embodied in the notion of Finlandization — have a long history. President Franklin D. Roosevelt persuaded Stalin that he understood the Soviet desire for friendly states at its borders, and George Kennan, highly influential in the early years of the Cold War, conceded the region to the Soviets. However, early attempts to define the appropriate limits of Soviet hegemony, particularly two important alternatives to containment circulated as memoranda within the State Department in late 1945, were shunted aside as the Cold War heated up. Government policy statements increasingly
called for more aggressive measures to roll back the Iron Curtain, and the Office of Policy Coordination undertook numerous covert operations in the years that followed to support rebels throughout Eastern Europe and overthrow Soviet-sponsored regimes. That Finlandization resurfaced once the Eisenhower administration came to office is important not just because Eisenhower had campaigned in part on a plank highly critical of the Truman administration's supposedly 'passive containment', but also because it flew in the face of views shared by individuals across the political and ideological spectrum.

When used in reference to Eastern Europe, Finlandization was not synonymous with appeasement. For the Western European states, the status of Finland would have represented a long step backwards, requiring greater self-censorship in domestic politics and circumspection in foreign affairs. However, for the Eastern European states, such an evolution would have represented a giant step forwards. Certainly, their autonomy would be limited when compared to that of Britain or France, for example, but one could not expect more given their geopolitical position. Moreover, the success of this strategy would bring to the Eastern European peoples meaningful control over their own destinies and a large degree of freedom in the determination of domestic policy priorities. Whether Finlandization should be viewed as a strategy of appeasement depends, in large part, on one's perspective. Motivated by a combination of realistic and idealistic reasoning, it understood the limits of American power and influence in a region of great importance to the Soviet Union and relatively minimal strategic value to the United States, but it refused to abandon Eastern Europe to the oppressive status quo of Soviet domination. It shows how American policymakers could wisely adjust their objectives to accommodate political realities. This essay will explore how US policymakers understood the Finland analogy, the implications of the model, and why they opted for this alternative.

To Finlandization

The first reference to the Finland model appears in a memorandum written by John Foster Dulles in September 1953. In this short memo, Dulles briefly reconsidered US collective security policies. He argued that NATO 'is losing its grip', primarily because (1) the Western European allies were losing faith that the United States would respond militarily to a Soviet offensive in Europe and that even a certain nuclear response would discourage Soviet aggression (what was later termed 'extended deterrence') and (2) the allies suffered from persistent economic problems upon which the European Recovery Program had had but limited impact. Moreover,
Dulles wrote, the Soviet 'peace offensive' had encouraged the United States' European allies and Japan to think 'that the danger is past and that neutralism and military economy are permissible'.

Rejecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommendation to reduce unilaterally the US troop presence in Europe, Dulles offered an alternative: a 'spectacular effort to relax world tensions on a global basis' by negotiating a mutual withdrawal of Soviet and US forces from Eastern and Western Europe respectively. Through such an agreement, the United States could meet its budgetary requirements, prevent overextension of its armed forces, and drastically reduce Cold War tensions, while persuasively reassuring its European allies that the United States had no intention of becoming an isolationist Fortress America. Dulles' vision for a post-agreement Europe looked much the same as 1953 Europe but without the presence of superpower troops; Dulles had little intention of eliminating the spheres of Western and Soviet influence that divided the continent. In the list of 'general concepts', the second item reads, 'Satellites politically freed, but oriented (friendly) to USSR (note. Finland). Dullies' dream for a post-agreement Europe was remarkably limited; he hoped that one day the Eastern European states would have domestic political autonomy, perhaps even governments with popular legitimacy, but the memorandum implied they would continue to take their cues in international relations from the great power to the east.

Two days later, Eisenhower responded in writing to Dulles' proposal for mutual withdrawal. In his opening comments, Eisenhower declared his 'emphatic agreement' with Dulles' suggestion that the United States pursue some plan to relax global tensions; however, he only tepidly endorsed his secretary's specific proposal, stating, 'Mutual withdrawals of Red Army Forces and of United States Forces could be suggested as a step toward relaxing these tensions' [emphasis added]. The possibility of détente – although founded on pessimism about the steadfastness of the United States' European allies – which had suffused Dulles' memorandum was missing from Eisenhower's, which instead focused on the 'increased military preparation ... forced upon us' by communist rejectionism. Dulles' memo did not consider the future of US policy if the Soviets did not respond favorably to his proposal, and Eisenhower confronted him on this point. The costs of an arms race to maintain relative superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Eisenhower wrote, would be so great that 'we would be forced to consider whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment that we could designate.' Eisenhower's fleeting reference to preventive war challenged Dulles to come up with a more realistic alternative. While Dulles dreamed of ways of solving American budgetary, political, and military problems all in one
dramatic act, the President planned for the more likely outcome – the continuation and perhaps intensification of the Cold War, in its military as well as political aspects. Although Eisenhower did not reject Dulles’ suggestion for mutual withdrawal, his vague, partial endorsement leaves his views on the proposed objectives for Eastern Europe rather unclear.

What was Dulles seeking to convey regarding US hopes for Eastern Europe with his reference to Finland (‘note. Finland’) in his 6 September memorandum? The official American interpretation of Finland’s relationship to the Soviet Union and the West is most clearly stated in NSC 121, ‘The Position of the United States With Respect to Scandinavia and Finland’, approved in the last year of the Truman administration. The accompanying staff study stressed that ‘Finland is not a Soviet satellite. It is a constitutional democracy with unrestricted internal sovereignty wherein the democratic freedoms are guaranteed by law.’ Nevertheless, Finland also had a ‘special relationship’ with the Soviet Union such that the country’s ‘freedom of action in its foreign relations is drastically curtailed by its proximity to Soviet power and by various treaty obligations which Finland was forced to undertake after the war’. As a result, US policy toward Finland was different from that toward the other neutral Scandinavian states. Washington’s objective was ‘limited to the maintenance of Finland as an independent and democratic state; because it would be extremely dangerous to Finland, it is not in our interest to make any attempt to incorporate Finland into a Western bloc’. This 1952 analysis of Finland and the international situation emphasized Finland’s status as an autonomous, neutral state. Though the Finns were seen as fundamentally anti-Soviet, their geopolitical position demanded that they carefully balance between East and West, often following the Soviet lead in matters of foreign affairs. The United States planned to continue to support Finland, but it was compelled to avoid any action that would ‘threaten the delicate balance of Finnish-Soviet relations and call forth drastic Soviet measures inimical to Finnish independence’.

