INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:
A SURVEY OF THE FIELD

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Class: Monday, 1:30 pm – 3:20 pm,
Location: 1450 Social Sciences
Office Hours: Wednesday, 10 am – 12 pm,
or by appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION
As its title suggests, this course is designed to guide students through the literature of one of international relations’ major “sub-subfields”: international security. It is intended primarily for graduate students in the Department of Political Science, though others are welcome to attend, with the instructor’s permission. Four caveats:

1. As this literature is immense and ever-expanding, any course of this nature can only be a survey, hoping to whet your appetite for further exploration. It must make difficult choices, and numerous topics have received less than their full due—including, among others, theories related to individual causes of war (sociobiology and ethology, Freudian psychology, personality); war termination; grand strategy and military doctrine; military intervention, humanitarian and otherwise; arms racing and crisis escalation; enduring rivalries; and economic interdependence.

2. This course is theoretical in orientation, and, with only the occasional exception, we will not focus on explaining the origins or consequences of particular wars or particular uses of force.

3. In part because realists have historically dominated the subfield of international security, the course’s readings are somewhat biased toward the realist perspective—though I have sought to include a fair number of readings partial to other approaches.

4. This course also focuses largely on more traditional questions of international security. That is certainly not meant to suggest that “new” security issues have no place in the field or that I as the instructor do not have interest in them. Just the opposite. But much of this recent exciting work either draws on older theoretical apparatuses and debates or consciously positions itself in contrast to them, and one can fully appreciate the moves being made only if one has a strong grasp of the foundations. Moreover, other graduate seminars regularly offered in the Department of Political Science and across the University—such as, Human Rights or Causes of Civil and Ethnic Conflict—devote their entire syllabi to such subjects, and I have sought to minimize overlap as much as possible.
WRITING ASSIGNMENTS
All students taking this course will be expected to complete five writing assignments.

1. **Two (2) Reaction Pieces** (3-4 pp.). These reaction pieces are an opportunity for you to try out new ideas in a less formal, more idiosyncratic format. And, because they will not be graded (except as part of your class participation grade), you can do so with little risk. So be adventurous.
   - Seminar members will be asked to commit at the beginning of the term to write a reaction piece for two different weeks.
   - Each reaction piece will be due by 6 p.m. on the Sunday before the seminar meets and will be circulated by e-mail to seminar members.
   - Writers of reaction pieces will deliver a brief presentation (5-7 minutes) to help kick off our discussion.

2. **Research Proposal** (5 pp.). This may be on any topic of interest to you that falls within the broad purview of international security. If the relevant readings do not appear on this syllabus, please clear the topic with me before you delve into it too deeply. The research proposal should follow the following format:
   a. **Question and Issue**: What are you proposing to investigate, and why should anyone care? (You might build a very brief literature review into this section.)
   b. **Hypotheses and Tentative Argument**: What are potential answers to this question, and which seems likely to prove most useful/insightful/revealing/correct (pick your epistemological stance)?
   c. **Research Plan**: Were you to write a fully fleshed out research paper, what evidence would you use to test your hypotheses/illustrate your argument/demonstrate the explanatory value of your model? Make sure you explain how you would know if you were wrong.
   - The research proposal must be circulated to all seminar members (and me) by 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 2. We will meet in small groups (depending on the seminar’s final size) during that week to review each other’s research proposals.

3. **Book Review** (6-7 pp.). The required readings are often followed by recommended readings. Pick a book from the recommended reading list or elsewhere (either way: clear it with me first!!), read it carefully, and subject its theoretical logic and empirical evidence to close scrutiny. While any good book review will of necessity summarize the book’s central arguments, the book review should focus on tearing apart the author’s logic, her theoretical silences, and whether the author’s evidence proves/supports her argument.
   - The book review must be on a topic unrelated to the research proposal (see above) or the literature review (described below).
   - The book review may be handed in any time before the Friday of exam week.
   (Note: Since the literature review is also due by that date, I urge you to submit the book review earlier in the term.)