A comprehensive review of US policy toward Finland was not conducted for two years, though increasingly close Finnish-Soviet trade relations concerned the United States. The focus of NSC 5403 was considerably different from that of its predecessor, but the text did not imply any significant policy changes. While NSC 121 had stressed the degree to which the USSR necessarily constrained Finland, NSC 5403 mentioned but did not emphasize these limitations. In contrast to the 1952 document, NSC 5403 was much clearer on the benefits which would accrue to the United States by supporting this neutral regime on the Soviet Union’s borders. The enumerated advantages were chiefly strategic in nature: Finland served as a land buffer to Soviet invasion of Scandinavia and, as long as it remained
neutral, would deny important air defense and early warning installations to the Soviets. But NSC 5403 also recognized gains on the symbolic level; the United States should continue to assist Finland ‘in view of Finland’s past record as an example of resistance to Soviet domination’. Although Yugoslavia was not mentioned by name, the logic of NSC 5403 was highly reminiscent of that often used to justify US assistance to Yugoslavia. Aside from the strategic considerations that influenced American support for that nation, US policymakers often stressed the importance of the Titoist model as an example of successful national communism. Similarly, Finland served as an example of a democratic, autonomous state that had successfully maintained its independence from the Soviet Union and preserved friendly relations with states on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and by prospering, it would inherently encourage Soviet-bloc states to pursue the same path.

Charles Bohlen’s comments during the September 1953 meeting of the Eastern European chiefs of mission further clarify the Finland analogy. Minister Christian Ravndal of the Budapest legation had inquired whether, given Stalin’s death the previous March and the successor regime’s ‘peace offensive’, the United States should be more receptive to peace overtures by individual satellite governments. Bohlen, then ambassador to the Soviet Union and concurrently counselor in the State Department, replied that ‘the touchstone should be the question of subservience of a given satellite country to the Soviet Union’. As an example, Bohlen cited Finland, ‘a country which had an acceptable relationship both to the Soviet Union and to the free world’. He thought it ‘unwise and unrealistic for the United States to pursue a policy that did not permit improved relations with a satellite state until it had opposed the USSR. In fact, Bohlen went so far as to acknowledge the Soviet Union’s ‘more or less legitimate interest ... in having a non-hostile regime in a bordering country’. Bohlen and his contemporaries never used the term ‘Finlandization.’ It first appeared in the mid-1950s during Austrian political debate over whether closer cooperation with the Soviet Union would undermine or strengthen Austria’s neutral status, and it then continually resurfaced, particularly in the 1970s. It is so laden with controversy and assumptions that I hesitate to describe the Eisenhower administration’s strategy with it; however, this essay uses it as a convenient short-hand. Bohlen’s comments hint that Finlandization did not represent merely a tolerable status for Eastern Europe and a stepping-stone to ultimate alignment with the West but rather may have been the US objective for the region. His reference to the ‘unwise and unrealistic’ pursuit of policies that would not accord the Soviets the same legitimate security interests the United States had accorded itself implied that the United States might actually benefit more if
the Finlandized satellites maintained close links and reasonably warm relations with the USSR than if they were to ally themselves with the West. A Soviet Union surrounded by hostile, or even neutral, states would likely be extremely nervous and afraid and more likely to initiate general nuclear war or pursue other aggressive policies. In Bohlen’s view, the Soviet Union would not disappear in the near future, but the magnitude of the threat it posed to the free world could be diminished, and a Soviet Union which felt threatened would be less likely to make the concessions necessary to alleviate Cold War tensions.

In mid-April 1954, Dulles discussed the Finnish model for Soviet-East European relations with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. Eden dismissed Dulles’ Finnish example as unrealistic, pointing out that ‘considerable autonomy was permissible to Finland from Russia because Finland was ‘the road to nowhere’, but the satellite countries were ‘the road to somewhere else’.’ Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration continued to perceive Finland as its model for thinking about Eastern Europe. At the 1955 Geneva Conference, Dulles, in private conversation with Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, raised the satellite issue. Although Bulganin was highly unreceptive to any suggestion regarding the political liberalization of Eastern Europe, Dulles’ comments are illuminating. He explicitly told Bulganin that the United States ‘had no desire that the Soviet Union should be ringed by a group of hostile states. In order to avoid this, however, it was not necessary that they be satellites. There was the example of Finland for instance.’ The Soviet Union, Dulles believed, was justified in wanting nearby states formally or informally aligned with it. Soviet control over domestic economic, political, and social decisions, not foreign policy, made these states satellites.

In June 1956 Secretary Dulles assured Yugoslav Ambassador Leo Mates that the United States was not terribly concerned about the continuing rapprochement between the Soviet Union and his country. Moreover, he agreed with Mates that the Eastern European countries were not developing in the direction of American or Western European democracy and emphasized that the establishment of democracy in Eastern Europe was not among US objectives for the region. He explained that the ‘post-World War I idea of a cordon sanitaire of hostile states around the Soviet Union was completely outmoded. The USSR was a major power entitled to have friendly governments surrounding it, such as Finland and Yugoslavia.’ Explicitly stating the reasoning implicit in Dulles’ comment, Mates added that ‘the emergence of hostile states would just create new world tensions’, which everyone wanted to avoid. Dulles agreed with Mates’ observation but also expressed concern that if the Soviets did not grant greater domestic autonomy soon, ‘independence might come to the satellites under
conditions in which hostility to the USSR was the dominant note. 18 Dulles’ prediction that regimes hostile to the Soviet Union might emerge in Eastern Europe came to pass in the form of popular revolution in Hungary just four months after his discussion with Mates, and he probably wanted to avoid such situations for several reasons. Such events might induce a bloody and swift Soviet repression that would place the US government in an uncomfortable and embarrassing position, heighten global tension as Mates had warned, or alternatively lead to a civil war that might destabilize the entire region as various local elements struggled for control of the instruments of state power. None of these scenarios would foster improved relations with the Soviet Union, nor would any outcomes detract from the Soviet threat, the essence of which lay in its military, specifically its nuclear, power.

At first glance, Dulles’ statement to Mates in opposition to the establishment of democracy in Eastern Europe appears to contradict the vision implicit in the Finland model. He seems to link ideology, reflected in the form of government, to behavior, manifested in the state’s relations with the Soviet Union and the West. In explaining to Mates why he believed the Eastern European states need not become democracies, Dulles argued that creating a post-World War I cordon sanitaire would be impossible in the 1950s, implying that democracies in Eastern Europe would necessarily find themselves sworn enemies of the Soviet Union. Yet Dulles also cited the example of Finland, an established constitutional democracy, as a state friendly to the Soviet Union, undermining this connection between domestic political structure and foreign policy. Moreover, the converse should also be true, that communist states should be incapable of comfortable relations with Western-style governments, but the example of Yugoslavia since its expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 would disprove that contention.

Still, one must recognize that Dulles was speaking to the representative of a government that maintained strong ties to the West but had remained nearly as authoritarian and devoted to communist ideology as its former allies in Eastern Europe. The inconsistencies cited above probably reflect Dulles’ attempts to reconcile the needs of diplomacy with his own long-term vision for Eastern Europe. While Dulles may have been circumspect about whether US hopes for the other side of the Iron Curtain included democratic governments, his vision certainly did not include the alliance with the West that many inferred from his liberation rhetoric.

The administration did not present its fairly limited objectives in Eastern Europe to the public until the exciting developments in Poland and Hungary in 1956, acclaimed by the administration publicly as a ‘real promise that the light of liberty soon will shine again in this darkness’ and
by some within the administration even privately as a ‘miracle’. With the
fate of these two countries and the Soviet response uncertain, Dulles
delivered a speech before the Dallas Council on World Affairs that made
explicit views he had previously expressed only in classified contexts; the
speech had the full weight of the administration behind it, as Eisenhower
had approved the text the day before. Dulles pledged US assistance to
satellites that chose to embark upon a path dictated by national interests
rather than those of their ‘exploiting masters’. Moreover, the United States
declared its commitment to the principle of noninterference in these
countries’ domestic affairs, for economic aid would not be conditional
‘upon the adoption by these countries of any particular form of society’.
These remarks were only somewhat surprising: Dulles had merely admitted
publicly the principles that had long underlain US-Yugoslav relations. More
important, though, the secretary of state sought to reassure the Soviet
leadership in a manner that would encourage their tolerance of Eastern
European regimes independent of the Soviet Union. He stated, ‘The United
States has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite
countries ... We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies.
We see them as friends and as part of a new and friendly and no longer
divided Europe.’

Dulles’ unequivocal rejection of the extension of NATO into Eastern
Europe, an act some had considered and even expected in the case of
Yugoslavia prior to its rapprochement with the Soviet Union, was perfectly
consistent with his private positions and was the most critical statement in
the speech. If the Soviets took Dulles at his word, then permitting greater
domestic autonomy in Eastern Europe posed but a minimal security threat.
Eisenhower’s diaries record that on 30 October the President similarly
instructed the new US ambassador to Hungary, Tom Wailes, that the United
States sought to encourage merely the formation of a neutral tier of states in
Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, although mass American public sympathy
for the Poles and Hungarians might have been motivated by devotion to the
principles of sovereignty and self-determination, the United States clearly
had ulterior motives in fostering nationalism in Eastern Europe to replace
the Soviet Union’s exploitative relationship with the satellites, despite
Dulles’ protest to the contrary: the Western security position in Europe
would be enhanced by economies focused on their own needs rather than
those of the Soviet military machine and by national militaries no longer as
committed to the pursuit of Soviet objectives. Furthermore, even though
his rhetoric spoke of a ‘no longer divided Europe’, Dulles’ plans anticipated
that Europe would remain divided into Western and Soviet spheres of
influence for the indefinite future, and he fully expected that although the
Eastern European states might eventually exercise independence in their
domestic affairs, the foreign policy of these states would still be oriented eastwards.

After the events of 1956, once it had become clear that the United States did not aim for liberation as understood by the public and the press, NSC policy statements mentioned for the first time the objective of Finlandization. As the end of the decade approached, the United States became aware of increasingly close relations between Finland and the Soviet bloc, not only in matters of foreign policy in which Finland insisted ‘on abstaining on even relatively harmless votes in international bodies and conferences’, but also in domestic affairs, in which maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union had come to dominate the political arena. Some diplomats perceived a ‘growing Finnish tendency ... to sacrifice bit by bit the country’s claim to neutrality and independence on the alleged ground that Finland’s interests dictate that the Soviets be appeased’.²³ Nevertheless, the new periodic NSC statement of policy toward Finland for 1959 proclaimed Finland ‘an example of democracy on the Communist threshold and a buffer against further Soviet encroachment in an area of direct confrontation between the West and Soviet imperialism.’ However, this document distinguished itself from previous statements with a sentence at the end of the first paragraph: ‘if Finland is able to preserve its present neutral status – that of a nation able to maintain its independence despite heavy Soviet pressure – it could serve as an example of what the United States might like to see achieved by the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe.’²⁴ Never before had an NSC policy document explicitly confirmed that the United States viewed Finland as a model for Eastern Europe. This line was not included in the statement without some discussion by the council. Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant for National Security, felt that ‘it was not necessary to include the sentence in US Policy toward Finland,’ that any comments regarding the satellites naturally belonged in statements of basic policy. CIA Director Allen Dulles and Secretary of State Christian Herter immediately rebutted these claims. Dulles declared that he ‘would be delighted if a Finnish-type government developed in Poland or Czechoslovakia,’ and Herter also expressed his agreement with the sentence, ‘though he felt it might be out of place’.²⁵ The issue was never firmly resolved, and Gray simply allowed it to die: it was included in the document as a unique testimony to the true purposes of American policy toward Eastern Europe.

The objectives that emerge from the documentary record of the Eisenhower administration are highly reminiscent of the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine of the mid-1970s. In December 1975, State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt told a gathering of American ambassadors in Europe that ‘it must be our policy to strive for an evolution
that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one ... our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence.’ Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak inferred from this statement that Sonnenfeldt had proclaimed a new US approach to the region, condoning Soviet domination over the Eastern European states. The ensuing brouhaha generated massive political pressure on the Ford administration, forcing Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to aver that the United States did not accept ‘Soviet “dominion” of Eastern Europe nor is it in any way designed to seek the consolidation of such “dominion”.’

Ironically, Sonnenfeldt had admitted no more than what John Foster Dulles and Charles Bohlen had recognized over 20 years before. While his comments regarding the ‘organic’ relationship between the satellites and the Soviet Union remain unclear (and Sonnenfeldt was never given the opportunity to explain them further before he was compelled to issue a retraction), they implied that the United States government held the Finlandization of Eastern Europe as its objective – domestic autonomy combined with, in Sonnenfeldt’s words, ‘a strong Soviet geopolitical influence’. The public uproar following Sonnenfeldt’s statements was precisely what American diplomats and policymakers had sought to avoid all those years. If such a strategy had been brought to light in the 1950s, it might very well have been discredited.

A US Strategy for Greater Soviet Security

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency often endorsed more ‘dynamic’ policies and more ambitious objectives, John Foster Dulles’ State Department, naturally much more sensitive to the political ramifications of aggressive behavior and unattainable goals, was the chief bastion of the Finland model. Where Eisenhower himself stood remains ambiguous: on different occasions, he supported policies that suggested vastly different objectives. However, had Dulles’ approach toward Eastern Europe ever been articulated to the public, the administration would likely have absorbed a great deal of politically-damaging criticism for abandoning the captive nations and relegating them to the Soviet orbit. What advantages, then, did Dulles and others perceive in a model that legitimized a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe?