4. **Literature Review** (12-15 pp.). The literature review should be a critical review of the literature on a well-defined theoretical question relating to war, peace, and security. The required and optional readings from the relevant section of the syllabus will in many cases serve as a useful guide to the literature on any given topic, but please consult me for suggestions as to possible additions to the list (if the list on the syllabus is short). Do not assume that you have adequately covered a particular topic for your review if you have read all the items in a particular section of the syllabus. You are welcome to pursue a subject not found on this syllabus, but then the burden on you, to discover what literature is appropriate, is obviously
far greater (though I will gladly help as much as possible). A good literature review should aim to do the following:

a. … summarize the literature on the topic and also organize it in some coherent way—preferably around a useful typology or theoretical theme, not around a succession of books and articles.

b. … identify the theoretical questions that this literature attempts to answer, explain the key concepts and causal arguments, and note some of the empirical research that bears on these theoretical propositions.

c. … identify the logical inconsistencies, broader analytical limitations, and unanswered questions of the leading scholarship.

d. … in its conclusion, suggest fruitful areas for subsequent research.

N.B. Unfortunately, because this is only the second time I have taught this course, I do not have a sample paper, written for me, that clarifies my expectations. But most of the literature reviews assigned as reading in this course are exemplary models that you might follow. And I will make available the literature review that Prof. Jack Levy (Rutgers University)—a master of the form—distributes to students in his graduate seminars.

• Authors of literature reviews will be responsible for delivering a short presentation (around 10 minutes) on the week that we will be discussing their chosen topic (or on the week most closely related to their chosen topic).

• The literature review may be handed in any time before the Friday of exam week.

• The selection of topics will help shape the schedule of class presentations, so please come to my office hours (or contact me by email) during the second week of classes to discuss your literature review topic and secure my approval.

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**GRADING**

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<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Class Participation (incl. 2 response pieces and presentations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research Proposal</td>
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<td>Book Review</td>
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<td>Literature Review</td>
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**READINGS**

The following books have been ordered for purchase at the University bookstore in the Coffman Memorial Union. You are not expected to purchase them all: use your judgment. Copies of these books have (whenever possible) also been placed in the 8402 drawer in the 12th floor lounge.

• Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (Random House, 2005).
• Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale UP, 1966).

Other readings may be found in one of two places:

- *On-line.* Most articles are available on-line. To find the on-line article most easily, type the journal title into the search engine at: http://www.lib.umn.edu/articles/ej.phtml, and then click on the appropriate resource.

- *Twelfth-floor Graduate Lounge.* All articles and essays not available in one of the required books (including those available on-line) will be made available in the 12th floor graduate lounge. As always, you may borrow the 12th floor copies for a short time. If you wish to copy these texts, you must (a) **sign them out** and (b) **return them as soon as possible**. If you wish to read these texts without photocopying them, do so in the graduate lounge only. Do not mark-up, bend, or staple the materials. Be considerate to your fellow seminar members.

**BACKGROUND READINGS**

While there are no specific course prerequisites, it is assumed that students have basic familiarity with theories of international politics. Those who have taken “the core” (POL 8401) will be well prepared. All (including those who have taken 8401) would be well served to have read Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (W.W. Norton, 1997), which clearly explores the various forms and implications of the three major theoretical traditions in IR (realism, liberalism, and Marxism).

While this course is more theoretically oriented, history is its proving ground, and empirical questions will be raised and addressed both in the assigned texts and in seminar discussions. For useful background sources on the history of war, strategy, and great power politics, consult the following:

CLASS SCHEDULE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS

* = required reading
§ = highly recommended reading
(Translation: I would have assigned it if I were not already assigning you too much reading. But if you have not read it yet, you eventually should.)

Guide to Journal Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>AJPS</th>
<th>American Journal of Political Science</th>
<th>ISQ</th>
<th>International Studies Quarterly</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARPS</td>
<td>Annual Review of Political Science</td>
<td>JCR</td>
<td>Journal of Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>APSR</td>
<td>American Political Science Review</td>
<td>PoP</td>
<td>Perspectives on Politics</td>
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<td>EJIR</td>
<td>European Journal of Int’l Relations</td>
<td>RIS</td>
<td>Review of International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>World Politics</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>International Security</td>
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Jan. 23

Introduction: Security, Strategy, and the Uses of Force

* What is Security?


The Nature of Strategy
* Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP, 1976) p. 75 (s. 2), pp. 80-81 (s. 11), pp. 86-88 (s. 23-26), pp. 605-610.

The Uses of Force
I. Causes of War and Peace

Jan. 30

Ia. The System: Anarchy, the Distribution of Power, Geography, etc.