Although Eastern Europe was of great symbolic importance, its strategic consequence was very limited. As the Eisenhower administration’s first basic national security policy document, NSC 162, argued, ‘Such a detachment [of a major European satellite] would not decisively affect the
Soviet military capability either in delivery of weapons of mass destruction or in conventional forces ...'. While the document contended that a successful detachment 'would be a considerable blow to Soviet prestige', it also acknowledged that the prospects of such a development were slim 'except by Soviet acquiescence or war'. Not surprisingly, the State Department clashed with the Department of Defense (joined by the Office of Defense Mobilization and Foreign Operations Administration members of the NSC, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative) over the policy recommendations in NSC 162 to reduce the Soviet threat. Based on the assessment that detachment would probably result in relatively little gain to the United States in its contest with the Soviet Union, the State Department proposed the inclusion of a paragraph prohibiting the United States from 'initiat[ing] aggressive actions involving force against Soviet bloc territory. Limited actions within our capabilities would not materially reduce the Soviet threat even if successful.'

Furthermore, considering the region's relative unimportance to Western interests, the risks of an aggressive strategy outweighed any conceivable benefits. Actions that sought the rollback of Soviet influence from Eastern Europe, the State Department thought, would have pernicious effects on US interests in that they would 'increase the risk of general war, would place serious strains on the coalition, and might well decrease the chances of agreement with the USSR on the more fundamental aspects of the Soviet threat.' These three themes – the horrors of general war, the objections and fears of the United States' European allies, and the damage of such actions to the possibility of negotiations – are prominent in intra-administration critiques of the more aggressive strategy of rollback. The opposition of the military establishment, combined with the support of Eisenhower who reminded the Council that all covert operations would have to pass through it for approval before implementation, led to the paragraph's exclusion from the document.

However, the intensity of the State Department's conviction that aggressive action would have negative repercussions was reflected in Policy Planning Staff Director Robert Bowie's follow-up memorandum to Dulles in which he strongly urged reconsideration of the Council's exclusion of this warning. In the following NSC meeting, Dulles decided not to press the issue, stating that he was willing to concede on the paragraph as long as actions such as 'the detachment of Albania or an assault on Hainan Island' would not be undertaken without the Council's approval. Given the president's opposition to the paragraph's inclusion, Dulles knew he would be fighting a losing battle, and he instead saved his political capital for another day. The important point is that an awareness of the strategic unimportance of Eastern Europe and of the dangers of an aggressive
strategy undergirded the State Department's approach. Moreover, Bowie's memo reflects the degree to which such thinking had pervaded at least the upper reaches of the Department.

As we saw earlier, Bohlen and Dulles both recognized that the Soviet Union had a legitimate security interest in being surrounded by non-hostile, even friendly, states. A Soviet Union surrounded by states allied with the West would feel threatened, and its heightened anxiety might lead it to interpret even innocuous Western moves as offensive and as a pretext to war. Such an international environment would not be conducive to the resolution of superpower conflict and posed an unacceptable level of threat to the United States. Under such conditions, Washington would be incapable of pursuing its objectives as stated in NSC 162/2: 'the broad aim of US security policies must be to create, prior to the achievement of atomic plenty, conditions under which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet with the Soviet-Communist threat with resolution and to negotiate for its alleviation under proper safeguards.' Just as the United States often recognized the advantages and necessity of negotiating from a 'situation of strength', so did some recognize that Cold War tensions could be reduced only when the Soviet Union could negotiate from a position of confidence and security as well.

American policy was certainly not always consistent on this score. An unfortunate side-effect of the establishment of NATO was that it forced the Soviets to prevent incipient liberalization in the region and exacerbated tensions with the West. The United States did pursue various covert operations that were more consistent with a strategy of rollback than Finlandization. In these early years of the Cold War, US policy was riven by inconsistency and contradiction. The Eisenhower revisionists have successfully demonstrated that Eisenhower was not the well-meaning but obtuse and easily manipulated president of the earliest assessments of his administration. Although he may have been a subtle thinker and a powerful presence at NSC meetings, he did fail to impose coherence on US policy. One moment he would sagely nod in agreement with John Foster Dulles, and in the next assent to the plans of Foster's brother, Allen Dulles. Even Foster Dulles would, like his boss, occasionally fall into the trap of trying anything and everything against a Soviet threat that seemed to only be growing. One must also recall that Finlandization was hardly preeminent among American objectives; NATO may have unintentionally solidified Cold War boundaries, but Western policymakers would have concluded that that was a small price to pay for the greater security it brought to Western Europe. Such inconsistency was certainly the hallmark of US foreign policy toward the Soviet world in the 1950s. But given the still standard perception of this period as the apex of a highly ideological conflict and the all-too-
common criticism of US policy in this period as viewing the world through ideology-tinted glasses, the presence of realpolitik thought among Western statesmen during this time is important, even if Foster Dulles’ rhetoric rarely reflected the subtlety of his more private ruminations.

Pursuing Double Containment

Finally, the Finland model’s advocates may also have wanted to maintain Soviet influence in Eastern Europe to prevent the reemergence of a Germany with imperialist ambitions. Less than a decade after the end of World War II, the memory of German aggression remained fresh in the minds of American policymakers. World War II was a pivotal moment in the personal careers and the ideological outlook of the Eisenhower administration’s major foreign policy figures. The documents reveal that their experiences in and interpretations of the century’s two world wars had convinced them that although Germany could not be suppressed indefinitely and that the Morgenthau Plan was not a viable solution to the German problem, the security and stability of Europe depended on the constraint of German power.

Fear of a resurgent Germany continually appears in the thought of US foreign-policy makers on a variety of issues, particularly German unification. Prior to the Eisenhower administration taking office, Walter J. Donnelly, the US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), cabled the State Department in late 1952, discussing the ‘resurgence of Ger[man] productivity and vitality’ that ‘is creating an even greater imbalance in [the] power relationship between Ger[man] and Fr[ance].’ ‘[The] Resurgence of Ger[man] vitality’, he wrote, ‘is undoing the widely calculated balance between Fr[ance] and Ger[many] on which much American-Fr[ench] thinking regarding Eur[opean] integration was predicated.’ Analyzing these issues, an exploratory memorandum by a member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff cautioned that ‘it should not be overlooked that Germany once again seems to be in a dynamic-evolutionary phase of development in marked contrast to the other major powers in Western Europe and that a main premise of our Germany policy must be the uncertainty, the incalculability of future German national behavior.’ Once the balance of power in continental Europe was upset, German foreign policy would likely grow more aggressive, and it might ‘be impossible to constrain the forces of German expansion through legal bonds and limitations.’ The paper proposed that the United States envision European integration ‘in which German participation is so hedged by safeguards that it cannot develop into hegemony’ and implied that ‘a resurgent Germany, aware of its power, [could] be contained’ within structures such as the
European Defense Community and the Schuman Plan.\textsuperscript{35} During the Eisenhower administration, despite close relations with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, such thinking appears repeatedly. HICOG James P. Conant wrote to Dulles on the dangers inherent in the establishment of a German national army: ‘the basic German political situation is too unstable and the German governmental structure is too new to trust the final command of a national army to the hands of the unknown German leaders of the future.’\textsuperscript{36} Dulles’ comments at a 1955 meeting on NSC 5524, ‘Basic US Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations’, provide insight into the fears of US allies. Noting the French concern regarding Germany’s military revival, he added that ‘our forces were not stationed in Europe solely in relation to a Soviet threat, but as a means of reassuring the French against the Germans.’\textsuperscript{37} Dulles would probably have agreed with Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General, that the alliance was intended to ‘keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’.\textsuperscript{38}

The Soviets too expressed concern about Germany’s potential for wreaking havoc in the international arena once again. In July 1952 Stalin received an intelligence report warning that the European Defense Community would be incapable of controlling a resurgent West Germany which might attack France and seek to regain territory lost in the aftermath of World War II.\textsuperscript{39} In his \textit{Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR}, published in October 1952, he asked the same question as policymakers in the State Department, albeit in language that also sought to score points on the international political scene: ‘What guarantee is there that Germany and Japan will not rise to their feet again, will not attempt to break out of American bondage and live their own independent lives? I think there is no such guarantee.’\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, the evidence indicates that Stalin believed that Soviet security could be assured only by keeping Germany under Moscow’s firm hand. Throughout the 1950s, Germany’s spectacular recovery from the devastation of the war continued to worry Soviet leaders. Adenauer’s commitment to the West was perceived as somewhat anomalous, and the Soviets suspected that his successor might very well prove rather more nationalistic.\textsuperscript{41} In April 1956, Khrushchev told British leaders that ‘the Germans are beginning to get “upish” again, and it was probably a good thing for everybody that Germany was divided’, that a re-unified Germany might prove too powerful for either bloc to control.\textsuperscript{42}

While this disquiet about Germany’s revival was never explicitly linked to Eastern Europe, Dulles may have hinted at precisely such a connection during NSC discussions in 1958, in which he argued that the United States and the Soviet Union shared an interest in ‘containing’ the German potential for aggression. In reviewing NSC 5803, ‘Statement of US Policy Toward
Germany’, Dulles opened his comments as follows:

... with respect to Germany the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union have something in common – namely, that it was not safe to have a unified Germany in the heart of Europe unless there were some measure of external control which could prevent the Germans from doing a third time what they had done in 1914 and in 1939.

The Soviet Union and the United States would not agree to the reunification of Germany unless the country were placed within their respective institutions and thus under their respective spheres of influence; neither would accept neutralization as an option. As Dulles explained, ‘We simply could not contemplate re-unifying Germany and then turning it loose to exercise its tremendous potentialities in Central Europe ... Everything depended on the context in which Germany was re-unified, because you could not neutralize a great power like Germany indefinitely.’ Germany had shown its penchant for ambitious militarism twice before, and ‘another repetition of unlimited power loosed on the world’ would be disastrous. Both General White, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Eisenhower ‘agreed with all that the Secretary of State had said’.

Dulles’ reference to the common US-Soviet interest in preventing German expansionism may help explain his motives for advocating the evolution of Eastern Europe along the Finnish paradigm. If US objectives were realized, then Germany would be contained by Western European institutions such as NATO and by virtue of Soviet political influence over the states to its east. However, if the advocates of rollback succeeded in causing the retreat of Soviet influence from Eastern Europe, and the region were to erupt in violence as communist governments attempted to retain power despite popular opposition, then Germany could very easily step into the vacuum of East-Central Europe. Finlandization seemed to Dulles like an excellent means of achieving the entire range of US objectives: domestic autonomy for the Eastern European satellites, possibly with popularly elected governments; retreat of Soviet military forces to within Soviet borders; and containment of German aggressive potential. Whether Dulles actually assessed US interests and strategy according to such a strict balance-of-power model remains questionable. However, a recent study of Dulles concluded that he ‘subscribed to balance-of-power theory and formulated his strategic design accordingly’, and there is a reasonable amount of contextual evidence within the documentary record to indicate that this line of argument may have played some role in his thinking on Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.

The link between the containment of Germany and the maintenance of
significant Soviet foreign policy influence in Eastern Europe may also be inferred from Dulles’ discussions with Tito in their 1955 meeting at the resort of Brioni. During their conversation, Tito spoke extensively about the need to reunify Germany in such a way that it would not pursue militaristic or expansionist aims as it had in the past. Summing up his comments, Tito told Dulles, ‘But, because the United States feared Russian aggression, it should not forget the possibility of future German aggression. We must constantly think of both dangers, for if we think of only one we promote the other.’ If the United States chose to focus solely on the Soviet Union, an imperialistic Germany might very likely appear on the horizon. If the United States were to weaken the Soviet Union excessively, German nationalists might perceive an opening for them to wield their own power in central Europe. Dulles cryptically replied that ‘we are well aware of this’, avoiding any elaboration of his thoughts on how the United States would address the problem of double containment.45 But the strategy of Finlandization represented one response to Tito’s warning, as its moderate approach might restrain German ambitions, allay Soviet fears, and bring domestic autonomy to the satellites.

But why did policymakers describe their objectives using the example of Finland rather than Yugoslavia? Policymakers viewed nationalist communist governments, like that of Tito’s Yugoslavia, as a step in the right direction, but US interests apparently demanded more. The 1954 NSC policy statement on Yugoslavia set as the United States’ long-term objective the ‘eventual fulfillment of the right of the Yugoslav people to live under a government of their own choosing, which maintains peaceful and stable relations with neighboring states’.46 The United States had always hoped that Tito would one day relinquish power in favor of a popularly-elected government. Shortly after the Tito–Stalin rift, a Policy Planning Staff document concluded that ‘we recognize that Yugoslavia’s internal regime continues to be one which is deeply distasteful to our people and that as long as such a regime exists, Yugoslav-American relations can never take on the cordiality and intimacy which we would wish.’47 Finland had a popularly-elected, constitutional government, and the Finnish model thus implied more than mere domestic autonomy. Yet, the revealing argument so well articulated by Philip Trezise of the Policy Planning Staff in 1956 — that state economies oriented toward national, rather than Soviet, interests would deny important resources to the Soviet Union — fails to make a convincing case for the value of fostering democratic, rather than merely non-puppet, governments among the satellites.48

Although policymakers do not clearly articulate them, perhaps because they appeared so fundamental and obvious, there are at least two reasons they likely perceived for encouraging the establishment of democratic
regimes in Eastern Europe. First, in an ideological extension of the Trezise argument of economic interest, they probably believed that democratic states that shared many Western values would be less likely to participate in a general war as part of the Soviet bloc. Certainly, they recognized that ideology was not the sole factor in determining political leanings; Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’s with the United States in the early years of the decade showed that this assertion did not always hold. But the Cold War was, in part, a war of values and ideals beyond the traditional power politics of the nineteenth century, and policymakers often argued that communist states, even ‘independent’ ones, that remained dedicated to the goal of furthering international communism acted in ways detrimental to US interests. Clearly, then, fostering democracy in the Soviet bloc, beyond mere national communism, would benefit US security interests.