NB: This week overlaps greatly with many readings you have done or will do in the IR core, POL 8401. The reading assignments presume your familiarity with basic realist arguments about the nature of international anarchy and the workings of the balance of power. For those less familiar with these arguments, the Levy reading will be quite helpful, though now a bit dated; read also Brooks 1997 and Taliaferro 2000/2001 under “Offensive and Defensive Realism” to supplement.

The reading load is unusually heavy this week. Guidance: read at least the Levy overview and the sections on balancing failures, questioning neorealist logic, and the rationalist approach to war. If time permits, read others.

* Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (Columbia UP, 1954).

Balancing: Logic and Evidence

◆ Both the Mearsheimer and the Waltz are essential structural realist readings. If you have not read them before, you should do so soon. ◆

Why States Fail to Balance

Offensive and Defensive Realism

If you have already read Jervis 1978, read Brooks 1997 for an excellent discussion of these two varieties of realist logic.


Rising Powers, Declining Powers, and War

Gilpin’s seminal book is a classic and deserves a read under any number of categories. Many of those who call themselves neo-classical realists were inspired by Gilpin’s rich and decidedly unscientific text. Copeland’s book is an effort to think about preventive war more systematically.


Offense-Defense Theory

Offense-defense theory derives from Jervis 1978. Van Evera’s article and book are a good example of how far offense-defense theory can be taken (and how loosely it can be understood). Lieber’s article and book and the Shimshoni article are fine critiques. I, for one, am tired of this literature, but good portions of the field continue to mine it.


*Questioning Neorealist Logic*

I presume you have read at least Wendt’s seminal article(s) and thus grasp the basic constructivist point. Milner’s critique of the logic of anarchy is an excellent one from a liberal perspective. The Weldes essay is an impressive examples of critical constructivist scholarship, with implicit critiques of realist logic.


* R. Harrison Wagner, “What was Bipolarity?” *IO* 47:1 (winter 1993) pp. 77-106.


*Rationality, Bargaining, and War*

Depending on how one understands the logic of neorealism, rationality may or may not be essential to the theoretical framework’s operation. But rationalist literature on war has exploded in the last 20 years, with Fearon 1995 particularly important. Reiter 2003 is a good review essay, and Gartzke 1999 an important comment on this literature. The Fearon essay is, however, a good place to start to understand how rationalist scholars approach the phenomenon of war.


February 6

Ib. Between State and System:
Security Institutions—Alliances, Security Communities, IOs

Alliances: Origins and Effects

* I presume most of you have read Mearsheimer 1994 elsewhere. Walt 1987 is an important work, but its realist logic is fairly straightforward, with the innovative move being the replacement of power with threat. Barnett 1996 is a good application of Wendtian constructivist logic to the Middle East.


Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Cornell UP, 1997).


IO 59:4 (fall 2005), special issue on international institutions and socialization in Europe and beyond.
Security Communities and Regimes
  [recommended: chapter 12-13 and at least one of the empirical chapters]
Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies* (Princeton UP, 1995);

The United Nations
  NB: We will explore peacekeeping and intervention later in the term.

Collective Security
Feb. 13

Iia. Regime Type: The Democratic Peace

NB: The reading this week seems far heavier than it actually is. Focus on the theoretical arguments and on the kinds of empirical evidence presented. No need to get bogged down in the details of the cases, unless you happen to be interested in them.


The Democratic Peace: Yes!

* The essays by Doyle in Brown 1996 are the seminal readings of the contemporary debate on the Democratic Peace. Owen is a good statement of the normative dyadic democratic peace argument, and Lipson and Schultz epitomize the rationalist tradition. Again, move quickly through the empirical material, focusing on the theoretical logic.

* Michael Brown, ed., Debating the Democratic Peace (MIT Press, 1996) essays by Doyle (3-58) and Owen (116-156); skim the two essays by Russett.


John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War (Cornell UP, 1997).


The Democratic/Liberal Peace: The Skeptics Reply


* Rebuttals by the Believers


* The Democratic Peace, With a Twist


Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, eds., *Democracy, Liberalism, and War* (Lynne Rienner, 2001).
Feb. 20

Ilb. Domestic Sources of Security Policy

* Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell UP, 1991) pp. 1-65, 305-322. Read a case study, if you are so inclined.

(Snyder and Mansfield, “Democratization and War,” belongs here as well)

* Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia UP, 1996) esp. chapters by Elizabeth Kier (pp. 186-215), Iain Johnston (pp. 216-268), and Thomas Berger (pp. 317-356).