Second, the promotion of democracy has always been an essential element in America’s self-definition. Samuel Huntington has noted that in America, unlike most European states, ‘ideology in the form of the principles of the American Creed existed before the formation of a national community and political system. These principles defined the identity of the community when there were no institutions for dealing with the other countries of the world.’ The country’s origins explain why Americans believe that their ‘foreign policy should also be substantively directed to the promotion of [its liberal] values in an external environment ... [and reflect] the political values and principles which define American identity.’

Although realist considerations demanded that the United States often ally itself with dictators during the Cold War, the American sense of mission required that US foreign policy include among its goals the principle of political justice embodied in democratic governance, and this reflection of the national sense of purpose was also manifested in US objectives for Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

In the early years of the Eisenhower administration, the Finland model was not unchallenged, its chief competitor being the more aggressive alternative of rollback. Behind the strategies of Finlandization and rollback lay intricate, and very different, webs of assumptions regarding the goals of Soviet foreign policy, the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the Cold War, the role of time, and the strategic importance of the satellite states. The strategies also entailed two disparate visions of the region’s ultimate status. Believing that the establishment of long-term, stable, and mutually beneficial relations with the Soviet Union was impossible under current
global conditions, proponents of rollback aimed at the retraction of all aspects of Soviet power, including military forces, communist ideology, and political influence, to within the USSR's borders. However, rollback had been conclusively defeated on the level of strategic thought by the end of 1954, never again to reappear as a serious subject of discussion. At most, it persisted until the Hungarian fiasco of 1956 through covert paramilitary operations such as 'Red Sox/Red Cap'. If Eisenhower administration decision-makers aimed for any status for Eastern Europe beyond the status quo, it was one modeled on Finland's relations with its Western and Soviet bloc neighbors.

Eisenhower administration policymakers who patterned their objectives in Eastern Europe on Finland were certainly not insensitive to concerns of justice. John Foster Dulles' public, moralistic rhetoric was not merely a calculating ploy: while he recognized that powerful, misleading rhetoric was politically effective, his moralistic tendencies also honestly reflected an important aspect of his temperament. Dulles did want to bring freedom to Eastern Europe. Yet, he and his colleagues were also highly committed to resolution of the United States' difficulties with the Soviet Union, to reduction of the Soviet threat through negotiation. The set of objectives based on the Finnish precedent was constructed as a means of escaping this apparent dilemma. The people of Eastern Europe would have governments of their own choosing, and their choices in domestic policy would not be dictated by the Soviet Union. At the same time, these states would remain within the Soviet sphere of influence, 'friendly' to the Soviet Union. Drawing the distinction between independence to conduct foreign policy and independence to determine the priorities of domestic policy, the Finland model sought to reconcile these concerns of peace and justice by balancing between them. Thus, Finlandization was not merely a way station to membership in the Western alliance: instead, it defined the American vision for Eastern Europe.

The models and images with which US policymakers conceived of their strategy toward Eastern Europe in the 1950s are not of historical interest alone, for they have implications for the challenges of the post-Cold War era as well. Unlike many of their contemporaries, Dulles and his colleagues who advocated the Finlandization of Eastern Europe accorded the Soviet Union the same legitimate security interests as the United States. They understood that the Soviet Union required 'friendly' states at its borders, for if the two superpowers were to successfully negotiate a satisfactory, stable co-existence, both would make the necessary concessions only when they felt secure. In the post-Cold War era, the United States would be well-advised to allot conceivable adversaries room to breathe. Aggressive US policies which seek to excessively delimit the range of action permitted
regional powers and emerging superpowers will foster only feelings of insecurity and alienation in these states, increasing the potential for global conflict and decreasing the possibility of global cooperation. If the world is to harvest the potential benefits accompanying the end of the Cold War, then the United States and its partners must pursue policies toward that end. The United States’ formidable military, economic, and political resources should be used realistically and carefully. The possession of muscle does not alone necessitate that it be flexed.

NOTES

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1. Stephen E. Ambrose, with Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday 1981) p.238. Standard histories of liberation have tended to argue that the Eisenhower administration never seriously considered rolling back Soviet influence from Eastern Europe. As Alexis Johnson, who worked in the State Department's Far Eastern Division during Dulles' tenure as secretary of state, commented in an oral history, 'Foster Dulles was a realist and knew the world well, and I think the 'liberation' theme that he adopted was for domestic political purposes more than out of any genuine conviction with regard to international affairs.' Johnson memoir, Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University. John Lewis Gaddis maintained in Strategies of Containment that if the administration had a liberation strategy, it consisted almost entirely of rhetorical gestures. If these minimal measures were to succeed in creating rifts between the satellite governments and the Soviet Union and between the captive peoples and their respective governments, all the better as far as the United States was concerned. See his Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (NY: OUP 1982) pp.155-7.

An alternative view has argued that the administration actually developed a coherent plan for liberation. Although it was not prepared to intervene militarily to detach a satellite, the administration conceived of liberation as a long-term goal that could be achieved by employing various instruments of national power, ranging from covert propaganda and paramilitary operations to economic pressure programs. While most within the administration supported this view, conflicts arose over the merits of 'soft' and 'hard' policies to achieve that end. See James D. Marchio, 'A New Look at the Eisenhower Administration and Eastern Europe', paper presented to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 1992, and his 'Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953-1959', Ph.D. diss., American University, 1990.

Neither perspective explicitly defines liberation. Both appear to view it as it was commonly understood by the public and media in the early 1950s – the complete liberation of the satellites from the Soviet/communist sphere of influence. They disagree over whether the administration seriously tried to fulfill that objective, but neither account seems to question this antiquated interpretation of the administration’s ends in Eastern Europe.


'LIBERATION À LA FINLAND'


5. The most recent literature on John Foster Dulles has hinted at an alternative interpretation of US objectives in Eastern Europe, mentioning Dulles' occasional advocacy of Finland as the model for the region. It neither discusses Finlandization's meaning, nor systematically examines the concept's treatment beyond the initial reference in 1953. See John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Unexpected John Foster Dulles', in his *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (NY: OUP 1992) p.80; and Frederick W. Marks III, *Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Westport, CT: Praeger 1993) p.75. The Finland model also challenges traditional interpretations of Dulles' views on neutrality. Although US cooperation with Tito – and Dulles' apparently favorable impression of the Yugoslav leader after their 1955 meeting at Brioni – complicated the view that accepted at face value the secretary's unqualified condemnation of countries that chose to remain neutral during the Cold War, Gaddis concludes that Dulles 'clearly had little sympathy for 'neutralism', and considered it not in the best interests of the United States and the rest of the free world' (*Strategies of Containment*, note 1, p.154).

6. Dulles memo, 6 Sept. 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, II, pp.457–60. At the National Security Council meeting of 27 Aug. 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had urged that the United States reduce its troop commitments abroad, particularly land forces, to avoid budgetary tensions. In the ensuing discussion of the Chiefs' report, Dulles expressed concern about the political implications of the proposal: 'the change of policy proposed in the JCS report could result in a grave disaster if we were not allowed sufficient time to prepare public opinion abroad for this change. Domestic opinion would, of course, be delighted with this new concept. The difficulties would come overseas.' Emphasizing the importance of the free world alliance, he added later, in rare agreement with C.D. Jackson, Assistant to the President for Cold War Strategy. 'The "art of the thing" is to reshape our policy and program in such a fashion that we can still maintain enough free world cohesion to provide for common pooling of resources ...

7. Secretary Dulles prophesied that this reshaping could probably be accomplished, but he pointed out that the whole free world was in the grip of nervous tension and greatly feared a revival of the Fortress America concept. The JCS responded that while it recognized such objections, it believed the redeployments were necessary for US security and that the political difficulties could be overcome if the situation were skillfully handled. See Minutes, NSC Meeting, 27 Aug. 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, II, pp.443–55.

8. In considering further the JCS proposals, Dulles was apparently still very troubled by the effects of the proposed redeployment on the Western alliance and the allies' morale, even if the United States endeavored to portray it as consistent with previously articulated policies on troop commitments overseas. His memo shortly after the meeting may be interpreted as a way to redeploy troops without politically ruinous consequences. When one considers that George Kennan was roundly criticized for offering a similar suggestion in the form of 'disengagement' five years later, in the Reith lectures, the radical nature of Dulles' memo becomes readily apparent. On the comparison to Kennan, see Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War* (note 5) pp.79–80.

9. Dulles believed that the 'no single country, not even the United States, could, out of its own resources, adequately match the strength of a powerful totalitarian state. The attempt to do so would "bust us" and possibly lead the United States down the path of authoritarianism. Minutes, NSC meeting, 27 Aug. 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, II, p.452. In his reply to Dulles' memo, Eisenhower expressed the same idea: 'if the contest to maintain this relative position [of constant mobilization and readiness] should have to continue indefinitely, the cost would either drive us to war – or into some form of totalitarian government'. Eisenhower to Dulles, 8 Sept. 1953, *FRUS: 1952–1954*, II, p.461.


11. Eisenhower to Dulles (note 7). The President's relatively lukewarm endorsement of Dulles'
radical proposals is especially curious in light of Special Assistant for National Security Robert Cutler's memo of 3 Sept. 1953, in which he reported to Dulles that when he told Eisenhower of 'the further views you had expressed at that meeting of the only way you now saw to work the matter out [presumably those stated in the memo of 6 Sept.], he was extremely interested and reacted favorably.' Eisenhower 'took to the dramatic idea which you stated and the reason you expressed for mentioning extreme secrecy.' Cutler to Dulles, 3 Sept. 1953, FRUS: 1952–1954, II, p.456. Apparently Eisenhower had a change of heart in the intervening week and grew considerably less confident of the wisdom of Dulles' proposals.


12. For just one example of such reasoning, consider NSC 174, 'Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe', approved by the President on 23 Dec. 1953: 'Tito's establishment of an independent, communist regime ... has brought valuable assets to the free world in the struggle against aggressive Soviet power. It provides a standing example of successful defiance of the Kremlin and is proof that there is a practical alternative for nationalist communist leaders to submission to Soviet control.' NSC 174, 11 Dec. 1953, FRUS: 1952–1954, VIII, pp.112–13; see also the accompanying NSC staff study, particularly paras 8–21, FRUS: 1952–1954, VIII, pp.118–21.


14. The controversial term, revived in the 1960s by the German Christian Democrats to criticize Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, then became a staple of the West's political vocabulary, serving as 'a symbolic warning of what was in store for Western Europe if it pursued a policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union'. See R.M. Berry, 'Finlandization', in Byron J. Nordstrom (ed.) Dictionary of Scandinavian History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1986) p.195. Some scholars objected to the term because they believed it twisted the truth of Finnish foreign policy. See, for example, Fred Singleton, 'The Myth of "Finlandisation"', International Affairs (London) 57 (Spring 1981) p.285. From this perspective, Finland's foreign policy after World War II tried 'to defend Finnish national identity and independence by endeavoring to convince the Soviet Union that Finland's values and institutions of political and economic liberalism do not pose any threat to Soviet security along the strategic border which runs from Leningrad to Murmansk'. See Berry, 'Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line,' in Dictionary of Scandinavian History, supra, p.151. The Finnish view corresponds to this scholarly argument, and the classic text is Mauno Kobson, Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War (London: Hugh Evelyn 1968).

On the other hand, Walter Laqueur forcefully argued in a 1977 Commentary essay that Finlandization may be defined as 'that process or state of affairs in which, under the cloak of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty of a country becomes reduced'. Finland had preserved its domestic autonomy at the price of its independence in foreign affairs, according to Laqueur; it 'must not oppose any major Soviet foreign-policy initiative or enter into any commitments without Soviet approval, and it is expected to give active support to some aspects of Soviet foreign policy'. Like many a small country geographically close to a great power, Finland was compelled to accommodate the wishes and interests of its more powerful neighbor. For Laqueur, Finland's situation served as a powerful warning for Western Europe. See 'Finlandization', in his The Political Psychology of Appeasement (note 2) pp.7–8, 12.

In this essay, however, the Finlandization of Eastern Europe means merely that US decision-makers sought to make the satellite states look like Finland. The important question, then, is not the reality of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union (which exercised Laqueur and his critics) but how, according to the documentary evidence, US policy-makers understood Finland's relations with the Soviet Union.

15. The Finland model represented Bohlen's approach to Eastern Europe under Cold War constraints. But since he was convinced the Soviet empire would eventually collapse under
the weight of its internal contradictions, since the political situation that demanded the strategy would ultimately disappear. Bohlen's vision of Eastern Europe's final status did not derive from the Finland model.

16. Dulles memo of conversation with Churchill and Eden, 12 April 1954, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda, Box 1, Meetings with the President, 1954 [4], Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS, as cited in Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War (note 5) n.72, p.233.

17. 'Memorandum for the Record of the President's Dinner', 18 July 1955, FRUS: 1955–1957, V, pp.372–3. During a planning meeting that preceded the Geneva Conference, Dulles told the NSC that the United States 'was now confronting a real opportunity in the present situation for a rollback of Soviet power. Such a rollback might leave the present satellite states in a status not unlike that of Finland.' Dulles 'would not object to such a development. The big idea is to get the Russians out of the satellite states and to provide these states with a real sense of their freedom.' This passage makes very clear that popular interpretations of rollback misunderstood the administration's objectives, which were in fact relatively limited. See Minutes, NSC Meeting, 19 May 1955, FRUS: 1955–1957, V, p.184.

18. 'Memorandum of Conversation Between the Yugoslav Ambassador (Mates) and the Secretary of State', 29 June 1956, ibid. XXVI, pp.735–6.


20. 'Address by the Secretary of State Before the Dallas Council on World Affairs', 27 Oct. 1956, ibid. pp.317–18. Eisenhower summarized and reiterated these points in his radio and television address four days later.


22. This sort of reasoning is implicit in the background staff study to NSC 174, which defined the satellite threat as their augmentation of 'the political, military and economic power of the Soviet Union' and the extension of 'Soviet power into the heart of Europe.' It further noted that the 'Kremlin has pushed forward with considerable success its plan to expand the industrial and military capabilities of the satellites and to coordinate the Sovietized political system, military establishments and economies with those of the USSR in a working totality.' FRUS: 1952–1954, VIII, pp.116–17. One of the most explicit and sophisticated discussions of these considerations may be found in Philip Trezise's Policy Planning Staff paper on the importance of supporting Poland under the leadership of the nationalist Władysław Gomułka, particularly paras 4–9 which focus on the Soviet bloc-wide economic, political, and military effects of a nationalist shift in Poland's economy. Trezise to Bowie, 24 Oct. 1956, FRUS: 1955–1957, XXV, pp.266–7.


27. NSC 162, 30 Sept. 1953, FRUS: 1952–1954, II, pp.489–514 (see esp. paras 4a-b, 41–5); for the version approved by President Eisenhower, see NSC 162/2, 30 Oct. 1953, ibid. pp.577–97. Any strategy for Eastern Europe had to be weighed against the administration's own estimate of the importance of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. Ranking Soviet
priorities. NSC 5501 placed holding onto the Eastern European satellites as second only to maintaining the security of the regime and the country’s territorial integrity. In contrast, the goal of spreading international communism throughout the world appeared sixth, and last, in importance. NSC 5501, ‘Basic National Security Policy’, 6 Jan. 1955, in Documents of the National Security Council (Washington, DC: UP of America 1980) microfilm.

28. One of the other important arguments put forward against rollback was that the activities the strategy’s proponents envisioned did not correspond to the nature of the Soviet threat. The chief problem facing the United States, as Dulles noted in Nov. 1954, was ‘the forthcoming achievement of atomic plenty and a nuclear balance of power between the US and the USSR’. He elaborated, ‘Certainly no actions on the periphery of the Soviet Union would stop the growth of the atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union.’ If achievement of the capability were to be stopped, it must be stopped in Russia itself, and this meant action against Russia.’ And the administration had already excluded preventive war from consideration.

These concerns were discussed within high-level government circles during the Project Solarium policy exercise of summer 1953. Task Force A, chaired by George Kennan and charged with advocating the continuation of the containment policies of the Truman administration, raised such objections to the proposals of Task Force C. See ‘A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force “A” of Project Solarium’, 16 July 1953, NSC Minutes, Record Group 273, Records of the National Security Council, National Archives, and also ‘Summary of Points Made in Discussion Following Presentation by Task Forces’, 16 July 1953, FRUS: 1952–1954, II, p.434.


32. This observation is also reflected in another prominent State-Defense argument over the text of NSC 162. The State Dept, joined by the CIA, suggested that the document recognize that the reduction of the Soviet threat could be achieved ‘only through settlements that both the United States and the USSR find it in their interest to accept’. The Defense establishment urged the adoption of a statement that that aim would be achieved ‘only by actions designed to bring about a negotiating attitude in the USSR and its resulting accommodation [sic] to the security of the United States and that of the free world’, NSC 162, p.512. In the following NSC meeting, Dulles argued that ‘we could not reduce tensions with the USSR if in each case we expected to gain all the advantage and the Soviets none. Such settlements, he repeated, must be mutually acceptable’. The Secretary of State was quite insistent on this point and grew progressively more explicit, finally declaring that the Defense proposal would ‘eliminate all hope of settlements in Korea, Austria, Germany, etc.’ Minutes, NSC meeting, 7 Oct. 1953, FRUS: 1952–1954, II, pp.529–30. Despite Dulles’ arguments, the Council, at Eisenhower’s suggestion, side-stepped the debate, including merely the bland recommendation that the United States work to improve the power position of the free world relative to that of the Soviet bloc. NSC 162/2, p. 594.
35. Fuller to Nitze, 4 Sept. 1952, ibid. pp.356–60. Note the use of the language of ‘containment’ in reference to Germany; Germany was perceived as essential to the Western defense against the Soviet Union but also as a potential threat. Only threats, not friends, must be ‘contained’.


40. Robert V. Daniels (ed.) A Documentary History of Communism and the World, 3rd ed, (Hanover, NH: UP of New England 1994) p.126. The quote appears in the context of a passage in which Stalin argued that war among capitalist countries was inevitable, whereas the socialist Soviet Union had pursued a policy of peace and could avoid involvement in capitalist wars.

41. In Feb. 1954, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov discussed Germany, NATO, and the EDC. Molotov told Eden that ‘from past experience, [the] USSR had good cause to be suspicious of Germany. Eden countered by saying Adenauer was a wise man who would not lead Germany back on [the] path of militarism. Molotov nodded reflectively but said Adenauer was old and would not live long.’ US Berlin Conference Delegation to Stare, 3 Feb. 1954, FRUS: 1952–1954, VII, p.937. Similarly, Averell Harriman recalled a conversation with Khrushchev: ‘And Khrushchev said, “Oh, I know Adenauer would never engage in war.” He’d just called him a warmonger I think, but he said, “I know Adenauer would never get into a war, but who know who will succeed Adenauer – what their attitudes will be?” What will be the attitude of Germany, if Strauss becomes Chancellor?’ Harriman commented that the Russians were always afraid of German revanchism. Harriman memoir, Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton U.


49. This sort of thinking is reflected in documents regarding aid to the nationalist communist Gomulka government in Poland. See Embassy in Poland to Department of State, 6 Nov. 1956, ibid. pp.409–14.

50. It is also possible that Eisenhower administration policymakers perceived the connection between the physical security of the United States and the preservation of civil liberties at home. Living during Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anticommunist reign of terror, they saw how fear of the Soviet Union and global communism could permit the suppression of much political opinion in the name of national security. Fred I. Greenstein’s The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (NY: Basic Books 1982) has shown that Eisenhower attempted to utilize his leadership skills to minimize and eventually eliminate McCarthy’s influence. Assuming that policymakers believed that the promotion of democracy would enhance American security, then their support for the emergence of democratic states in
Eastern Europe was probably also motivated by the desire to preserve domestic freedoms.