**Bureaucratic Politics**


David A. Welch, “The Organizational and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect And Prospect,” *IS* 17 (fall 1992) pp. 112-146.


**Civil-Military Relations**


Feb. 27

III. Psychological Approaches: Group and Individual
* Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (University of Michigan Press, 1999) chapters 1 (pp. 3-8), 5-12 (pp. 63-193).
  OR: What can game theory tell us about things it should have no business telling us much about?
  {If you are so inclined, you may also skim chapters 2-4 and 13 (esp. pp. 216-225, 233-239).}

§ Rose McDermott, Political Psychology and International Relations (University of Michigan Press, 2004).
Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (University of Michigan Press, 1997).
II. Coercion: Theory, Instruments, Alternatives

Mar. 6

Deterrence and Compellence (Conventional and Nuclear)

The Theory of Coercion

Nuclear Deterrence and Compellence, Theory and History

McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (Vintage, 1988).

Critiques of Deterrence Theory
* Jennifer Milliken, “Metaphors of Prestige and Reputation in American Foreign Policy and American Realism,” in Francis A. Beer, and Robert Hariman,


Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton UP, 1994) part 3.


The Rational Deterrence Debate


Deterrence: An Empirical Debate


Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (Yale UP, 1988).
Some Cases of Extended Deterrence and Compellence
Jutta Welde, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

Mar. 20 Playing Nice, Reassurance, Engagement: Appeasement by any other name…?
Mar. 27  
Military Strategy and Effectiveness  
The Revolution in Military Affairs


Roundtable review of Military Power, with essays by Eliot Cohen, Lawrence Freedman, Stephen Rosen, and Martin van Creveld, as well as a reply by Biddle, in the *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28:3 (June 2004) pp. 413-469.


Apr. 3  
Research Design Paper Due By *6 p.m., Sunday, April 2*

* The paper should be circulated by email to all seminar members by 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 2. Small group meetings (or the seminar as a whole, depending on the seminar’s final size) will be scheduled for the week of Monday, April 3, to review each other’s research proposals. *
III. Enduring, yet Contemporary, Concerns

Apr. 10 The Ethics of Force

* Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (Basic Books, 1977) especially chapters 1-5, 7-10, 12, 16-19 (but you are encouraged to read it all). [any edition is acceptable]

Apr. 17  Terrorism

* Bruce Hoffmann, *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia UP, 1998) chapters 1, 5-7 (pp. 13-44, 131-205). For good historical background, you can skim chapters 2-4.


Mia Bloom, *Dying To Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (Columbia UP, 2005).


Apr. 24  Globalization and Security


May 1 Peacekeeping, Intervention, and Occupation


May 8 Pressing Questions

1. *Is the World Pushing Back? Does It Matter?*

2. *Is War Obsolete?*


Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” *IS* 15:3 (winter 1990/91) pp. 7-57.


3. *What are the Implications of China’s Rise?*


(For a constructivist perspective, review Lynch article on engagement with China.)


Recommended: Economic Interdependence

We simply do not have enough time to cover all topics of interest. One of the most venerable hypotheses in the literature on the causes of war, also located somewhere between system and state, is that suggesting that increasing economic interdependence dampens the likelihood of war. We read a bit of this in the week on globalization, but really just skim the surface. Suggested readings follow.

Recommended: War Termination

After spending so much time on the causes of war, it seems incongruous not to spend any time on the implications of the conduct of war or on how wars end (or, as it has sometimes been put, on how peace breaks out). Oddly political scientists have rarely devoted much attention to either question, though there are emerging fascinating literatures in each. Recommended readings on war termination follow, including some readings on a case—the end of the Cold War.

Theoretical Readings
• Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (Columbia UP, 1971).
• Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (Columbia UP, 1971).
• Hein Goemans, War and Punishment (Princeton UP, 2000).

The Debate Over the End of the Cold War
• Nina Tannenwald and William Wohlforth, eds., Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War, special issue of the Journal of Cold War Studies 7:2 (spring 2005).
Recommended: Coercive Diplomacy

More Theoretical Discussions

Debating Airpower
Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Cornell UP, 1996).

A Case: Kosovo 1999
Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Brookings, 2000).
Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (RAND, 2001).
Recommended: Alternatives to Force: Economic Statecraft


Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions”